State ex rel. Mazurek v. District Court of Montana Fourth Judicial Dist.
Decision Date | 25 July 1996 |
Docket Number | No. 95-577,95-577 |
Citation | 922 P.2d 474,53 St.Rep. 678,277 Mont. 349 |
Parties | STATE of Montana, ex rel. Joseph P. MAZUREK, Attorney General, Relator, v. DISTRICT COURT OF the MONTANA FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT, and the Honorable Ed McLean, District Judge, Respondent. |
Court | Montana Supreme Court |
Joseph P. Mazurek, Attorney General, Chris Tweeten, Deputy Attorney General, Helena, Karen S. Townsend, Deputy Missoula County Attorney, Missoula, for Appellant.
Michael J. Sherwood, Missoula, for Respondent.
Petitioner, the State of Montana on relation of Attorney General Joseph P. Mazurek, filed with this Court an application for writ of supervisory control under Article VII, § 2(2) of the Montana Constitution and Rule 17, M.R.App.P. The State's application requests that we address two orders of the Fourth Judicial District Court, Missoula County, granting the motions of defendant Michael Paul Johns (Johns) to admit certain evidence relating to the misconduct of the alleged victims under the Montana Rape Shield Law, § 45-5-511(2), MCA. Defendant Johns also filed a cross-petition for writ of supervisory control.
In its order of April 9, 1996, this Court accepted original jurisdiction over the issues raised by the State in its application for writ of supervisory control, declined to accept jurisdiction over the evidentiary-related issues raised in the cross-petition for writ of supervisory control, and declined original jurisdiction over Johns' request to dismiss certain counts of the amended information.
At the time of the alleged incidents, Johns and the victims, identified as K.C. and L.A., were students attending the University of Montana-Missoula. Johns is charged with two counts of felony sexual intercourse without consent and two counts of criminal endangerment. These counts arise from two separate incidents involving K.C. and L.A. Johns filed a motion seeking to introduce evidence relating to the prior sexual history of the alleged victims. Two pretrial hearings have been held in the respondent District Court pursuant to the Montana Rape Shield Law, codified at § 45-5-511(2), MCA. The District Court considered certain evidence relating to the past sexual conduct of K.C. and L.A. and determined that the evidence would be admissible at trial.
The State requests that this Court address the following decisions of the District Court:
(a) The respondent court intends to admit testimony from a witness named Bob Keissal that he observed L.A. sitting on the lap of, rubbing against, and fondling a person named Brad Becker on the night in which the conduct that is the subject of counts one and three of the amended information occurred.
(b) The respondent court intends to allow a witness named Ben Graham to testify that L.A. was "hitting on every guy in sight" and sitting on Brad Becker's lap on the night in which the conduct that is the subject of counts one and three of the amended information occurred.
(c) The respondent court intends to allow a witness named Brad Woons to testify that after the conduct that is the subject of counts one and three of the amended information occurred, L.A. came into his dormitory room, eventually undressed, lay down on a bed in the dormitory room, and appeared to masturbate.
(d) The respondent court intends to allow a witness named Brian Mothershead to testify from personal knowledge that L.A., while in high school, became intoxicated and spent the night in a motel room, waking up unclothed and wrapped in a blanket in the company of several men the following morning.
(e) The respondent court intends to allow a witness named Shannon Sims to testify from personal knowledge to the same incident described in (d) above.
(f) The respondent court intends to allow witnesses Daryl and Jean Toews to testify that K.C. made and recanted false allegations of sexual assault against Chad Reddig.
This Court accepted jurisdiction over the issues raised in the State's petition for writ of supervisory control.
This Court has stated that:
State ex rel. Forsyth v. District Court (1985), 216 Mont. 480, 484, 701 P.2d 1346, 1348 (quoting State ex rel. O'Sullivan v. District Court (1946), 119 Mont. 429, 431-32, 175 P.2d 763, 764); accord State ex rel. Mapes v. District Court (1991), 250 Mont. 524, 528-29, 822 P.2d 91, 94. In our order of April 9, 1996, we determined that this case implicates such "extraordinary circumstances" as are contemplated in Forsyth and Mapes, and, consequently granted the State's petition. The State correctly notes that § 46-20-103, MCA, provides the scope of issues from which the State may appeal in a criminal case and that evidentiary rulings under the Rape Shield Law, § 45-5-511(2), MCA, are not included. See State ex rel. Dep't of Justice v. District Court (1976), 172 Mont. 88, 93, 560 P.2d 1328, 1331 ( ). Therefore, if the District Court erroneously admits this evidence at trial, the State has no adequate remedy on appeal.
In addition, the State asserts that the Rape Shield Law was enacted to protect victims from further trauma at trial by restricting the admissibility of evidence relating to the victim's prior sexual conduct. Once a trial is held and the testimony has been presented in open court, the injury which the statute is intended to prevent will have been inflicted upon the victim. A later decision of this Court would be wholly ineffective in rectifying the injury to the victim. For these reasons we granted the State's petition for writ of supervisory control.
In reviewing a district court's decisions regarding the admissibility of evidence relating to the extrinsic sexual conduct of sexual assault victims under § 45-5-511, MCA, we determine whether the district court abused its discretion. State v. Howell (1992), 254 Mont. 438, 445, 839 P.2d 87, 91, cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1036, 113 S.Ct. 1862, 123 L.Ed.2d 483 (1993); State v. Rhyne (1992), 253 Mont. 513, 518-19, 833 P.2d 1112, 1116. The State argues that the District Court's rulings on the admissibility of the testimony labeled as issues (a) through (f) violate Montana's Rape Shield Law. Section 45-5-511, MCA, the Rape Shield Law, provides in relevant part:
(2) No evidence concerning the sexual conduct of the victim is admissible in prosecutions under this part except evidence of the victim's past sexual conduct with the offender or evidence of specific instances of the victim's sexual activity to show the origin of semen, pregnancy, or disease which is at issue in the prosecution.
(3) If the defendant proposes for any purpose to offer evidence described in subsection (2), the trial judge shall order a hearing out of the presence of the jury to determine whether the proposed evidence is admissible under subsection (2).
The State asserts, and we agree, that the statute recognizes only two instances in which the sexual conduct of a victim may be admitted and that neither circumstance is satisfied in the instant case. First, such evidence may be admitted where the conduct involves the defendant as a participant. Second, such evidence may be admitted where an issue exists as to the origin of semen, pregnancy or disease, and the victim's sexual conduct is probative on that issue. Section 45-5-511(2), MCA.
In State v. Fitzgerald (1989), 238 Mont. 261, 263, 776 P.2d 1222, 1223, the defendant wanted to present testimony that the victim was a prostitute. Fitzgerald argued that he and the victim acted consensually and that the victim fabricated the rape story so that she would not have to face her pimp with no earnings for the evening. The district court refused to allow this line of questioning and we affirmed. Fitzgerald, 776 P.2d at 1223. Like Johns in the present case, Fitzgerald asserted that this line of questioning was relevant to the victim's veracity and essential to his right of confrontation. This Court, however, has repeatedly rejected this assertion. State v. Higley (1980), 190 Mont. 412, 422-23, 621 P.2d 1043, 1050. In Higley we stated that "rules limiting inquiry into sexual conduct of the victim are essential to preserve the integrity of the trial and to prevent it from becoming a trial of the victim." Higley, 621 P.2d at 1050-51. This Court has consistently upheld the exclusion of prior sexual conduct evidence rejecting claims that the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article II, § 24 of the Montana Constitution guarantee the defendant the right to introduce such evidence. Howell, 839 P.2d at 91; Higley, 621 P.2d at 1050. We have held that the Sixth Amendment right of confrontation is not absolute and that the Rape Shield Law serves a compelling state interest in preventing rape trials from becoming trials on the prior sexual conduct of the victims. Howell, 839 P.2d at 91; Fitzgerald, 776 P.2d at 1223-24. In balancing the rights of victims and the rights of the defendant we have stated that:
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