State ex rel. Nichols v. Songstad
| Decision Date | 17 May 2018 |
| Docket Number | No. W2016–02011–COA–R3–JV,W2016–02011–COA–R3–JV |
| Citation | 563 S.W.3d 868 |
| Parties | STATE EX REL. Jana Ruth Alford NICHOLS v. Randall Nelson SONGSTAD |
| Court | Tennessee Court of Appeals |
Daniel Loyd Taylor and John N. Bean, Memphis, Tennessee, for the appellants, Randall Nelson Songstad.
Herbert H. Slatery, III, Attorney General and Reporter; Brian A. Pierce, Assistant Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee, Department of Human Services.
Lee Ann Pafford Dobson, Germantown, Tennessee, for the appellee, Jana Ruth Alford Nichols.
Father unilaterally modified his child support obligation without submitting a petition to modify to the trial court because his oldest child emancipated. The trial court found that Father had impermissibly modified his child support obligation based, inter alia , on the fact that Father failed to follow the Child Support Guidelines. Discerning no error, we affirm the trial court's judgment.
The facts in this case are largely undisputed. Randall Nelson Songstad ("Father") and Jana Ruth Alford Nichols ("Mother") were divorced in the Chancery Court of Shelby County ("chancery court") on January 30, 2006. A Permanent Parenting Plan ("the plan") was entered on May 17, 2006, which required Father to pay child support for the parties' two minor children in the amount of $1,154.00 per month. The plan included the language "[t]he parents acknowledge that court approval must be obtained before child support can be reduced or modified." Father and Mother both signed the plan.
In 2011, the eldest of the parties' two children emancipated after she graduated high school. After her emancipation, Father unilaterally prorated his child support payments by approximately fifty percent without filing a petition to modify or bringing his modification request before the court in any way. Mother, however, accepted Father's reduced child support payments for the next four years, until the parties' youngest child also emancipated in 2014.1
Mother, who became a Texas resident after the parties' divorce, applied for Title IV–D assistance2 in Texas in 2014. After receiving little to no assistance in Texas, Mother filed for contempt in the chancery court. The State of Tennessee ("the state") then filed a notice of Title IV–D services and a notice to transfer to the Shelby County Juvenile Court ("juvenile court") in the chancery court on July 7, 2015. The matter was administratively transferred to the juvenile court pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 36–5–402.3 The state then filed a petition to establish arrears and/or to modify order on September 30, 2015, in the juvenile court. The matter was continued several times and was finally heard on June 9, 2016, by Magistrate Debra Sanders. The juvenile magistrate entered her findings and recommendations on June 21, 2016, in which the magistrate granted, in part, the petition to establish arrears and modify child support, as to the establishment of arrears only. The Magistrate additionally established arrears in the amount of $29,994.00 to be paid monthly by Father in the amount of $1,154.00 beginning July 1, 2016. Father filed a timely motion to rehear requesting a rehearing before the Presiding Judge.4
On July 27, 2016, Special Judge Nancy Percer Kessler heard the case.5 The court entered an order on the same day finding that Father's request for rehearing was granted and taken under advisement. The juvenile court entered its final order on August 25, 2016, in which it found that Father was in arrears in the amount of $29,994.00. Father timely appealed this order.
Father presents one issue on appeal, which we have slightly restated: Whether the trial court erred in not allowing Father to prorate his child support upon his oldest child's emancipation without a court order.
This Court reviews questions of the law de novo with no presumption of correctness. Kelly v. Kelly , 445 S.W.3d 685, 692 (Tenn. 2014) (citing Armbrister v. Armbrister , 414 S.W.3d 685, 692 (Tenn. 2013) ). When reviewing child support determinations, however, this Court reviews those decisions "using the deferential ‘abuse of discretion’ standard." Richardson v. Spanos , 189 S.W.3d 720, 725 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005). A trial court abuses its discretion when it "applies an incorrect legal standard, reaches a decision that is illogical, basis its decision on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence, or employs a reasoning that causes an injustice to the complaining party." Id. (citing Perry v. Perry , 114 S.W.3d 465, 467 (Tenn. 2003) ; Clinard v. Blackwood , 46 S.W.3d 177, 182 (Tenn. 2001) ; Overstreet v. Shoney's, Inc. , 4 S.W.3d 694, 709 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999) ).
As a preliminary matter, we must first address Father's argument that the trial court violated his constitutional rights by retroactively applying Wunder v. Wunder , M2014–00008–COA–R3–CV, 2014 WL 7332857 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2014) to his 2011 proration of child support. We are cognizant that the trial court heavily relied on Wunder , a memorandum opinion, in its order. Indeed, in its conclusions of law, the trial court specifically states that it "adopts the findings in Wunder v. Wunder , 2014 WL 7332857." We also recognize the factual similarities between Wunder and the case at bar; however, "[w]hen a case is decided by memorandum opinion it shall be designated ‘MEMORANDUM OPINION,’ shall not be published, and shall not be cited or relied on for any reason in any unrelated case ." Tenn. R. Ct. App 10 (emphasis added). Accordingly, we will not rely on Wunder as the trial court did in this case, and Father's argument regarding a violation of his constitutional rights and the retroactive application of Wunder is pretermitted.
Father next asserts that a parent may unilaterally prorate child support without requesting a modification from the court upon emancipation of the child because (1) a parent has no duty to support a child once he or she has reached the age of majority and (2) proration of child support is not considered a "modification" of a child support award. Respectfully, we disagree. The Child Support Guidelines control this case, and they require Father to seek a modification from the court and establish a significant variance prior to modifying his child support obligation.
"[S]ince 1984, the process and criteria for ascertaining a parent's child support obligation has been governed by Child Support Guidelines promulgated by the Tennessee Department of Human Services in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 35–5–101(e)." Richardson , 189 S.W.3d at 724—25. Tennessee Code Annotated section 36–5–101(e) states: "In making the court's determination concerning the amount of support of any minor child or children of the parties, the court shall apply, as a rebuttable presumption, the child support guidelines, as provided in this subsection...." Tenn. Code Ann. § 36–5–101(e)(1)(A). "Tennessee's Child Support Guidelines have the force of law." State ex rel. Williams v. Woods , 530 S.W.3d 129, 137 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2017) (citing Jahn v. Jahn , 932 S.W.2d 939, 943 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996) ). Therefore, courts must use the "child support guidelines ‘to promote both efficient child support proceedings and dependable, consistent child support awards.’ " Id. (citing State ex rel. Vaughn v. Kaatrude , 21 S.W.3d 244, 249 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000) ); see also Tenn. Code Ann. § 36–5–101(e) ; Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs. 1240–02–04–.01(3)(b), (c).
Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs. 1240–02–04–.05(1). This Court has explained that "the Tennessee Child Support Guidelines clearly state that the income shares guidelines can apply to actions pending before the effective date, provided that the hearing on the petition to modify is held after the effective date." Boyd v. Bates , No. M2007-02345-COA-R3-CV, 2008 WL 3342998, at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 11, 2008) (). Therefore, the income shares model may apply to cases pending prior to January 18, 2005, so long as the hearing occurred after that date. See Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs. 1240–01–04–.05(1).
The income shares guidelines require a "significant variance" for a modification of a child support order. Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs. 1240–02–04–.05(2)(a) (). A significant variance, in other words, acts as a condition precedent for a modification. See id. Because of the change from the flat percentage model to the income shares model in 2005, the guidelines distinguish between a significant variance for child support orders that were "established or modified before January 18, 2005" and requests to modify orders that were established or modified after the effective date of the guidelines. See id. In relevant part, regarding orders entered prior to January 18, 2005, the Child Support Guidelines state:
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