State ex rel. Matin v. Bloom

• Decision Date: 06 February 2009
• Docket Number: No. 34582.,34582.
• Citation: 674 S.E.2d 240
• Court: West Virginia Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE of West Virginia, ex rel. Khan MATIN, M.D., Petitioner, v. The Honorable Louis BLOOM, Judge of the Circuit Court of Kanawha County, and E.H. et al., Respondents.

674 S.E.2d 240

STATE of West Virginia, ex rel. Khan MATIN, M.D., Petitioner, v. The Honorable Louis BLOOM, Judge of the Circuit Court of Kanawha County, and E.H. et al., Respondents.

No. 34582.

Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.

Submitted January 27, 2009.

Decided February 6, 2009.

Syllabus by the Court

1. "In determining whether to entertain and issue the writ of prohibition for cases not involving the absence of jurisdiction but only where it is claimed that the lower tribunal exceeded its legitimate powers, this Court will examine five factors: (1) whether the party seeking the writ has no other adequate means, such as direct appeal, to obtain the desired relief; (2) whether the petitioner will be damaged or prejudiced in a way that is not correctable on appeal; (3) whether the lower tribunal's order is clearly erroneous as a matter of law; (4) whether the lower tribunal's order is an oft repeated error or manifests persistent disregard for either procedural or substantive law; and (5) whether the lower tribunal's order raises new and important problems or issues of law of first impression. These factors are general guidelines that serve as a useful starting point for determining whether a discretionary writ of prohibition should issue. Although all five factors need not be satisfied, it is clear that the third factor, the existence of clear error as a matter of law, should be given substantial weight." Syllabus Point 4, State ex. rel. Hoover v. Berger, 199 W.Va. 12, 483 S.E.2d 12 (1996).

Darrell V. McGraw, Attorney General, Charlene A. Vaughan, Deputy Attorney General, Charleston, for the Petitioner.

Jennifer S. Wagner, Esq., Daniel F. Hedges, Esq., Mountain State Justice, Inc., Charleston, for the Respondents.

PER CURIAM¹.

This case is before the Court upon a Petition for a Writ of Prohibition filed by the West Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources ("DHHR") in which it seeks to prohibit the Circuit Court of Kanawha County from taking any action in the underlying mandamus action. The DHHR objects to the re-opening of E.H. v. Matin, Civil Action No. 81-MISC-585, for the purposes of (1) conducting an evidentiary hearing on the progress in implementing care to individuals with traumatic brain injuries and (2) examining the issue of overcrowding and other potential violations of W.Va. Code, 27-5-9 [2007]² at State psychiatric facilities.

As set forth below, we find that the circuit court's proposed order-to conduct an evidentiary hearing in this matter—falls within the circuit court's power to ensure that a state agency complies with legislative mandates. Specifically, the circuit court has the power to ensure that patients are receiving treatment guaranteed to them under W.Va.Code, 27-5-9. The circuit court also has the power to enforce a Consent Order it previously issued. For these reasons, the Petitioner's Writ of Prohibition is denied.

I. Facts and Background

This mandamus action was originally filed in this Court on June 23, 1981, by a group of patients at the Huntington State Hospital, which has since been renamed the Mildred H. Bateman Hospital ("the hospital"). In E.H. v. Matin, 168 W.Va. 248, 284 S.E.2d 232 (1981) ("Matin I"), Justice Neely provided a vivid description of the hospital, stating "Once again this Court's attention must be focused on the `Dickensian Squalor of unconscionable magnitudes' of West Virginia's mental institutions." 168 W.Va. at 249, 284 S.E.2d at 232. This `Dickensian Squalor' included problems with the facilities³, poor communication among the staff and treating physicians, and numerous administrative problems including staff training and qualification issues.

To formulate a remedy to address these problems, the Court stated that the Legislature had already articulated guidelines for the operation of the State's mental health facilities:

By the passage of W.Va.Code, 27-5-9 in 1977, the West Virginia Legislature acknowledged its concern for both humane conditions of custody and effective therapeutic treatment. Therefore, West Virginia has already articulated a legislative position which is in conformity with the highest possible standards of moral rectitude. Consequently, we are not asked to impose a new constitutional standard upon a reluctant and unwilling state; rather, we are asked only to order the executive branch to fulfill its obligation under clear and unambiguous statutory provisions.

168 W.Va. at 257, 284 S.E.2d at 237.

The Court went on to state that it was not an expert in medicine, mental health or institutional management, nor was it a suitable forum for the development of an appropriate plan for the entire reorganization of the mental health care delivery system in the state. 168 W.Va. at 259, 284 S.E.2d at 237-38. The Court therefore transferred the matter to the Circuit Court of Kanawha County to monitor the case consistent with guidelines announced in the opinion. These guidelines provide us with a means of assessing the current action before this Court. The Matin I guidelines state:

This case exclusively concerns the rights of patients to mandamus relief under our statute. Thus we arrive at the following holdings: (1) W.Va.Code, 27-5-9 [1977] creates specific enforceable rights in the entire inmate population of the State's mental hospitals. (2) W.Va.Code, 27-5-9 [1977] requires a system of custody and treatment which will reflect the competent application of current, available scientific knowledge. Where there is a good faith difference of opinion among equally competent professional experts concerning appropriate methods of treatment and custody, such differences should be resolved by the director of the West Virginia Department of Health and not by the courts. (3) It is the obligation of the state to provide the resources necessary to accord inmates of mental institutions the rights which the State has granted them under W.Va.Code, 27-5-9 [1977].

168 W.Va. at 259-60, 284 S.E.2d at 238.

After a number of hearings in the circuit court, the parties agreed and the circuit court accepted, in October 1983, what is termed the West Virginia Behavioral Health System Plan. E.H. v. Matin, 189 W.Va. 102, 104, 428 S.E.2d 523, 525 (1993) ("Matin II"). This plan was to be implemented by the DHHR with oversight by the court and a court monitor. The plan was implemented and no significant problems with it were brought before this Court until 1993. In 1993, in Matin II the DHHR appealed a ruling by the circuit court halting the construction of a new hospital.⁴

The Court in Matin II found that the circuit court exceeded its authority in ordering the halting of construction on the new hospital. Specifically, Syllabus Point 1 of Matin II held:

Where the legislature, through the budget process, expressly provides for funding to build a new public facility, absent some constitutional challenge or an express statutory provision to the contrary, the courts are not authorized to interfere with the legislative mandate.

The Court in Matin II was concerned about the level of the circuit court's involvement in the decisions of the DHHR relating to the Behavioral Health System Plan. The Court ordered the parties to file briefs on whether continued monitoring by the circuit court was appropriate.

Four months later, in E.H. v. Matin, 189 W.Va. 445, 432 S.E.2d 207 (1993) ("Matin III"), the Court held that the reasons for continued circuit court monitoring outweighed the reasons in support of discontinuing it. The Court therefore decided to keep the court monitor in place for eighteen more months, unless a sufficient showing could be made to continue it for a longer period of time.

The circuit court monitoring continued until 2002. In an order dated March 27, 2002, the circuit court dissolved the office of the court monitor and removed the case from its active docket. The circuit court stated that it would only consider major non-implementation issues going forward, including the eight unresolved issues⁵ that were identified in the order. The circuit court's order also notes that it would only consider these issues after submission to an "ombudsman" process. While the case was removed from the circuit court's active docket, the court continued to hold periodic hearings on the progress the parties were making on these unresolved issues.

In 2002, the position of "Ombudsman for Behavioral Health" was developed at the request of the then-Secretary of the DHHR, Paul Nussbaum.⁶ It was hoped that the Ombudsman could provide an internal and informal means of resolving compliance issues without resorting to litigation. Ideally, the Ombudsman would attempt to resolve individual patient complaints by facilitating communication between agencies and through the use of mediation. The Ombudsman compiles regular reports of grievances, monitors compliance with various court orders issued in E.H. v. Matin, and is to meet regularly with DHHR officials to resolve and avoid litigation.

The Ombudsman has issued regular reports to the circuit court and the DHHR from 2003 through 2008. The current dispute arises, first, out of two issues raised by the Ombudsman in his 2007-2008 Annual Report⁷. These issues involve (1) generally, the provision and coordination of case management services; and (2) specifically, the treatment of traumatic brain injuries. The traumatic brain injury issue was initially resolved on July 3, 2007, when the parties entered into a "Consent Order on Services To Individuals With Traumatic Brain Injuries." This Consent Order was entered into between the parties, with the assistance of a mediator. The circuit court did not participate in the making of the Consent Order, but adopted it after both parties agreed to it. The circuit court held a hearing on May 15, 2008, regarding the implementation of the traumatic brain injury delivery plan, as set forth in the Consent Order, and found that the DHHR had made insufficient progress and noted the...