State ex rel. A.M.D.
| Decision Date | 09 November 2006 |
| Docket Number | No. 20060337-CA.,20060337-CA. |
| Citation | 2006 UT App 457,153 P.3d 724 |
| Parties | STATE of Utah, in the interest of A.M.D., a person under eighteen years of age. A.M.W., Appellant, v. S.D., Appellee. |
| Court | Utah Court of Appeals |
Elizabeth A. Hruby-Mills, Michael K. Woolley, Richards Brandt Miller & Nelson, and Melissa A. Patten-Greene, Salt Lake City, for Appellant.
Sharon S. Sipes, Law Office of Sharon Sipes PC, Ogden, and James H. Woodall, South Jordan, for Appellee.
Martha Pierce and Brent J. Newton, Salt Lake City, Guardians Ad Litem.
Before Judges BENCH, BILLINGS, and DAVIS.
¶ 1 A.M.W. (Mother) appeals the Third District Juvenile Court's (juvenile court) order terminating her parental rights in her daughter, A.M.D., a minor child. We affirm.
¶ 2 Mother and S.D. (Father) met in 1999 while attending a substance abuse program. The couple became romantically involved, and in August 2000, A.M.D. was born. Mother and Father raised A.M.D. together until they separated in 2002. At that time, the Third District Court (district court) awarded Mother and Father joint legal and physical custody of A.M.D.
¶ 3 In 2004, the district court modified its custody order and entered a decree of paternity awarding Father primary custody of A.M.D. Mother's visitation rights were subject to drug testing, as her substance abuse had become increasingly severe. Initially Mother complied with the drug testing requirements. However, when Father became suspicious that Mother was tampering with the drug tests and requested observed urine testing, Mother refused to comply. Mother subsequently entered another substance abuse program, but relapsed into drug use soon after her discharge. Mother admitted that from February 2005 to July 2005 her "constant" abuse of methamphetamines, pills, and alcohol was "out of control." As a result of Mother's failure to comply with the paternity decree's drug testing requirements, she has not seen A.M.D. since January 2005.
¶ 4 On February 28, 2005, Father petitioned the juvenile court for termination of Mother's parental rights. This prompted Mother to enter a long-term, inpatient rehabilitation program, where she remained throughout the litigation. Mother moved to consolidate the juvenile court proceeding with the proceeding in the district court. Mother later moved the juvenile court to allow her expert, Dr. Debra Quackenbush, to conduct an updated evaluation of the relationship between A.M.D. and Mother. The juvenile court denied both motions, but stated in its order that Dr. Quackenbush would be permitted to testify at trial as to whether termination of Mother's parental rights would be in A.M.D.'s best interests.
¶ 5 At trial, Mother testified about her history of substance abuse, her emotional absence from A.M.D., her placing A.M.D. at physical risk, and the devastating effects these events have had on A.M.D. Mother also called Dr. Quackenbush as a witness, but the juvenile court prevented Dr. Quackenbush from testifying on the ultimate issue of whether termination was in A.M.D.'s best interests, and from answering certain hypothetical questions. However, the juvenile court did receive, through a letter admitted into evidence, expert opinion regarding the best interests of A.M.D. from Mother's second expert, Ms. Susan Mitchell.
¶ 6 The juvenile court permitted Father's expert, Ms. Terry Begay, to testify despite her inadvertent violation of a witness exclusionary order requested by Mother at the outset of trial. Ms. Begay testified on the ultimate issue and answered hypothetical questions. At the conclusion of trial, the juvenile court terminated Mother's parental rights. Mother appeals.
¶ 7 Mother first argues that the juvenile court erred by failing to communicate with the district court regarding that court's custody proceeding. She believes that rule 100 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure required communication between the two courts regarding consolidation of the two cases. See Utah R. Civ. P. 100. "[T]he interpretation of a rule of procedure is a question of law that we review for correctness." Brown v. Glover, 2000 UT 89, ¶ 15, 16 P.3d 540.
¶ 8 Next, Mother asserts that the juvenile court erred in its rulings regarding her expert witness, Dr. Quackenbush. First, Mother claims the court's refusal to allow Dr. Quackenbush to testify on the ultimate issue—the best interests of A.M.D.—violated rule 704 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. See Utah R. Evid. 704(a). Second, Mother contends that the juvenile court wrongly denied Dr. Quackenbush the opportunity to answer hypothetical questions. In addition, Mother challenges the juvenile court's ruling precluding Dr. Quackenbush from conducting an updated assessment of the relationship between Mother and A.M.D. "[T]rial courts have wide discretion in determining the admissibility of expert testimony." State v. Kelley, 2000 UT 41, ¶ 11, 1 P.3d 546. Accordingly, "absent a clear abuse of this discretion, [we] will not reverse the trial court's determination." Id. We also review the juvenile court's order denying the updated assessment for abuse of discretion.
¶ 9 Mother's third argument is that the juvenile court erred by permitting Father's expert, Ms. Begay, to testify despite her inadvertent violation of the witness exclusionary order. See Utah R. Evid. 615. State v. Rangel, 866 P.2d 607, 613 (Utah Ct.App.1993).
¶ 10 Finally, Mother urges that the combination of the alleged errors warrants reversal under the cumulative error doctrine. "Under the cumulative error doctrine, we will reverse only if the cumulative effect of the several errors undermines our confidence . . . that a fair trial was had." State v. Kohl, 2000 UT 35, ¶ 25, 999 P.2d 7 (quotations and citation omitted).
¶ 11 The juvenile court terminated Mother's parental rights because it concluded that Father had demonstrated by "clear and convincing evidence" that Mother was unfit and termination was in A.M.D.'s best interests. Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-406(3) (Supp.2004). Mother claims that the juvenile court erred in several of its rulings during the termination proceeding, each of which we discuss in turn.
¶ 12 Mother first asserts that rule 100 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, see Utah R. Civ. P. 100(b), required the juvenile court to communicate with the district court regarding the consolidation of the two proceedings. According to Mother, because the district court ruled on the custody issues and the juvenile court ruled on parental rights issues, rule 100 applied below. We disagree.
¶ 13 At the outset, we note that the juvenile court usually has exclusive jurisdiction over "the termination of the legal parent-child relationship." Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-104(1)(g) (Supp.2006). See also In re V.K.S., 2003 UT App 13, ¶ 22 n. 10, 63 P.3d 1284 (). Because the instant case does not involve a contested adoption, the juvenile court had exclusive jurisdiction over the termination proceeding. Rule 100 does not require communication between two courts regarding consolidation when one court does not have proper jurisdiction.
¶ 14 In addition, the plain language of rule 100 indicates that the rule is inapplicable here. See Utah R. Civ. P. 100(b). Rule 100 states, in relevant part,
[t]he judge or commissioner assigned to a case in which child custody, child support[,] or parent time is an issue shall communicate and consult with any other judge or commissioner assigned to any other pending case involving the same issues and the same parties or their children. The objective of the communication is to consider the feasibility of consolidating the cases before one judge or commissioner or of coordinating hearings and orders.
Id. "In interpreting a statute or rule, we examine its plain language and resort to other methods . . . only if the language is ambiguous." Hartford Leasing Corp. v. State, 888 P.2d 694, 701 (Utah Ct.App.1994) (quotations and citation omitted).
¶ 15 In order for rule 100 to require communication between the applicable courts there must be a "pending case involving the same issues and the same parties or their children." Utah R. Civ. P. 100(b). We must determine whether the paternity decree proceeding in the district court dealt with the same issues-child custody, child support, or parent time—as the parental termination proceeding in the juvenile court. We determine it did not.
¶ 16 The paternity proceeding in the district court dealt with child custody and parent time. Utah Code section 30-3-5 granted the district court jurisdiction over child custody, child support, and parent time. See Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(4)-(7) (Supp.2004). Similarly, the district court's paternity decree relies upon numerous other sections of Utah Code dealing specifically with child custody and parent time. See id. § 30-3-32 (Supp.2004) (governing parent time); id. § 30-3-33 (Supp.2004) (); id. § 30-3-35.5 (Supp.2004) ().
¶ 17 On the other hand, the termination proceeding in the juvenile court did not deal with the "same issues" of child custody and parent time, and therefore rule 100 did not apply. See Utah R. Civ. P. 100(b). The termination proceeding focused first on Mother's fitness as a parent, and second on the best interests of A.M.D. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-402 (2002) (...
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Utah Standards of Appellate Review - Third Edition
...court properly denied an updated assessment of the relationship between mother and child. See State ex rel. A.m.D., 2006 UT App 457, ¶ 8, 153 P.3d 724. (7) Whether the juvenile court properly allowed a witness to testify. See State ex rel. A.m.S., 2000 UT App 182, ¶ 16, 4 P.3d 95; State ex ......