State Ex Rel. Little v. Martin

Decision Date06 May 1893
Citation33 P. 9,51 Kan. 462
PartiesTHE STATE OF KANSAS, on the relation of John T. Little, Attorney General, v. EDWARD L. MARTIN et al
CourtKansas Supreme Court
Original Proceeding in Quo Warranto.

THIS is an original proceeding in the nature of quo warranto, brought in the name of the state by the attorney general, questioning the right of the Union Terminal Railway Company and the other defendants to use and enjoy the powers, privileges and franchises of a railway corporation, and for an ouster from the exercise of such powers, privileges, and franchises. In his petition, the attorney general alleges that

"1. On December 29, 1891, the defendants, Edward L. Martin Arthur E. Stilwell, Arthur A. Mosher, and James H. Pickering of Kansas City, Mo., and Omar D. Hall, Wm. Thompson, and J Jay Spencer, of Kansas City, Kan., associated themselves together with a view of filing a charter and forming a corporation under the laws of the state of Kansas, and on said day they caused to be filed in the office of the secretary of state of the state of Kansas an instrument intended as a charter, in which they named as directors for the first year themselves, and also Edward P. Merwin, of New York city, and William S. Taylor, then of Philadelphia, Pa but now of Kansas City, Mo., and the name of the proposed corporation was therein stated to be 'The Union Terminal Railroad Company,' with an authorized capital stock of $ 2,000,000, divided into shares of $ 100 each, and its declared purpose was as follows, to wit: 'This company is formed to acquire by purchase or lease, or to construct, maintain, and operate, a standard-gauge railroad for the transportation of persons and property, by the use of steam or other motive power, from a point on the north side of the Kansas river opposite the city of Argentine, in the county of Wyandotte, in the state of Kansas, in a northwesterly direction, by the most convenient and practicable route, to a point at or near the Missouri river; thence along and down the valley of the Missouri, and up the valley of the Kansas river, to the place of beginning; so as to substantially encircle the city of Kansas City, Kan., in said county of Wyandotte. Also, to acquire, by purchase or lease, or to construct, maintain and operate such branch or branches, or spur or spurs, as may be necessary for the business of said company, to enable it to make connection with the Consolidated Terminal Railway Company, now constructing a road in the state of Missouri, at or near the state line between Missouri and Kansas, where said Consolidated Terminal railway intersects the state line, at or near the confluence of the Kansas and Missouri rivers; or with any other railroad or roads with which it may desire to connect. The main line of the company's road will be about 22 miles in length, and the main spur will run from a point at or near where the Consolidated Terminal railway intersects the state line, up the valley of the Missouri and Kansas, to a point where Ohio avenue (old Second street) extended would intersect the river; thence across the Kansas river, and by the shortest and most practicable route, to this company's main line.' The route of said proposed road was not defined otherwise than as above shown, and the places from and to which the road was intended to be run were not named, and they did not and do not appear, unless it be by the designation of a circle around a single city and a spur therefrom to the state line.

"2. Soon after the filing of said instrument, the defendant Edward L. Martin was, in some manner to the relator unknown, designated as president, and the said William S. Taylor in like manner as secretary, and they have ever since assumed to act as such.

"3. Although the declared purpose of the proposed corporation was to build a circular railroad around Kansas City, Kan., yet such was not and is not the real purpose of the defendants; but the said Edward L. Martin and William S. Taylor were and are president and secretary, respectively, of the Consolidated Terminal Railway Company, a Missouri corporation, and the said Edward L. Martin was and is president of the Kansas City Suburban Belt Railway Company, a Missouri corporation; both of said Missouri corporations being managed by the persons named as defendants as one interest, owning railroad tracks not exceeding 12 miles in length and partly encircling Kansas City, Mo., which is contiguous to Kansas City, Kan.; and said Missouri corporations desired and intended only to build a spur from the proposed end of their track at the state line, westerly a short distance in the direction of Argentine, Kan., about five miles from said starting point, to be used in connection with said tracks in Missouri, and for that purpose the persons named as defendants caused said instrument called a charter to be filed in the office of the secretary of state of the state of Kansas.

"4. The said Missouri corporations were organized for the purpose of doing a general switching and transfer business in car-load lots from one railroad to another, at Kansas City, Mo., and transferring cars from elevators and other industries to railroad companies for transportation, and in delivering cars for railroad companies received on their respective lines to such elevators and industries, and for the purpose of leasing certain parts of their tracks to railroad companies for terminal facilities, and said Missouri corporations are doing such business exclusively, all compensation for such switching business being paid by the several railroad companies employing them; and said Missouri corporations, although they have been transacting business for several years, have no route, nor tracks, nor stations, nor depots, nor rolling stock, nor facilities for transacting the usual and ordinary business of a railroad corporation as a common carrier in transporting passengers and property from place to place, nor for transporting property for all persons indifferently, in quantities great or small, at certain rates based upon tonnage and distance; and said Missouri corporations are not adapted nor intended for carrying on such usual and ordinary business of railroad corporations, but only for doing a switching business for railroad companies, at certain rates per car as a switching charge, and for leasing certain parts of their tracks to railroad companies for terminal facilities; and the railroad track proposed by said so-called 'Union Terminal Railroad Company' was and is intended to form a part of said Missouri system for switching and terminals, and for no other purpose, and if such track shall be completed, it will be adapted to no other use or purpose.

"5. The said The Union Terminal Railroad Company is not a duly-chartered and organized railway corporation, and, although stock has been issued for the full amount named in said instrument called a charter, yet no share thereof has ever been legitimately issued nor paid for, but the same has been donated to certain persons and corporations expected to take first-mortgage bonds, which have already been issued to the amount of $ 2,000,000 on the proposed railroad, although such bonds have not been paid for; and the association of such persons named as defendants, and the said proposed corporation as a railway corporation, were and are unauthorized by law, and the organization of said persons as a railway corporation is fraudulent and void.

"6. Notwithstanding the foregoing facts, said persons named as defendants, without being legally incorporated, have acted within the county of Wyandotte and state of Kansas as a railway corporation, under the name of 'The Union Terminal Railroad Company' aforesaid, and under that name have usurped and assumed to and are exercising the power of eminent domain by the condemnation of real property in Wyandotte county for a right-of-way for a proposed railroad track, and by the crossing in Kansas of rights-of-way and tracks of railroad corporations, although said power has not been conferred by law upon said persons nor upon the said pretended railway corporation designated as 'The Union Terminal Railroad Company.'"

The prayer of the petition is, that the defendants be required to answer

"By what warrant they claim to have, use and enjoy the powers, liberties, privileges and franchises of a railway corporation, and especially the transcendent power of eminent domain, and that they be forever ousted from the exercise of such usurped powers, liberties, privileges, and franchises, and for such other relief as may be proper in the premises."

The defendants demurred to the petition, upon the ground that it did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against them or either of them, and that its averments were not sufficient in law to require them to make answer thereto. The cause was submitted upon the petition and demurrer.

John T. Little, attorney general, for The State; Frank Doster, and David Martin, of counsel.

A general demurrer is interposed to plaintiff's petition, which raises only the question whether the petition does or does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. We contend as follows:

I. An enterprise such as that described in paragraphs one and four of the petition could not be incorporated as a railway company under the laws of this state.

II. The power of eminent domain could not be conferred upon such an enterprise.

III. The defendant company is not a "duly chartered and organized railway corporation," within the meaning of P 1390, General Statutes of 1889, and therefore cannot exercise the power of eminent domain, nor the right given to railroad corporations to cross the tracks of each other.

IV. The organization of the defendant company as a...

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    ... ... 544; Chouteau v. Railroad ... Co., 122 Mo. 375; State ex rel. v. Railroad ... Co., 207 Mo. 103; Kellogg v. Malin, 50 Mo ... Louisville, etc., ... Co., 102 Tenn. 124; State ex rel. v. Martin, 51 ... Kan. 462. (d) Plaintiff cannot possibly be concerned except ... ...
  • Bridwell v. Gate City Terminal Co.
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    • 1 de março de 1907
    ...Law, 217, 26 Am.St.Rep. 421; Niemeyer v. Little Rock Ry., 43 Ark. 111; Collier v. Union Ry. Co., 83 S.W. 155, 113 Tenn. 96; State v. Martin, 33 P. 9, 51 Kan. 462; Branch Com'rs v. West End R. R. Co., 29 N. J. 566; National Docks R. R. Co. v. Central R. R. Co., 32 N.J.Eq. 755, 766. While the......
  • Bridwell v. Gate City Terminal Co
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    • 1 de março de 1907
    ...217, 26 Am. St. Rep. 421; Niemeyer v. Little Rock Ry., 43 Ark. 111; Collier v. Union Ry. Co., 83 S. W. 155, 113 Tenn. 96: State v. Martin, 33 Pac. 9, 51 Kan. 462; Long Branch Com'rs v. West End R. R. Co., 29 N. J. 566; National Docks R. I. Co. v. Central R. R. Co., 32 N. J. Eq. 755, 766. Wh......
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