State ex rel. McFerran v. Justice Court of Evangeline Starr, 30630.
Decision Date | 11 February 1949 |
Docket Number | 30630. |
Citation | 202 P.2d 927,32 Wn.2d 544 |
Parties | STATE ex rel. McFERRAN v. JUSTICE COURT OF EVANGELINE STARR. |
Court | Washington Supreme Court |
Department 1
Proceeding by the State, on relation of Edward M. McFerran, against Justice Court of Evangeline Starr, Justice of the peace in and for Seattle Precinct, King County, State of Washington for a writ of prohibition to prevent defendant from proceeding to try or call for trial certain cases. From an order granting petition, Judge Starr appeals.
Order reversed and cause remanded with instructions.
Appeal from Superior Court, King County; Robert M Jones, judge.
Lloyd Shorett, Max R. Nicolai and Gordon S. Clinton, all of Seattle, for appellant.
P. R McIntosh and W. S. Lewis, both of Seattle, for respondent.
This is an appeal from an order made and entered by the superior court for King county, prohibiting Evangeline Starr, a duly elected, qualified and acting justice of the peace for Seattle precinct, King county, Washington, from proceeding to try or call for trial causes numbered 2755, 2756, 2757 and 2758 of the justice court records of Roy De Grief, a justice of the peace in and for such precinct and city.
The facts are undisputed. During the month of August, 1947, four complaints charging Edward M. McFerran with various violations of the traffic code were filed with Justice of the Peace De Grief. McFerran was arrested and released on bail and the causes were set for trial on September 3, 1947, Before Judge De Grief. McFerran, accompanied by his attorney, appeared Before Judge De Grief, prepared to go to trial. No jury was demanded. At that time, without defendant McFerran having filed an affidavit of prejudice, Judge De Grief disqualified himself on the following ground: 'In that the court felt that he could not give the defendant a fair and impartial trial,' and transferred the causes to the justice court of Evangeline Starr, who, as stated, is also a justice of the peace for Seattle precinct, King county, Washington.
On October 10, 1947, the defendant, through his attorney, objected to Justice of the Peace Starr taking jurisdiction, on the ground that the statutory requirements for change of venue had not been complied with, and that Judge Starr had no jurisdiction.
McFerran, as relator, then filed a petition for a writ of prohibition in the superior court for King county, asking that the writ issue against Judge Starr, on the ground that Judge De Grief had no power to transfer the causes to Judge Starr's court.
Judge Starr filed a demurrer and motion to dismiss, as well as a return and answer to the petition of relator. The court overruled the demurrer and denied the motion to dismiss. Thereafter Judge Starr filed an amended answer and return, and the cause was set for hearing. On March 22, 1948, the court made and entered findings of fact, conclusions of law and an order granting relator's petition, prohibiting Judge Starr from proceeding to try or call for trial such causes. Oral notice of appeal was given by Judge Starr in open court, and the appeal was duly perfected.
We shall hereinafter refer to Judge Starr as appellant, and Edward McFerran as respondent.
Appellant makes four assignments of error, and states that they all pertain to one fundamental question. Appellant then says:
Appellant contends that even though a justice court is not a court of record, and even though there is no statute which authorizes a justice of the peace to disqualify himself from trying a criminal complaint, a justice of the peace has the inherent power to disqualify himself on the ground of bias and prejudice, and transfer the complaint to another justice of the peace. Appellant concedes that there are no statutes which specifically empower a justice of the peace to bring about a change of venue on its own motion on the ground of disqualification for bias and prejudice.
Respondent contends that a justice court has jurisdiction only by virtue of legislative enactment. He then quotes the following constitutional provisions:
Washington Constitution, Art. IV,§ 10.
'The supreme court and the superior court shall be courts of record, and the legislature shall have power to provide that any of the courts of this state, excepting justices of the peace, shall be courts of record.' Washington Constitution, Art. IV, § 11.
'The legislature shall prescribe by law the jurisdiction and powers of any of the inferior courts which may be established in pursuance of this constitution.' Washington Constitution, Art. IV, § 12.
Respondent then states:
Respondent then quotes Rem.Rev.Stat. § 1925, which provides:
'Any justice shall, on complaint on oath in writing Before him charging any person with the commission of any crime or misdemeanor of which he has jurisdiction, issue a warrant for the arrest of such person, and cause him to be brought forthwith Before him for trial,' after which he states:
'The statute specifically limits the venue of such trial by use of the words 'Before him for trial.'
'The venue having been fixed by legislative enactment, it follows that there can be no change of venue except by express legislative authority.'
Respondent further states that the only pertinent statutes are Rem.Rev.Stat. §§ 1774 , 1775, 209, 2018 and 2020, and quotes such sections. He then states that § 1774 may be disregarded as it applies only to those causes where the defendant has asked for a change of venue by the filing of an affidavit in accordance with the statute. Section 1775 provides that change of venue may be allowed for the same causes for which it is allowed in the superior court. Section 209 sets out the grounds upon which a change of venue...
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...to avoid even a cause for suspicion of irregularity in the discharge of their duties.”). In State ex rel. McFerran v. Justice Court of Evangeline Starr, 32 Wash.2d 544, 548, 202 P.2d 927 (1949), the court stated “[t]here can be no question but that the common law and the Federal and our sta......
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...L.Ed. 394 (1948) (Simpson, J., dissenting); and to support the right to an impartial trial, State ex rel. McFerran v. Justice Court of Evangeline Starr, 32 Wash.2d 544, 548, 202 P.2d 927 (1949); State v. Espinoza, 51 Wash.App. 719, 722, 754 P.2d 1287 (1988), rev'd. in part by, 112 Wash.2d 8......
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...guaranty of an impartial trial does not distinguish between jury and bench trials. State ex rel. McFerran v. Justice Court of Evangeline Starr, 32 Wash.2d 544, 548-49, 202 P.2d 927 (1949). We held, "[t]here can be no question ... the Federal and our state constitutions guarantee to a defend......
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Keen v. State, No. W2004-02159-CCA-R3-PD (Tenn. Crim. App. 6/5/2006), W2004-02159-CCA-R3-PD.
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