State ex rel. Matalik v. Schubert, No. S

• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Wisconsin
• Writing for the Court: WILKIE
• Citation: 57 Wis.2d 315,204 N.W.2d 13
• Decision Date: 08 February 1973
• Docket Number: No. S
• Parties: STATE ex rel. Emil MATALIK, Petitioner, v. Dr. Edward F. SCHUBERT, Supt., Respondent. tate 148.

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204 N.W.2d 13 57 Wis.2d 315 STATE ex rel. Emil MATALIK, Petitioner,
v.
Dr. Edward F. SCHUBERT, Supt., Respondent. No. State 148. Supreme Court of Wisconsin. Feb. 8, 1973.

Howard Eisenberg, State Public Defender, Madison, for petitioner.

Robert W. Warren, Atty. Gen., Wm. A. Platz, Asst. Atty. Gen., Madison, for respondent.

WILKIE, Justice.

Three issues are raised by this petition:

1. Did petitioner have a constitutional right to a jury determination on the question of his competency to stand trial?

[57 Wis.2d 319] 2. Was petitioner denied due process of law at the hearing which was held to determine his competency to stand trial?

3. Is petitioner now entitled to have proceedings instituted similar to those prescribed by ch. 51, Stats., for civil mental commitments to determine whether he should continue to be committed?

RIGHT TO JURY DETERMINATION OF INCOMPETENCY TO STAND TRIAL

Equal Protection

Petitioner argues that he has been denied the equal protection of the laws guaranteed him in the state and federal constitutions by being committed to Central State Hospital without a jury determination regarding his competency to stand trial. Petitioner notes that under ch. 51, the civil commitment statute, persons alleged to be mentally ill have a right to a jury trial. ^1a The lack of a jury trial to

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determine his competency to stand trial on a pending criminal charge, petitioner [57 Wis.2d 320] argues, is constitutionally unjustifiable when compared with such civil procedures.

The definitions of 'mental illness' and 'mental deficiency' found in ch. 51, Stats., make it clear that such incompetency is not dissimilar from that defined in sec. 971.15, wherein no jury trial is mandated and a trial court may 'summarily' determine a defendant's competency. ² As the right to a jury determination is a significant right accorded some who are alleged to be incompetent, it may not be arbitrarily withheld from others and yet meet the mandate of the equal protection clause. ³ Although suggesting it may be a relevant consideration in the evaluation of one's mental condition, the United States Supreme Court recently held in Humphrey v. Cady that a person's criminal record does not present a sufficient justification to deny important rights afforded those not having such a record. ⁴ Here, it appears that the civil definition of mental illness or deficiency might have been utilized to commit petitioner but for the fact that he had a criminal charge lodged against him. In order to justify the material difference in the rights afforded petitioner and others who are alleged to be incompetent to stand trial, i.e., no jury trial, there must be some rational basis for the distinction other than 'the arbitrary decision of the State to seek his commitment under one statute rather than the other.' ⁵ Therefore, this court must determine [57 Wis.2d 321] whether some rational basis, justifying the difference in the rights afforded these two classes of persons who are alleged to be mentally ill, exists. ⁶

It has long been the rule of Anglo-American law that an incompetent person should not be forced to face the judicial process during such incompetency. This common law rule was ably summarized by Blackstone:

'. . . Also, if a man in his sound memory commits a capital offence, and before arraignment for it he becomes mad, he ought not to be arraigned for it, because he is not able to plead to it with that advice and caution that he ought. And if, after he has pleaded, the prisoner becomes mad, he shall not be tried; for how can he make his defense? If, after he be tried and found guilty, he loses his senses before judgment, judgment

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shall not be pronounced; and if after judgment he becomes of nonsane memory, execution shall be stayed: for peradventure, says the humanity of the English law, had the prisoner been of sound memory, he might have alleged something in stay of judgment or execution.' ⁷

This proposition has recently received reaffirmation by the United States Supreme Court in Pate v. Robinson, ⁸ wherein it was held an incompetent person could not be tried for an alleged crime consistently with his constitutional right to a fair trial. Presently, therefore, [57 Wis.2d 322] all states permit the suspension of criminal proceedings against an incompetent accused--usually at the trial stage, but also at the sentencing, execution and appeal stages of the criminal process. ⁹

The rationale underlying such suspension of criminal proceedings is twofold. First, a defendant's full assistance and cooperation has been traditionally thought essential to developing the 'true facts' of the case:

'. . . The testimony of other witnesses will constantly be checked against the defendant's own version by his counsel and discrepancies brought to the attention of the court. If he chooses, the accused may take the stand and give the court the benefit of his knowledge of what took place. Through the type of assistance which only a competent accused can provide, the probability that a correct determination will result from the trial is greatly increased.' ¹⁰

Second, suspending criminal proceedings against an incompetent defendant is rooted in the 'fundamental fairness' doctrine which pervades Anglo-American justice. Thus, only where a defendant is mentally competent will he be able 'to exercise effectively the rights which this society extends to persons charged with committing a crime.' ¹¹ Thus, for these reasons, it cannot be denied that the procedure spelled out by sec. 971.14, Stats., on the determination of incompetency to proceed, is a critically important failsafe device for the benefit of accused persons who may not be able to fully cooperate and assist in their defense.

Petitioner's entire equal-protection argument is based on the theory that the jury trial afforded those under sec. 51.03, Stats., must be made available to him because [57 Wis.2d 323] his commitment under the procedure provided by sec. 971.14 and the civil commitment procedure are essentially the same. This is not the case. The procedure provided for civil commitment under sec. 51.03 is for a permanent commitment, whereas sec. 971.14 contemplates a commitment of a temporary nature. Sec. 971.14(5) specifically provides that the detention is of a temporary nature 'for so long as such condition endures.' ¹² Emphasizing the temporary nature of the incompetency-to-stand-trial commitment is a very recent pronouncement

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of the United States Supreme Court in Jackson v. Indiana, ¹³ wherein it was held:

'(A) person charged by a State with a criminal offense who is committed solely on account of his incapacity to proceed to trial cannot be held more than the reasonable period of time necessary to determine whether there is a substantial probability that he will attain that capacity in the foreseeable future.'

Sec. 51.04 of the civil commitment procedure provides for a ninety day emergency detention of persons alleged to be mentally ill and this procedure does not, by statute, call for a jury trial. This temporary commitment procedure is more comparable to the temporary commitment procedure under sec. 971.14, than are the permanent civil commitment proceedings provided for under ch. 51. Even if such temporary civil commitments[57 Wis.2d 324] require a jury trial, ¹⁴ we think there is a rational reason for providing for a procedure without a jury trial in the case of the temporary commitment of persons not considered competent to stand trial under the provisions of sec. 971.14. The purpose of sec. 971.14 is to maximize rather...