State ex rel. Ogle v. Hocking Cnty. Common Pleas Court

• Citation: 167 Ohio St.3d 181,190 N.E.3d 594
• Decision Date: 21 December 2021
• Docket Number: 2021-0234
• Parties: The STATE EX REL. OGLE, Appellant, v. HOCKING COUNTY COMMON PLEAS COURT et al., Appellees.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Ohio

167 Ohio St.3d 181

190 N.E.3d 594

The STATE EX REL. OGLE, Appellant,

v.HOCKING COUNTY COMMON PLEAS COURT et al., Appellees.

No. 2021-0234

Supreme Court of Ohio.

Submitted August 3, 2021

Decided December 21, 2021.

Melanie A. Ogle, pro se.

Lambert Law Office, Randall L. Lambert, Ironton, and Cassaundra L. Stark, for appellees.

Per Curiam.

{¶ 1} Appellant, Melanie A. Ogle, appeals the judgment of the Fourth District Court of Appeals dismissing her complaint for writs of mandamus and prohibition against appellees, Judge Dale A. Crawford and the Hocking County Common Pleas Court, and denying her motion for disqualification of attorney Randall L. Lambert. We affirm the denial of the motion for disqualification. However, we reverse the dismissal of the prohibition and mandamus claims and remand the case for further proceedings.

I. Background

{¶ 2} In August 2011, a Hocking County jury found Ogle guilty of assaulting a peace officer, in violation of R.C. 2903.13. State v. Ogle , Hocking C.P. No. 09CR0125 (Sept. 28, 2011). Ogle was represented by counsel at trial.

{¶ 3} On September 16, 2011, prior to sentencing, Judge Crawford placed Ogle on house arrest. Judge Crawford's order stated, in part, that Ogle would be "released on a Recognizance Bond with the conditions as follows: (1) the Defendant is to have no contact, direct or indirect, with any juror, witness, lawyer or the Court while on bond." (Emphasis added.) On September 21, Ogle filed a "Notice of Pro Se Appearance."

{¶ 4} On September 27, Judge Crawford held a sentencing hearing. At the outset, Ogle refused to sign a waiver-of-counsel form, insisting that she did not waive her right to counsel but had "an inability to obtain counsel." Judge Crawford asked Ogle three times whether she wished for the court to appoint counsel to represent her. Ogle did not directly answer the judge's question but responded each time that she did not waive her right to counsel. Ogle did not explain why she was unable to obtain counsel, but she apparently believed that Judge Crawford's September 16 order forbade her from speaking to an attorney. Judge Crawford told Ogle, "I will take your notice of pro se appearance as a voluntary waiver of your right to counsel at this point in time because you have not requested the Court appoint counsel on your behalf." Ogle continued to assert that she did not waive her right to counsel, prompting Judge Crawford to say the following:

Well, as I said, I could have ten different hearings, Mrs. Ogle, with you, and you could say the same thing, "I haven't waived my right to counsel" and then I don't know what I am supposed to do. I can't force counsel upon you. I have asked you if you want the Court to appoint counsel since you can't afford one. You won't answer yes under that question so I am going to proceed with sentencing.

Judge Crawford then conducted the hearing, at the end of which he imposed a sentence of six months in the county jail and ordered Ogle to pay a $2,500 fine, $792.65 in restitution, and court costs. When asked if she had anything else to say, Ogle again stated: "I do not waive my right to counsel. I have an inability to obtain counsel and this hearing is being held in violation of my Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to the Constitution of the United States." On September 28, Judge Crawford journalized the sentencing entry.

{¶ 5} The court of appeals affirmed Ogle's conviction. State v. Ogle , 4th Dist. Hocking Nos. 11CA29, 11CA32, 12CA2, 12CA11, 12CA12, and 12CA19, 2013-Ohio-3420, 2013 WL 3988782.

{¶ 6} On September 30, 2020, Ogle filed a complaint for writs of mandamus and prohibition in the court of appeals. She alleged that Judge Crawford had no jurisdiction to hold the September 27, 2011 sentencing hearing, because she had not waived her right to counsel. She asked the court of appeals for writs of mandamus and prohibition as a means to void the September 28, 2011 sentencing entry.

{¶ 7} Judge Crawford and the Hocking County Common Pleas Court, represented by Lambert, filed a motion to dismiss Ogle's complaint. Ogle filed a memorandum in opposition to the motion to dismiss and a motion to disqualify Lambert as counsel. Ogle claimed that Lambert had represented Trent Woodgeard in a lawsuit that she had filed against Woodgeard in federal court. Woodgeard, a Hocking County sheriff's deputy, was the peace officer whom Ogle was convicted of assaulting in 2011. See Ogle at ¶ 41. Ogle argued that it was a conflict of interest for Lambert to represent both Judge Crawford, who presided over her criminal trial, and Deputy Woodgeard, who was "the false accuser, alleged victim, and sole witness against" her in that same criminal trial.

{¶ 8} On January 7, 2021, the court of appeals granted the motion to dismiss. 4th Dist. Hocking No. 20CA9. The court of appeals held that prohibition would not lie, because Judge Crawford had general jurisdiction over Ogle's felony case. In addition, the court held that Ogle was not entitled to mandamus relief, because she had an adequate remedy by way of direct appeal to assert her right-to-counsel claim. The court of appeals denied the motion to disqualify Lambert because there was no evidence that an attorney-client relationship had ever existed between Lambert and Ogle.

{¶ 9} Ogle appealed to this court as of right.

II. Legal analysis

A. The dismissal of Ogle's prohibition complaint

{¶ 10} To be entitled to a writ of prohibition, Ogle must establish the exercise of judicial power, the lack of authority for the exercise of that power, and the lack of an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. State ex rel. Elder v. Camplese , 144 Ohio St.3d 89, 2015-Ohio-3628, 40 N.E.3d 1138, ¶ 13. However, if the absence of jurisdiction is patent and unambiguous, she need not establish the third prong—the lack of an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. State ex rel. Sapp v. Franklin Cty. Court of Appeals , 118 Ohio St.3d 368, 2008-Ohio-2637, 889 N.E.2d 500, ¶ 15. We review de novo a decision granting a motion to dismiss under Civ.R. 12(B)(6). Alford v. Collins-McGregor Operating Co. , 152 Ohio St.3d 303, 2018-Ohio-8, 95 N.E.3d 382, ¶ 10.

{¶ 11} There is no dispute that Judge Crawford exercised judicial authority. The court of appeals reasoned that his exercise of that authority was lawful because R.C. 2931.03 vests the common pleas court with original jurisdiction over most criminal matters, including the felony charge against Ogle. But according to Ogle, the issue is not Judge Crawford's general jurisdiction but whether she alleged facts to suggest that her sentencing entry was void.

{¶ 12} Ogle's argument rests on the United States Supreme Court's decision in Johnson v. Zerbst , 304 U.S. 458, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938). Johnson was convicted in federal court of counterfeiting money, following a trial at which he was not provided counsel. Id. at 459-460, 58 S.Ct. 1019. Johnson later filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus based on the denial of his constitutional right to counsel. The district court denied relief on the ground that any such deprivation was an error to be corrected on appeal, not a defect that rendered the judgment of the trial court void. Id. at 459, 58 S.Ct. 1019. The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that "[a] court's jurisdiction at the beginning of trial may be lost ‘in the course of the proceedings’ due to failure to complete the court—as the Sixth Amendment requires—by providing counsel for an accused who is unable to obtain counsel, who has not intelligently waived this constitutional guaranty, and whose life or liberty is at stake." Id. at 468, 58 S.Ct. 1019. If these requirements are not met, the trial court no longer has jurisdiction and the judgment of conviction is void. Id.

{¶ 13} We recently clarified that "[a] sentence is void only if the sentencing court lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case or personal jurisdiction over the accused," State v. Henderson , 161 Ohio St.3d 285, 2020-Ohio-4784, 162 N.E.3d 776, ¶ 27, but the declaration in Zerbst that a Sixth Amendment violation renders an associated conviction void remains in force.

{¶ 14} Appellees argue that the United States Supreme Court overruled Zerbst in Edwards v. Arizona , 451 U.S. 477, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981). This is incorrect. Edwards changed the standard for what constitutes a waiver of the right to counsel (in the context of a police interrogation), but it did not overrule the holding in Zerbst that if there is no valid waiver of the right to counsel at trial, then the resulting conviction is void.

{¶ 15} Alternatively, appellees contend that Ogle's claim is barred by res judicata, either because she raised the issue that the trial court erred by sentencing her in violation of her Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights in her direct appeal or because she did so unsuccessfully in a federal habeas corpus proceeding. However, res judicata is an affirmative defense and is not a proper basis for dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. State ex rel. Neguse v. McIntosh , 161 Ohio St.3d 125, 2020-Ohio-3533, 161 N.E.3d 571, ¶ 10.

{¶ 16} Next, appellees suggest that this court should affirm the dismissal of Ogle's complaint for failure to state a claim. They contend that Ogle never asserted her Sixth Amendment right to counsel and therefore waived it. But the transcript of the sentencing hearing shows that Ogle never expressly waived her right to counsel; to the contrary, she repeatedly asserted it and expressly invoked the Sixth Amendment at least four times during the hearing. Courts disfavor self-representation and will therefore " ‘indulge in every reasonable presumption against waiver [of counsel].’ " (Brackets added in Hackett ) State v. Hackett , 164 Ohio St.3d 74, 2020-Ohio-6699, 172 N.E.3d 75, ¶ 56 (Stewart, J., concurring), quoting Brewer v. Williams , 430 U.S. 387, 404, 97 S.Ct. 1232, 51 L.Ed.2d 424 (1977). Ogle has at least...