State ex rel. Miecznikowski v. City of Hammond
| Decision Date | 26 May 1983 |
| Docket Number | No. 3-782A144,3-782A144 |
| Citation | 448 N.E.2d 1239 |
| Parties | STATE of Indiana, on relation of Joseph MIECZNIKOWSKI, et al., Appellants (Plaintiffs Below), v. CITY OF HAMMOND, Indiana, Appellee (Defendant Below). |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Hilbert L. Bradley, Gary, for appellants.
Robert G. Berger, Hammond, for appellee.
After being demoted by the Hammond Board of Public Works and Safety (hereinafter "Board"), four Hammond firefighters (hereinafter "firefighters") sought judicial review of the Board's decision. The trial court affirmed the demotions and the firefighters appeal. We address four issues:
(1) Whether the firefighters' due process rights were violated by the city attorney's participation in a hearing although the Board rejected the fire department's reorganization plan considered at that hearing and took no action against the firefighters until after a second hearing;
(2) Whether the firefighters received sufficient notice and an adequate hearing before they were demoted;
(3) Whether the Board's findings are specific enough to enable the court to review the Board's decision; and
(4) Whether the change in the firefighters' work schedules violated fire department regulations. 1
Affirmed in part; reversed in part; remanded with instructions.
On March 10, 1981, the Fire Chief sent a letter to the Board, proposing a reorganization plan which would require that eight firefighters be demoted. A hearing was held on March 19, 1981. At this hearing, the attorney for the eight firefighters objected to the participation of the city attorney as a member of the Board. He also objected to the notice given the eight firefighters prior to the hearing. The parties have stipulated that the Board sustained the objection to the participation of the city attorney. Therefore, the reorganization plan requiring that eight firefighters be demoted was not approved by the Board.
The Fire Chief submitted a second plan which required that four firefighters be demoted. The firefighters were given notice of the proposed demotions and a hearing was held on April 9, 1981. Following that hearing, the Board issued the following:
The firefighters filed a complaint in the trial court, seeking review of the Board's decision. Following a hearing, the trial court affirmed the Board's decision and denied the firefighters' request for declaratory judgment and mandate.
The firefighters are appealing from the judgment of the trial court. Because they bore the burden of proof in that court, they are appealing from a negative judgment. See Ind.Code 18-1-11-3(c) (Cum.Supp.1980) (repealed); Atkins v. Klute (1976), 169 Ind.App. 206, 346 N.E.2d 759, 762 (). Therefore, the decision of the trial court will be disturbed only if the evidence is without conflict and leads unerringly to a conclusion contrary to that reached by the trial court. Campbell v. City of Mishawaka (1981), Ind.App., 422 N.E.2d 334, 336 (trans. denied).
The firefighters contend that the March 19, 1981 hearing was defective because they received insufficient notice, and the city attorney acted as "judge, jury and prosecutor." 2 We need not determine whether any of the firefighters' statutory or constitutional rights were violated by the alleged defects in the hearing. The March 19, 1981 hearing was held to consider a reorganization proposal submitted by the Fire Chief which would have required that eight firefighters be demoted. Following the hearing, the Board granted the motion made by the eight firefighters to dismiss the plan because of the city attorney's participation in the hearing. The Board, therefore, took no action against the eight firefighters pursuant to the March 19, 1981 hearing. Because no adverse action was taken against them as a result of the hearing, the firefighters suffered no harm from any defects in that hearing, and we need not address this contention on appeal.
The firefighters sought judicial review pursuant to IC 18-1-11-3, 3 which gave the Board disciplinary powers over firefighters and police officers. The statute in effect in April, 1981 provided, in pertinent part:
IC 18-1-11-3(a)(3). 4 The requirement that written reasons for removal be entered on the Board's records has been interpreted as requiring that charges filed be part of the Board's records prior to the hearing. Martincich v. City of Hammond (1981), Ind.App., 419 N.E.2d 240, 245.
In this case, the record shows that the Board sent letters to the firefighters, notifying them of the hearing 5 and enclosing a copy of the Fire Chief's letter to the Board regarding the demotions. 6 John Cvitkovich, the only firefighter present at the hearing testified that he received the notice and understood that he was to be demoted as part of a departmental reorganization. The firefighters argue that this did not provide them with sufficient notice of the charges against them. 7 This was not a disciplinary proceeding; no charges have been made and the Fire Chief's letter stated that the demotions were not related to job performance. 8 The firefighters know that their demotions were part of a reorganization plan. A review of the entire record indicates that the firefighters knew that the plan had been proposed in response to an order issued by the mayor which requested reorganization for economic reasons. They were aware of the reason for demotion and of the hearing; therefore, the notice given was sufficient. 9 The firefighters also received a hearing at which they had the opportunity to appear, to present evidence, and to cross-examine witnesses. The statutory requirements were complied with.
The firefighters contend that defects in the March 19, 1981 hearing impermissibly tainted the Board's decision. However, they have not shown how the second hearing and the Board's decision were so affected.
The parties stipulated that the Board denied the first reorganization plan because the City attorney participated as an advocate and as a member of the Board. At the April 9, 1981 hearing, the City attorney represented the Fire Chief and did not take part in the Board's decision. The participation of another Board member in both hearings is not alone sufficient to impair the firefighters' rights.
Furthermore, the Board denied the Fire Chief's proposal to demote eight firefighters. It later decided to demote four firefighters pursuant to a second reorganization plan. This situation differs from that considered in Shoaf v. City of Lafayette (1981), Ind.App., 421 N.E.2d 1168 (trans. denied). In Shoaf, the police commission dismissed a police officer, following a defective proceeding. The court held that the commission could not cure the defects by holding a rehearing of its dismissal decision because it had no authority to review its own decision. In this case, however, the Board denied a proposal, and later considered and granted another proposal. The denial of the first proposal and the refusal to demote the eight firefighters did not strip the Board of its authority to consider another proposal. The Board did not review a previous decision at the April 9 hearing; it made a new decision about a new proposal. 10
The firefighters further contend that their due process rights were violated because they were demoted without adequate notice or hearing. Demotion from rank is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment's due process guarantees if a statute creates a legitimate claim of entitlement to continue in that rank. Sheridan v. Town of Merrillville (1981), Ind.App., 428 N.E.2d 268, 271. IC 18-1-11-3, as in effect in April, 1981, created such an entitlement; therefore, the firefighters were protected by procedural process requirements, so they could not be demoted without sufficient cause, notice, and a hearing. As we have previously stated, the firefighters received notice of the reasons for demotion and an adequate hearing. Their...
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