State ex rel. Mountain Fuel Co. v. Trent, 10592

• Decision Date: 29 September 1953
• Docket Number: No. 10592,10592
• Court: West Virginia Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE ex rel. MOUNTAIN FUEL CO. v. TRENT, State Compensation Commissioner.

Page 608

77 S.E.2d 608

138 W.Va. 737

STATE ex rel. MOUNTAIN FUEL CO. v. TRENT, State Compensation Commissioner.

No. 10592.

Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.

Submitted Sept. 2, 1953.

Decided Sept. 29, 1953.

Syllabus by the Court

1. Where the language of a valid statute is clear, definite and free of ambiguity, effect must be given to it without recourse to the rules of interpretation.

2. An accident in which one person was killed outright, one other was later declared to be totally and permanently disabled, and several others sustained minor injuries, fails to come within the definition of a 'catastrophe' as set forth in Chapter 131, Article 3, Section 1 of the Acts of the Legislature, 1945, where the injury resulting in the total permanent disability was not one of the injuries specifically enumerated in the statute.

E. Wayne Talbott, Philippi, for petitioner.

John G. Fox, Atty. Gen., T. D. Kauffelt, Asst. Atty. Gen., for respondent.

BROWNING, Judge.

Relator, Mountain Fuel Company, a corporation, seeks a writ of mandamus directing the respondent, State Compensation Commissioner, to classify an accident occurring in relator's mine on October 23, 1946, as a 'catastrophe' within the meaning of the Workmen's Compensation Act, and to credit the charges heretofore made against relator's account accordingly.

The accident occurred when thirteen of relator's employees were exposed to a quantity of carbon dioxide gas or 'black damp'. One employee died immediately as a result of such exposure, one other was declared to be permanently and totally disabled, and awarded compensation benefits for life on February 28, 1951. This award was protested by relator, and upon affirmance by the Commissioner was appealed to the Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board where the employer contended that, if the award was upheld, the accident should be classified a 'catastrophe' and the relator's account credited. The Appeal Board ordered that the award be affirmed, adding that it was the opinion of the Board that a 'catastrophe' was indicated. This Court refused an appeal from that order and the relator filed its petition for writ of mandamus alleging that, though requested to do so, the Commissioner has refused to properly adjust the charges consonant with a 'catastrophe'.

The respondent demurred to the petition on two grounds: (1) That the relator has not exhausted its administrative remedies; and (2) that the petition shows upon its face that the accident was not a 'catastrophe' within the statutory definition thereof.

The relator contends that the Appeal Board, by its order of August 9, 1952, decided this question, and no appeal having been taken within the statutory period from that order, nothing now remains to be done except for the Commission to comply therewith. A careful examination of the order, however, indicates that the Board affirmed the Commissioner's ruling of January 14, 1952, this language being used: '* * * it is hereby adjudged, ordered and decreed that the order of the Commissioner as of the 14th day of January, 1952, should be and the same hereby is affirmed; * * *.' After inserting a semicolon at that point, the order continues: 'but it is the opinion of the Appeal Board that the award should be charged to the surplus found * * *.' In a memorandum accompanying the Board's order, it states that while it believes the disability resulting from the accident constitutes a catastrophe within the meaning of the statute, that the matter was not properly before it, inasmuch as no order of the Commissioner was entered relative to that phase of the case. There was no adjudication of this question by the Appeal Board, and the Commissioner was not bound by the suggestion contained in its order relative to the charges that should be made in his department. The provisions of Code, 23-5-1, are sufficient to give the Appeal Board jurisdiction of the question raised in this proceeding if originally passed upon by the Commissioner and properly presented upon appeal to the Board. However, we do not believe that remedy to be exclusive, and are of the opinion that this Court has jurisdiction in mandamus to adjudicate the issue presented upon this record.

Section 1, Article 3 of Chapter 131 of the 1945 Acts of the Legislature, reads in part as follows: '* * * A catastrophe is hereby defined as an accident in which three or more employees are killed or receive injuries, which, in the case of one individual, consist of: Loss of both eyes or the sight thereof; or loss of both hands or the use thereof; or loss of both feet or the use thereof; or loss of one hand and one foot or the use thereof. * * *'

It is interesting to note that in 1947 the Legislature amended this section by Chapter 165, Article 3, Section 1, Acts of the Legislature, 1947, to read as follows: 'A catastrophe is hereby defined as an accident in which three or more employees are killed or receive injuries, which, in the case of each individual, consists of: Loss of both eyes or the sight thereof; or loss of both hands or the use thereof; or loss of both feet or the use thereof; or loss of one hand and one foot or the use thereof.' It will be noted that only one word of the 1945 Act was changed by the Amendment of 1947. The word 'one' appearing before the word 'individual' in the earlier Act was changed to the word 'each'. It will also be noted that the accident occurred in 1946, while the 1945 Act was effective, and that the award of total permanent disability, which the relator contends makes the accident a...