State ex rel. Moats v. Janco

Decision Date16 March 1971
Docket NumberNo. 12979,12979
Citation180 S.E.2d 74,154 W.Va. 887
CourtWest Virginia Supreme Court
PartiesSTATE ex rel. Howard William MOATS v. Joseph JANCO, Sheriff, etc.

Syllabus by the Court

1. A duly elected justice of the peace who resides in the district for which he was elected is authorized and empowered to exercise within the county in which such district is located the jurisdiction conferred upon him by the Constitution and the statutes of this State; and his lack of professional legal training and his inability to attain the status of a duly licensed attorney at law do not of themselves render his judgment of conviction of a defendant of a criminal offense of which the justice has jurisdiction violative of the due process clauses of the Federal and State Constitutions.

2. A justice of the peace is disqualified from acting in a criminal case in which he has a pecuniary interest, however remote, and a judgment of conviction rendered by him in such case is void because violative of the due process clauses of the Federal and State Constitutions.

3. The provision of Section 11, Article 17, Chapter 50, Code, 1931, as amended, which allows a justice of the peace a fee of four dollarls in each criminal case as compensation for all official services performed by him in any single case, including his specified incidentral services, and the provision of Section 15, Article 5, Chapter 7, Code, 1931, as amended, which authorizes the payment of the fee of four dollars from the general school fund or the general county fund by order of the county court on the sheriff are constitutional and valid.

4. The provision of Section 11, Article 17, Chapter 50, Code, 1931, as amended, which allows a justice of the peace a fee of fifty cents for preparing a transcript and a fee of two dollars for bond or recognizance mentioned in the section, being dependent upon the conviction of the defendant in a criminal case, is unconstitutional in that it produces a pecuniary interest in the justice which, if either fee is charged or such fees, if earned, are not waived by the justice, disqualifies him from acting in the case and renders his judgment of conviction of the defendant void because violative of due process of law.

5. 'A void judgment, being a nullity, may be attacked, collaterally or directly, at any time and in any court whenever any claim or right is asserted under such judgment.' Point 3, syllabus, State ex rel. Bradley v. Johnson, 152 W.Va. 655. (166 S.E.2d 137.)

Thomas C. Cady, Morgantown, for appellant.

Chauncey H. Browning, Jr., Atty. Gen., George E. Lantz, Deputy Atty. Gen., Willard A. Sullivan, Asst. Atty. Gen., Charleston, for appellee.

HAYWOOD, Judge.

This habeas corpus proceeding is here upon appeal by the petitioner, Howard William Moats, from the final judgment of the Circuit Court of Monongalia County rendered October 24, 1969, which refused to require the defendant, Joseph Janco, Sheriff of Monongalia County, to release the petitioner from the jail of Monongalia County where he was confined pursuant to a judgment of William M. Bowers, Justice of the Peace of Morgan District, Monongalia County, rendered October 18, 1969, which imposed upon the petitioner a fine of fifty dollars or imprisonment in the county jail for a period of thirty days.

This appeal was granted by this Court June 29, 1970, and was originally submitted for decision upon the record and the briefs and the oral arguments of the attorneys for the respective parties on September 15, 1970.

Upon the petition of the defendant a rehearing of the case was granted January 25, 1971, and upon the rehearing this proceeding was submitted for decision upon the record and the original briefs and additional briefs, and the oral arguments of the attorneys for the respective parties on February 16, 1971.

After the Circuit Court of Monongalia County refused to admit the petitioner to bail, this Court, in a separate original habeas corpus proceeding, by order entered October 28, 1969, directed the Circuit Court of Monongalia County to release the petitioner on his own recognizance in the amount of $100.00 pending an application for an appeal in this proceeding and pursuant to the order of this Court the petitioner was released from custody October 29, 1969, after having served eleven days of the thirty day sentence imposed by the justice.

There is little, if any, dispute in the material facts disclosed by the record.

About 6:00 o'clock Friday evening, October 17, 1969, the petitioner was arrested by Trooper J. R. Rogers in Grant District of Monongalia County and was placed in the county jail in Morgantown until approximately 11:00 o'clock Saturday morning, October 18, 1969, when he was taken before William M. Bowers, Justice of the Peace of Morgan District, and served with a warrant charging him with the offense of driving a vehicle on a highway of this State while under the influence of intoxicating liquor which, under Section 2(c) Article 5, Chapter 17C, Code, 1931, as amended, is a misdemeanor for a first offense, and any person convicted of such offense shall be punished by imprisonment in the county jail for a period of not less than twenty-four hours nor more than six months and in addition to the mandatory jail sentence may be fined not less than fifty dollars nor more than one hundred dollars and the operator's or chauffeur's license of such person shall be revoked for a period of six months.

The justice read and explained the warrant to the petitioner who stated that he understood the offense and the sentence that could be imposed and when asked if he desired to plead guilty said that he did and entered a plea of guilty. Before entering the plea he was asked by the justice if he wanted an attorney and replied that he had no money and he was not provided with the assistance of an attorney for his defense. Upon the plea of guilty the justice imposed a sentence which was entered in his docket in this form: 'The defendant is committed to the county jail for thirty days in lieu of fine and cost.' In his testimony, however, the justice stated with reference to that sentence: 'I gave him a fine and costs of fifty dollars, or thirty days.' At the time of his arrest the petitioner was nineteen years of age, was indigent and unable to employ an attorney, had no money except a nickel in his possession, owned property consisting of his clothes and household articles of the value of fifty dollars and an automobile of the value of sixty dollars, was unemployed, lived in a one room house, with no inside water or toilet facilities, for which he paid ten dollars a month rent, and received as his only income one hundred and thirty eight dollars a month from public welfare.

The errors assigned and relied on by the petitioner for reversal are that upon his trial he was denied due process of law and equal protection of law because the justice of the peace (1) was without professional legal training and not licensed as an attorney; (2) was pecuniarily interested in the disposition of the case; (3) the petitioner was denied the assistance of counsel which as an indigent he was unable to employ; (4) was subjected to cruel and unusual punishment, excessive fine, and involuntary servitude because too poor to pay the fine and costs assessed against him; and (5) was sentenced to the county jail for thirty days in lieu of fine and costs, in violation of the statute which limits confinement to a period of ten days.

No appeal from the judgment of the justice of the peace has been applied for or granted and if it is a valid or voidable judgment, instead of a void judgment, it is in full force and effect and enforceable against the petitioner.

There is no merit in the contention of the petitioner that his conviction and sentence by the justice of the peace were violative of due process of law because the justice of the peace was without professional legal training and was not licensed as an attorney at law. Article VIII, Section 1, of the Constitution of this State provides that 'The judicial power of the State shall be vested in a supreme court of appeals, in circuit courts and the judges thereof, in such inferior tribunals as are herein authorized and in justices of the peace.' The office of justice of the peace in this jurisdiction is a judicial office. That office is established by Article VIII, Section 27, of the Constitution of this State, which provides that each county shall contain districts 'not less than three nor more than ten in number, and as nearly equal as may be in territory and population', that 'There shall be elected in each district containing a population not exceeding twelve hundred, one justice of the peace, and if the population exceeds that number, two such justices shall be elected therein', and that 'Every justice shall reside in the district for which he was elected'. Article VIII, Section 28, of the Constitution of this State also provides that 'The jurisdiction of justices of the peace shall extend throughout their county; they shall be conservators of the peace and have such jurisdiction and powers in criminal cases as may be prescribed by law.' See State ex rel. Ralich v. Millsop, 138 W.Va. 599, 76 S.E.2d 737.

Section 1, Article 18, Chapter 50, Code, 1931, as amended, confers criminal jurisdiction upon justices of the peace of the various offenses mentioned in the section; and Section 9, Article 19, Chapter 17C, Code, 1931, as amended, provides that justices of the peace shall have concurrent jurisdiction with the circuit, criminal and intermediate courts of the misdemeanors created by Chapter 17C, which include the offense of which the petitioner was convicted by the justice of the peace.

The Constitution prescribes no qualification for a justice of the peace except the requirement of Article VIII, Section 27, that he must reside...

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17 cases
  • Miller v. Burley
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of West Virginia
    • March 29, 1972
    ...opinion previously rendered and destroys its force and effect unless it is subsequently adopted by the same tribunal. State ex rel. Moats v. Janco, W.Va., 180 S.E.2d 74. Inasmuch as the original holding of this Court reversing the judgment of the circuit court is set aside and reversed on t......
  • State ex rel. Collins v. Bedell
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of West Virginia
    • July 12, 1995
    ...... 4 In syllabus point 1, in part, of State ex rel. Moats v. Janco, 154 W.Va. 887, 180 S.E.2d 74 (1971) this Court held that a lay justice of the peace was ......
  • Tennant v. Marion Health Care Foundation, Inc.
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of West Virginia
    • June 15, 1995
    ...the case or the process"). See also State ex rel. Shrewsbury v. Poteet, 157 W.Va. 540, 202 S.E.2d 628 (1974); State ex rel. Moats v. Janco, 154 W.Va. 887, 180 S.E.2d 74 (1971). Similarly, judicial judgment must be made free of " 'partisan interests, public clamor, or fear of criticism.' " S......
  • Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc.
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    • Supreme Court of West Virginia
    • April 3, 2008
    ...prior to the rehearing of this case. Notably, however, that opinion no longer has any force or effect. See State ex rel. Moats v. Janco, 154 W.Va. 887, 901, 180 S.E.2d 74, 83 (1971) ("As a general rule, when a rehearing is granted, the status of the case is the same as though no hearing had......
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