State ex rel. Mason v. Burnside, 2007-2084.
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Ohio |
| Citation | 2007 Ohio 6754,881 N.E.2d 224,117 Ohio St.3d 1 |
| Docket Number | No. 2007-2084.,2007-2084. |
| Parties | The STATE ex rel. MASON, Pros. Atty. v. BURNSIDE, Judge. |
| Decision Date | 20 December 2007 |
v.
BURNSIDE, Judge.
William D. Mason, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Lisa Reitz Williamson, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for relator.
Baker & Hostetler, L.L.P., James R. Wooley, and Stephan J. Schlegelmilch, Cleveland, for respondent.
PER CURIAM.
{¶ 1} This is an action for a writ of prohibition to prevent a common pleas court judge from enforcing an order in a capital case requiring the prosecuting attorney to provide all police reports and witness statements to defense counsel. Because the state has an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law by appeal to raise its claim, we grant the judge's motion and dismiss the case.
{¶ 2} Wilson Santiago was indicted on multiple counts, including aggravated murder with capital specifications, for the murder of a Cleveland police detective. Respondent,
Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Judge Janet R. Burnside, is the judge presiding over the criminal case.
{¶ 3} On October 22, 2007, Judge Burnside ordered relator, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney William D. Mason, to "produce copies of (A) all police reports of whatever form, title or description and (B) all witness statements to defense counsel no later than October 25, 2007 at 4:00 p.m." The judge entered this order upon Santiago's motions to assure that defense counsel would receive the same information that the state was willing to provide to the defendant's experts. On. October 24, the state filed a memorandum claiming that the judge had exceeded her authority under Crim.R. 16 by making the discovery order.
{¶ 4} On November 6, Judge Burnside issued a new judgment entry ordering the state to "provide all the police reports and witness statements no later than November 13, 2007 at 4:30 p.m." The judge stated that although the order "contravenes the strict language of Crim.R. 16," because the state had been willing to ignore the rule and provide the same reports to the defense experts, fundamental fairness compelled the disclosure of the reports to defense counsel as well. More specifically, the judge observed that the state's position would cause the ineffective assistance of defense counsel:
{¶ 5} "The unstated premise of this arrangement is that experts hired by defense counsel may not divulge contents of police reports to defense counsel. This places Defendant's counsel in an unenviable and awkward position of possessing less information than their agents, that is, their chosen witnesses. Obvious difficulties are seen with this arrangement. The fact the arrangement has allegedly been used in other capital cases does not enamor this Court of its use here. How is the Defendant protected from counsel being unwittingly ill advised and unprepared for facts of which experts have knowledge but counsel does not[?] Without such disclosure how are the defense counsel going to take advantage of facts brought out? How can counsel formulate direct examination of the witnesses? How does defense counsel protect against * * * unwittingly introducing expert testimony based on facts that are not in fact testified to and placed in evidence[?]"
{¶ 6} Instead of seeking leave from the court of appeals to immediately appeal the judge's discovery order pursuant to R.C. 2945.67 and seeking a stay of the order, Mason filed this action for an extraordinary writ of prohibition to prevent Judge Burnside from enforcing her November 6 order. Mason also filed a motion for a stay of the November 6 discovery order pending the court's resolution of this prohibition case. Judge Burnside filed a motion to dismiss, and Mason filed a memorandum in opposition.
{¶ 7} This cause is now before us for our S.Ct.Prac.R. X(5) determination.
{¶ 8} We must now determine whether dismissal, an alternative writ, or a peremptory writ is appropriate. Dismissal, which Judge Burnside requests, is required if it appears beyond doubt, after presuming the truth of all...
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