State ex rel. Natalina Food Co. v. Ohio Civil Rights Com'n

• Decision Date: 05 December 1990
• Docket Number: No. 89-1399,89-1399
• Citation: 55 Ohio St.3d 98,562 N.E.2d 1383
• Parties: , 54 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 1009, 59 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 41,582 The STATE, ex rel. NATALINA FOOD COMPANY, Appellant, v. OHIO CIVIL RIGHTS COMMISSION, Appellee.
• Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Page 98

55 Ohio St.3d 98

562 N.E.2d 1383, 54 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 1009,

59 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 41,582

The STATE, ex rel. NATALINA FOOD COMPANY, Appellant, v. OHIO CIVIL RIGHTS COMMISSION, Appellee.

No. 89-1399.

Supreme Court of Ohio.

Submitted July 19, 1990.

Decided Dec. 5, 1990.

Schwartz, Einhart, Wood & Szuter, Gregory P. Szuter and Antoinette M. Frantz, Cleveland, for appellant.

Anthony J. Celebrezze, Jr., Atty. Gen., and Gregory J. Vincent, Columbus, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

In this appeal, relator-appellant, Natalina Food Company ("Natalina"), seeks a writ of prohibition to prevent respondent-appellee, the Ohio Civil Rights Commission ("OCRC"), from conducting an administrative hearing on an OCRC complaint. The OCRC complaint alleges that Natalina discharged Paul S. O'Brien, Sr. because of his age and handicap in violation of R.C. 4112.02(A). Natalina contends that the OCRC lacks jurisdiction to decide O'Brien's discrimination claim because O'Brien is a West Virginia resident whose employment occurred principally in that state, not in Ohio.

The material facts underlying this appeal are not in dispute. Some years ago, O'Brien was hired in West Virginia to work for Freezer Queen, Inc., an Ohio-based pizza manufacturer and distributor. Natalina later purchased Freezer Queen and reorganized the company. Natalina retained O'Brien in his position as a sales representative and route supervisor, but O'Brien's continued employment apparently did not involve the duties and responsibilities he previously performed in Ohio. Natalina sent O'Brien's paychecks to him from Ohio, however, and O'Brien's supervisors appear to have been located here.

Natalina fired O'Brien in February 1988, and he filed a charge of discrimination with the OCRC shortly thereafter. The OCRC investigated the charge and determined that probable cause for a complaint existed. Natalina argued lack of jurisdiction in a request that the OCRC reconsider the decision to issue a complaint. The OCRC denied Natalina's request and issued the complaint regarding O'Brien's discharge.

Natalina then filed the instant action in the Court of Appeals for Summit County. The OCRC answered and later filed a motion that sought dismissal of the complaint pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B) (failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted) or, in the alternative, summary judgment. In addition, the OCRC submitted a certified record of the proceedings that preceded the OCRC's complaint. Natalina responded to the motion to dismiss and also moved for summary judgment based on submitted evidence.

The court of appeals dismissed Natalina's complaint pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6). Civ.R. 12(B), however, requires that a motion to dismiss be "treated as a motion for summary judgment and disposed of as provided by Rule 56" when the motion presents matters outside the pleading. The court of appeals did not exclude the evidence that the parties provided in support of their respective motions for summary judgment. Thus, the court of appeals should have considered this case on the cross-motions for summary judgment, and it erred by granting the OCRC's motion to dismiss.

The court of appeals' error, however, does not require us to remand this case. Our plenary authority in extraordinary actions permits us to consider the instant appeal as if it had been originally filed in this court. See, e.g., State, ex rel. Pressley, v. Indus. Comm. (1967), 11 Ohio St.2d 141, 40 O.O.2d 141, 228 N.E.2d 631, paragraph ten of the syllabus; State, ex rel. Natl. Emp. Benefit Serv., Inc., v. Cuyahoga Cty. Court of Common Pleas (1990), 49 Ohio St.3d 49, 50, 550 N.E.2d 941, 943, at fn. 1. Thus, we now decide if either the OCRC or Natalina is entitled to judgment as a matter of law pursuant to the standard in Civ.R. 56.

For a writ of prohibition to issue, we must find that the OCRC is about to exercise unauthorized quasi-judicial power and that this will cause injury for which no other adequate remedy exists. State, ex rel. Yates, v. Court of Appeals for Montgomery Cty. (1987), 32 Ohio St.3d 30, 33, 512 N.E.2d 343, 346. Natalina implicitly concedes that it will eventually be able to appeal an adverse OCRC decision under R.C. 4112.06 and that this appeal is an adequate remedy. However, relying on cases like State, ex rel. Adams, v. Gusweiler (1972), 30 Ohio St.2d 326, 59 O.O.2d 387, 285 N.E.2d 22, Natalina contends that the OCRC has no jurisdiction whatsoever to consider O'Brien's claim and, thus, that the writ should issue notwithstanding the available appeal. See, also, State, ex rel. Johnson, v. Perry County Court (1986), 25 Ohio St.3d 53, 25 OBR 77, 495 N.E.2d 16.

Natalina makes four arguments in support of its basic premise. First, Natalina argues that the OCRC lacks jurisdiction because R.C. Chapter 4112 should be construed to prevent the OCRC from considering charges filed by nonresident employees, like O'Brien, who work outside Ohio for Ohio employers. Second, Natalina relies on Prendergast v. Indus. Comm. (1940), 136 Ohio St. 535, 17 O.O. 190, 27 N.E.2d 235, to argue by analogy to workers' compensation law that the OCRC lacks jurisdiction because O'Brien's employment was not "localized" in Ohio. Third, Natalina relies on choice-of-law principles to argue by analogy that the OCRC lacks jurisdiction because West Virginia has a more substantial interest than Ohio in O'Brien's claim. Fourth, Natalina relies on due process guarantees requiring minimum contacts in a forum state for suits against nonresident defendants to argue, again by analogy, that the OCRC lacks jurisdiction because O'Brien has no minimum contacts with Ohio.

For a writ of prohibition to issue despite an available appeal, however, a "patent and unambiguous" restriction on a tribunal's jurisdiction must exist. State, ex rel. Smith, v. Court (1982), 70 Ohio St.2d 213,...