State ex rel. McGrael v. Phelps

• Decision Date: 14 December 1910
• Citation: 128 N.W. 1041,144 Wis. 1
• Parties: STATE EX REL. MCGRAEL ET AL. v. PHELPS ET AL.
• Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

144 Wis. 1

128 N.W. 1041

STATE EX REL. MCGRAEL ET AL.

v.PHELPS ET AL.

Supreme Court of Wisconsin.

Dec. 14, 1910.

Syllabus by the Judge.

To determine the purpose of a statute expressed in literal sense, words necessarily implied from those used, are as clearly a part thereof as the written words.

In searching for the purpose of an enactment which, applied in the ordinary sense to the subject thereof, would lead to a result so unreasonable as to suggest that such was not its purpose, some other and a reasonable meaning should be adopted, if one can be found within the fair scope of the language used.

In the situation suggested in the last foregoing, the court may “consider the surrounding circumstances, the existing conditions, the evils to be remedied, the objects to be attained,” “look at the whole and every part of the statute, to its subject-matter, to its effects and consequences, to its reason and spirit,” and then read it with all words in place, necessarily or reasonably implied, so as to harmonize and give a sensible effect to every portion thereof and express the apparent intent.

In chapter 477, Laws 1909, providing that if the aggregate of votes at a primary election for all candidates “for nomination for any one office voted for on any party ballot” shall be “twenty per cent. or more” of the number “cast for nominee of such party for Governor at the last general election” the one receiving the most votes shall have his name “placed on the official ballot at the following election” as such party's candidate for such office, and if such aggregate shall be less than such per cent. such person shall have his name placed on such ballot with individual nominations under the designation “independent,”--by necessary implication, the words,--for the particular official district involved or words of similar import--should be deemed in place after the words “for any one office” and the words--in such district or words of similar import--after the word “Governor.”

The literal sense of the words “vote cast for nominee of such party for Governor” standing alone is so contrary to the apparent legislative intent, that words, as before indicated, should be deemed in place by reasonable, if not necessary, implication.

In general, a legislative interference with the elective franchise must stand the test, at least, of these fundamentals of the state Constitution:--(a) The express and implied inhibitions of class legislation; (b) The recognized existence and inviolability of inherent rights; (c) The constitutionally declared purpose of government; (d) The express guaranty of the right to vote.

Section 1, art. 1, of the Constitution is a prohibition, by necessary implication, of legislation inconsistent therewith.

The right of suffrage includes the right to form political parties, and the right of each party to have all the machinery, not reasonably prohibited by law, for making its organization effective as to the policy of its members, by electing officers in harmony therewith.

Every legislative interference with freedom of voters to form political organizations and act under their respective party names is, at the same time, an interference with the right to vote; so the limit of power as to one is substantially the limit as to the other.

Rights mentioned in the last foregoing are included in section 1, art. 1, of the Constitution and are, by necessary implication, protected thereby from undue legislative interference, and are likewise protected by the limitation (in the words of grant) in section 1 of article 3 of the Constitution.

Notwithstanding constitutional inhibitions of legislative interference with the right to vote and rights incidental thereto, there is a legitimate field of legislative activity in the nature of regulation.

The field of legislative regulation mentioned does not extend beyond making laws which are reasonable.

The scope of reasonable regulation is indictated by its purpose, viz., to conserve guaranteed rights and promote their efficiency.

The office of regulation being to conserve, a regulation going clearly beyond, into the field of impairment, is unreasonable.

The extent to which the Legislature may go in the way of regulation of rights is primarily a matter of legislative judgment, subject, however, to judicial review.

The review mentioned has no regard to expediency; it has regard only to whether, from any fair point of view, the regulation, as a conservation measure, is legitimate, every reasonable doubt being resolved in favor thereof.

A regulation which necessarily tends to afford one political party of substantial status a better opportunity for efficient existence than another, however large, or materially impair or prevent fair opportunity for any organization of voters of substantial numbers and standing to compete for favor, is an unreasonable interference.

A legislative interference with freedom, as regards political party organization and contest, which naturally impairs opportunity for members of any political party of substantial significance to efficiently maintain their organization, and, to that end, present their party candidates and principles, as such to the voters at large for indorsement, is unreasonable.

The validity of a legislative police regulation depends upon whether the ends sought to be attained are appropriate, and the means to such ends are also appropriate.

Legislative regulations of the right to vote and rights incidental thereto are appropriate to at least these ends:

(a) To keep the ballot sheet within a reasonably workable compass, both from the standpoint of the party and the individual right; (b) To promote such party integrity on the only legitimate basis for legal conservation of party existence, as to discourage electors, claiming to belong to one organization from invading the primary of another; (c) To stimulate exercise of the right to participate by voting in public matters.

A legislative condition of a person having his name, as that of a party nominee, placed on the official ballot, under his party designation, in a special party column, that he shall have received a sufficient number of votes for such place at the preceding primary to fairly indicate that he is such party's nominee, and that the party has a reasonably significant membership, is in the field of legitimate regulation respecting the suitableness of the ballot, both as regards the major and minor election districts.

Some standard of measurement by which to test the competency of a political party to have the use of the official ballot sheet for the purpose of a party ballot follows, necessarily, from the use of the Australian ballot form.

The votes cast in an official district for a party nominee for Governor, is a proper basis from which to derive a unit of measurement for such party's status at the succeeding primary election, and a number equal to 20 per cent. thereof is a fair unit by which to determine the minimum of party strength in such district, required to be shown at such primary by such party as to any particular office--for such district, to entitle the person favored as the party nominee to have his name placed, as such, in the party column on the official ballot at the succeeding election.

The means indicated for regulating the workable size of the ballot sheet applies to minor districts as well as the state at large; treating a political party as having, in a sense, an individuality in each official district separate and apart from that in any other district.

The method mentioned for regulating the size of the official ballot sheet, is also a proper means of regulation to prevent participation by members of one party in the contests between candidates at the primary, of another party.

Such method is also a legitimate means of stimulating exercise of the elective franchise.

Additional Syllabus by Editorial Staff.

Inherent rights are those privileges enjoyed by the people before the adoption of the Constitution, only surrenderable by the people, or subject to limitation by fundamental law. The right in the beginning here to participatein governmental affairs by reasonable exercise of the elective franchise was “inherent” within the meaning of the fundamental declaration in the Bill of Rights.

Action by the State, on the relation of L. A. McGrael and others for a writ of mandamus, against Frank Phelps and others. Judgment of dismissal.

Winslow, C. J., and Timlin, J., dissenting.

Action invoking the original jurisdiction of this court to compel the board of county canvassers of Milwaukee county to certify the names of the petitioners as those of the regular nominees of the Democratic party in said county, entitled to have their names placed on the official ballot as such for the general election in 1910.

The petition, by appropriate allegations shows that at the last primary election each petitioner received the greatest number of votes cast thereat for any one to be the Democratic party candidate for the particular county office for which he was a candidate at such primary, but that the aggregate vote of all candidates for such office was not 20 per cent. of the vote of such county for the Democratic candidate for Governor at the general election in 1908, and by reason thereof the board of canvassers will not, unless judicially coerced thereto, certify his name for a place on the official ballot as the candidate of his party for such office at the next general election. The petition further shows, by appropriate allegations, that the Democratic party is a political organization which has existed for many years and, without exception, on all occasions therefor presented candidates for public offices and proclaimed party principles to be represented by such candidate.

Joseph E. Davies (J. E. Dodge and John A. Aylward, of counsel), for plaintiffs.

F. L. Gilbert, Atty. Gen., and Russell Jackson, Deputy Atty. Gen., for defendants.

MARSHALL, J. (after...