State ex rel. Miller v. Patterson, 73--765
| Decision Date | 17 October 1973 |
| Docket Number | No. 73--765,73--765 |
| Citation | 284 So.2d 9 |
| Parties | STATE of Florida ex rel. Kenneth J. MILLER, Relator, v. The Honorable William A. PATTERSON, and each and every, all and singular the Circuit Judges of the Circuit Court of the Sixth Judicial Circuit in and for Pinellas County, Florida, Respondents. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
John L. Riley, Riley, Schowe & Saltsman, St. Petersburg, for relator.
Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, Baya Harrison, III, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tampa, for respondents.
ON SUGGESTION FOR WRIT OF PROHIBITION
Relator seeks to prohibit respondents, as circuit judges of the Sixth Judicial Circuit, Pinellas County, from causing him to be tried on a felony charge now pending before them. He asserts his constitutional rights against twice being put in jeopardy for the same offense. We think he's right, and that prohibition is appropriate. 1
Relator was arrested on May 13, 1973 and charged by a Uniform Traffic Citation with 'failure to remain at the scene of an accident involving injury in violation of State Statute § 316.027.' Thereafter, such citation was filed in the County Court of Pinellas County, there to serve, pursuant to § 316.081, F.S.1971, F.S.A., as an accusatory writ upon which prosecution may be had. While that case was pending in the County Court the State Attorney filed the direct information involved herein in the Circuit Court which charges the relator with a Felony, to-wit: 'willfully' leaving the scene of an accident involving personal injury in violation of 's 316.062.' As may be suspected, at this point, it is undisputed that the accident referred to in the Uniform Traffic Citation, and the accident referred to in the pending information in the Circuit Court, are one and the same accident; and the one injured party is the same person in each case.
In due course the charge pending in the County Court was called up for trial and, on July 11, 1973 with the state then and there being represented by an Assistant State Attorney and acquiescing therein, relator changed his previously entered plea of not guilty and entered his plea of guilty. Such plea was accepted by the court and a finding of guilt entered, but formal adjudication of guilt was withheld pending a pre-sentence investigation.
On these facts relator first contends that the offense as laid in the aforesaid Uniform Traffic Citation is a misdemeanor. Secondly, he submits that he was placed in jeopardy thereof upon acceptance by the County Court of his plea of guilty thereto since that court has misdemeanor jurisdiction. 2 Finally, he insists that such offense is included within the felony offense of 'willfully' leaving the scene of an accident as embraced within the information now pending. He concludes, therefore, that the two charges are really the 'same offense' within the discipline of double jeopardy considerations and that prohibition will lie to preclude prosecution of the impending felony charge.
The state on the other hand contends that a violation of § 316.027, Supra, is a felony only, with no misdemeanor included within it. Accordingly, it says, the County Court has no jurisdiction to proceed on the Uniform Traffic Citation at all; but having done so nonetheless, its proceedings in the premises are absolutely void thus clearing the way for the pending Circuit Court prosecution. Moreover, says the state, jurisdiction cannot be conferred upon the County Court by waiver or estoppel predicated upon the state's acquiescence in the proceedings therein.
While we can agree with the state that jurisdiction cannot be conferred on the County Court by waiver or estoppel, we must disagree that that court did not have jurisdiction in the first place. Three sections of Chapter 316, F.S. 1971, F.S.A., known as the Florida uniform traffic control law, are relevant here. First of all, to summarize in the interest of brevity and conciseness, § 316.026 of that law is an omnibus section which provides that a violation of Any provision of Chapter 316, F.S. 1971, F.S.A., constitutes a crime punishable as a misdemeanor unless a different punishment is specifically otherwise provided for. Section 316.062 makes it incumbent on the driver of any mother vehicle involved in an accident resulting in injury or death to any person to give his name and address, and exhibit his license upon request, to the person injured or to another appropriate person or to the investigating police officer, and, further, to render aid to or assist any injured person as may be apparently necessary; or, if any of the foregoing are impossible or impracticable, to promptly report the accident to the nearest authorized police authority. Section 316.027, the critical section involved herein, is quoted in material part as follows:
'316.027 Accidents involving death or personal injuries.--
(1) The driver of any vehicle involved in an accident resulting in injury or death of any person shall immediately stop such vehicle at the scene of the accident, or as close thereto as possible, and shall forthwith return to, and in every event shall remain at the scene of, the accident until he has fulfilled the requirements of § 316.062. Every such stop shall be made without obstructing traffic more than is necessary.
(2) Any person Willfully failing to stop or to comply with said requirements under such circumstances is guilty of a Felony and, upon conviction, shall be punished by imprisonment in the state penitentiary for not more that one (1) year or by fine of not more than five thousand dollars ($5,000) or by both such fine and imprisonment.' (Italics ours.)
We parenthetically point out here that § 316.062, Supra, does not expressly require that a driver stop to comply therewith; but it is obviously impossible to comply without stopping. On the other hand, the aforequoted § 316.027 Expressly requires the driver to stop and/or to remain at the scene and fully to comply with the aforesaid §...
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Stanfill v. State
...that being the felony of "willfully" leaving the scene of an accident. This decision conflicts with the decisions in State v. Patterson, 284 So.2d 9 (Fla.2d DCA 1973), and Diggs v. State, 334 So.2d 333 (Fla.2d DCA 1976), which hold that section 316.027 creates two crimes, the misdemeanor of......
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State ex rel. Seal v. Shepard
...of this case are virtually identical to those recited in an opinion of our sister court of the Second District, State ex rel. Miller v. Patterson, Fla.App.2d 1973, 284 So.2d 9, except that in the case sub judice it is apparent that the plea of guilty entered by the relator in the County Cou......
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Martin v. State, 75--530
...and, accordingly, lacked the element of willfulness required in the felony defined by Fla.Stat. § 316.027(2). See State ex rel. Miller v. Patterson, Fla.App.1973, 284 So.2d 9. We hold that the evidence is sufficient because the defense of lack of mental capacity is an affirmative defense. I......
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Stanfill v. State
...PER CURIAM. By this appeal we are required to construe section 316.027(1) and (2), Florida Statutes 1975, in the light of State ex rel. Miller v. Patterson, 284 So.2d 9 (Fla.App. 2 1973); State ex rel. Seal v. Shepard, 299 So.2d 644 (Fla.App. 1 1974); Diggs v. State, 334 So.2d 333 (Fla.App.......