State ex rel. Lockhart v. Armistead

• Decision Date: 10 October 1977
• Docket Number: No. 59665,59665
• Parties: STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Major Field LOCKHART, Relator, v. T. N. ARMISTEAD, Superintendent, East Louisiana State Hospital, Respondent.
• Court: Louisiana Supreme Court

Page 496

351 So.2d 496

STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Major Field LOCKHART, Relator, v. T. N. ARMISTEAD, Superintendent, East Louisiana State

Hospital, Respondent.

No. 59665.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Oct. 10, 1977.

Rehearing Denied Nov. 11, 1977.

R. James Kellogg, American Civil Liberties Union of La., Inc., New Orleans, for plaintiff-relator.

William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Barbara Rutledge, Thomas S. Halligan, A. Mills McCawley, Asst. Attys. Gen., Henry N. Brown, Jr., Dist. Atty., James S. Harris, Asst. Dist. Atty., for defendant-respondent.

TATE, Justice.

In 1975, Lockhart was committed to a state mental institution upon a finding that he lacked mental capacity to assist his counsel in the defense of criminal charges. La.C.Cr.P. art. 648 (1975). His petition of habeas corpus was denied by the trial court.

We granted certiorari to consider whether Lockhart's continued confinement by virtue of Article 648 violates due process protections afforded him by our state and federal constitutions. 345 So.2d 898 (La.1977). This proceeding raises the constitutional due process issue:

Once it has been determined that a person by reason of a permanent mental defect lacks capacity to prepare his defense to criminal charges, may the state nevertheless continue confinement or restraint of this person solely on account of such mental incapacity?

Under Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 92 S.Ct. 1845, 32 L.Ed.2d 435 (1972), a negative answer is required, and we order the petitioner released.

(1)

Lockhart was charged by information with simple burglary. A sanity commission appointed to examine him found "he presently lacks the capacity to understand the proceedings against him, or to assist in his defense." In view of this finding, the trial judge committed Lockhart on July 14, 1975, to the East Louisiana State Hospital at Jackson "until such time as those authorities find him capable of understanding the proceedings against him and capable of assisting in his defense."

During the next fourteen months, Lockhart was examined on several occasions by neurologists who determined that he suffered from atherosclerosis with cerebral infarction. In a letter to the trial judge on September 29, 1976, the hospital superintendent reported: "The damage resulting from the multiple cerebral infarcts is considered permanent and irreversible." This affliction rendered Lockhart physically unable to communicate, and the medical staff considered it probable that he would not improve.

Despite this diagnosis, Lockhart was not released.

A petition for habeas corpus was filed in his behalf on March 9, 1977. This petition was dismissed on March 28, 1977.

(2)

Lockhart was committed under the authority of La.C.Cr.P. art. 648 A. In pertinent part, this provides: "If the court determines that the defendant lacks the mental capacity to proceed, the proceedings shall be suspended and the court shall commit the defendant to a proper . . . mental institution . . . for custody, care, and treatment for as long as the lack of capacity continues."

This provision is quite similar to an Indiana statute which was declared unconstitutional in its application, Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 92 S.Ct. 1845, 32 L.Ed.2d 435 (1972). The Indiana statute provided that "if the court shall find that the defendant has not comprehension sufficient to understand the proceedings and make his defense, the court shall order the defendant committed . . ." This confinement shall end "(w)henever the defendant shall become sane." See Ind.Code 35-5-3-2 (1971).

In Jackson, the petitioner was a deaf mute who, like Lockhart, had very little communicative ability. After being charged with two robberies, he was found incompetent to stand trial and was thus committed to a mental institution. The medical evidence indicated that the possibility of his ever gaining competence was quite bleak. Jackson therefore argued that his commitment was tantamount to a life sentence, and that he was thereby deprived of his liberty without due process of law.

In Jackson, the court held that due process requires there be a reasonable relationship between the purpose behind the commitment and the nature and duration of that commitment. 406 U.S. 736-38, 92 S.Ct. 1857-58.

In holding that Jackson's confinement denied him due process, the court stated, 406 U.S. 738, 92 S.Ct. 1858: "* * * a person charged by a State with a criminal offense who is committed solely on account of his incapacity to proceed to trial cannot be held more than the reasonable period of time necessary to determine whether there is a substantial probability that he will attain that capacity in the foreseeable future. If it is determined that this is not the case, then the State must either institute the customary civil commitment proceeding that would be required to commit indefinitely any other citizen, or release the defendant. Furthermore, even if it is determined that the defendant probably soon will be able to stand trial, his continued commitment must be justified by progress toward that goal."

Measured by this constitutional standard enunciated by Jackson, Lockhart's continued confinement clearly violates due process. Lockhart was held in a mental institution almost two years, despite the finding after one year that his condition would not improve. It is unnecessary for us to determine what time limits for commitment will comport with due process; it is sufficient to decide today that Lockhart's confinement exceeded the "reasonable period" envisioned by Jackson.

Accordingly, we hold that the state failed to afford Lockhart due process of law, when it continued to hold him under criminal commitment long after it became clear that he would not attain competence to stand trial.

(3)

We should note that the Louisiana statute...