State ex rel. Matalik v. Schubert, S
| Decision Date | 08 February 1973 |
| Docket Number | No. S,S |
| Citation | 57 Wis.2d 315,204 N.W.2d 13 |
| Parties | STATE ex rel. Emil MATALIK, Petitioner, v. Dr. Edward F. SCHUBERT, Supt., Respondent. tate 148. |
| Court | Wisconsin Supreme Court |
Howard Eisenberg, State Public Defender, Madison, for petitioner.
Robert W. Warren, Atty. Gen., Wm. A. Platz, Asst. Atty. Gen., Madison, for respondent.
Three issues are raised by this petition:
1. Did petitioner have a constitutional right to a jury determination on the question of his competency to stand trial?
2. Was petitioner denied due process of law at the hearing which was held to determine his competency to stand trial?
3. Is petitioner now entitled to have proceedings instituted similar to those prescribed by ch. 51, Stats., for civil mental commitments to determine whether he should continue to be committed?
Petitioner argues that he has been denied the equal protection of the laws guaranteed him in the state and federal constitutions by being committed to Central State Hospital without a jury determination regarding his competency to stand trial. Petitioner notes that under ch. 51, the civil commitment statute, persons alleged to be mentally ill have a right to a jury trial. 1a The lack of a jury trial to The definitions of 'mental illness' and 'mental deficiency' found in ch. 51, Stats., make it clear that such incompetency is not dissimilar from that defined in sec. 971.15, wherein no jury trial is mandated and a trial court may 'summarily' determine a defendant's competency. 2 As the right to a jury determination is a significant right accorded some who are alleged to be incompetent, it may not be arbitrarily withheld from others and yet meet the mandate of the equal protection clause. 3 Although suggesting it may be a relevant consideration in the evaluation of one's mental condition, the United States Supreme Court recently held in Humphrey v. Cady that a person's criminal record does not present a sufficient justification to deny important rights afforded those not having such a record. 4 Here, it appears that the civil definition of mental illness or deficiency might have been utilized to commit petitioner but for the fact that he had a criminal charge lodged against him. In order to justify the material difference in the rights afforded petitioner and others who are alleged to be incompetent to stand trial, i.e., no jury trial, there must be some rational basis for the distinction other than 'the arbitrary decision of the State to seek his commitment under one statute rather than the other.' 5 Therefore, this court must determine whether some rational basis, justifying the difference in the rights afforded these two classes of persons who are alleged to be mentally ill, exists. 6
determine his competency to stand trial on a pending criminal charge, petitioner [57 Wis.2d 320] argues, is constitutionally unjustifiable when compared with such civil procedures.
It has long been the rule of Anglo-American law that an incompetent person should not be forced to face the judicial process during such incompetency. This common law rule was ably summarized by Blackstone:
'. . . Also, if a man in his sound memory commits a capital offence, and before arraignment for it he becomes mad, he ought not to be arraigned for it, because he is not able to plead to it with that advice and caution that he ought. And if, after he has pleaded, the prisoner becomes mad, he shall not be tried; for how can he make his defense? If, after he be tried and found guilty, he loses his senses before judgment, judgment This proposition has recently received reaffirmation by the United States Supreme Court in Pate v. Robinson, 8 wherein it was held an incompetent person could not be tried for an alleged crime consistently with his constitutional right to a fair trial. Presently, therefore, all states permit the suspension of criminal proceedings against an incompetent accused--usually at the trial stage, but also at the sentencing, execution and appeal stages of the criminal process. 9
shall not be pronounced; and if after judgment he becomes of nonsane memory, execution shall be stayed: for peradventure, says the humanity of the English law, had the prisoner been of sound memory, he might have alleged something in stay of judgment or execution.' 7
The rationale underlying such suspension of criminal proceedings is twofold. First, a defendant's full assistance and cooperation has been traditionally thought essential to developing the 'true facts' of the case:
10
Second, suspending criminal proceedings against an incompetent defendant is rooted in the 'fundamental fairness' doctrine which pervades Anglo-American justice. Thus, only where a defendant is mentally competent will he be able 'to exercise effectively the rights which this society extends to persons charged with committing a crime.' 11 Thus, for these reasons, it cannot be denied that the procedure spelled out by sec. 971.14, Stats., on the determination of incompetency to proceed, is a critically important failsafe device for the benefit of accused persons who may not be able to fully cooperate and assist in their defense.
Petitioner's entire equal-protection argument is based on the theory that the jury trial afforded those under sec. 51.03, Stats., must be made available to him because his commitment under the procedure provided by sec. 971.14 and the civil commitment procedure are essentially the same. This is not the case. The procedure provided for civil commitment under sec. 51.03 is for a permanent commitment, whereas sec. 971.14 contemplates a commitment of a temporary nature. Sec. 971.14(5) specifically provides that the detention is of a temporary nature 'for so long as such condition endures.' 12 Emphasizing the temporary nature of the incompetency-to-stand-trial commitment is a very recent pronouncement '(A) person charged by a State with a criminal offense who is committed solely on account of his incapacity to proceed to trial cannot be held more than the reasonable period of time necessary to determine whether there is a substantial probability that he will attain that capacity in the foreseeable future.'
of the United States Supreme Court in Jackson v. Indiana, 13 wherein it was held:
Sec. 51.04 of the civil commitment procedure provides for a ninety day emergency detention of persons alleged to be mentally ill and this procedure does not, by statute, call for a jury trial. This temporary commitment procedure is more comparable to the temporary commitment procedure under sec. 971.14, than are the permanent civil commitment proceedings provided for under ch. 51. Even if such temporary civil commitments require a jury trial, 14 we think there is a rational reason for providing for a procedure without a jury trial in the case of the temporary commitment of persons not considered competent to stand trial under the provisions of sec. 971.14. The purpose of sec. 971.14 is to maximize rather than minimize the rights afforded criminally accused persons. The procedure for declaring an alleged criminal defendant incompetent to stand trial stops the criminal process because the defendant is not mentally competent to look after his own interests and to cooperate in the preparation of his defense at trial. This rational basis for the distinction between the procedures for even a temporary commitment under ch. 51 and under sec. 971.14, leads us to conclude that there is no basis here for claiming the unconstitutional denial of equal protection.
Petitioner argues that his commitment without a jury determination of his incompetency to stand trial deprives him of due process of law. There is no requirement for a jury trial to provide due process. The recent case of Jackson v. Indiana (reviewing a comparable Indiana statute) does not mandate a jury trial at the time of the original commitment. The United States Supreme Court has recently commented upon the nature of the due-process clause and its requirements:
'. . . In short, 'within the limits of practicability,' (Mullane v. Central Hanover Tr. Co., supra), 389 U.S. 306, at 318, 70 S.Ct. 652, 94 LEd. 865, a State must afford to all individuals a meaningful opportunity to be heard if it is to fulfill the promise of the Due Process Clause.' (Emphasis added.) 15
An opportunity to be heard on the question of one's competency is proffered by sec. 971.14(4), Stats. 16 At this stage of the proceedings where only a temporary commitment is sought, thereby halting the criminal process which has been instituted against an accused, this hearing, if meaningful, sufficiently complies with the elastic procedural requirements of the due process clause. 17
However, petitioner contends that he was denied a meaningful hearing prior to his commitment for incompetency to stand trial and was, therefore, deprived of his due process rights. The record of the hearing, wherein petitioner was found incompetent to stand trial and was committed to Central State Hospital, indicates that the district attorney challenged whether petitioner was competent to proceed. The psychiatric report was introduced into evidence and contested by neither petitioner's attorney nor the district attorney. On the basis of this report the trial court found petitioner unfit to proceed with the trial. The record does indicate that the petitioner did vigorously object to...
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