State Ex Rel. Owen v. Van Stone.

• Decision Date: 30 January 1912
• Citation: 17 N.M. 41,121 P. 611
• Parties: STATE ex rel. OWENv.VAN STONE.
• Court: New Mexico Supreme Court

17 N.M. 41

121 P. 611

STATE ex rel. OWEN

v.VAN STONE.

Supreme Court of New Mexico.

Jan. 30, 1912.

Petition for quo warranto by the State, on the relation of O. L. Owen, against George H. Van Stone. Petition dismissed.

St. Anne, c. 20, 1710, relating to informations in the nature of quo warranto, is a part of the common law.

Frank W. Clancy, Atty. Gen., and H. D. Terrill, for relator. Neill B. Field, Francis C. Wilson, and Chester D. Cleveland, for respondent.

PARKER, J.

This is a petition for leave to file an information in the nature of a quo warranto. A rule was issued against the respondent requiring him to show cause why leave should not be granted to file the information. Upon the return day, a motion to discharge the rule was interposed by the respondent, and the matter argued before the court by counsel for the respective parties. It appears that the relator was a candidate at the recent first state election for the office of Corporation Commissioner, and that the canvassing board appointed by the enabling act declared the respondent elected to that office and issued him a certificate of election in conformity with the provisions of that act. Relator accompanied his motion for leave to file the information with affidavits showing, or tending to show, that he was defeated for the office by reason of a mistake made in his name upon the printed ballot which was issued by the probate clerk in two of the counties of the state; his name appearing upon the said ballots as Sol Owen, instead of O. L. Owen.

The original jurisdiction of this court which is invoked is that conferred by section 3 of article 6 of the Constitution of the state, the provisions of which are as follows: “Sec. 3. The Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction in quo warranto and mandamus against all state officers, boards and commissions, and shall have a superintending control over all inferior courts; it shall also have power to issue writs of mandamus, error, prohibition, habeas corpus, certiorari, injunction and all other writs necessary or proper for the complete exercise of its jurisdiction and to hear and determine the same. Such writs may be issued by direction of the court or by any justice thereof. Each justice shall have power to issue writs of habeas corpus upon petition by or on behalf of a person held in actual custody, and to make such writs returnable before himself or before the Supreme Court, or before any of the District Courts or any judge thereof.”

[1] 1. In support of the petition for leave to file the information, it is urged that this court has exclusive original jurisdiction where the proceeding is against a state officer, as in this case. It is contended that the grant of jurisdiction to district courts does not include the concurrent jurisdiction in such cases. The grant to those courts is contained in section 13 of the same article, and is as follows: “Sec. 13. The district court shall have original jurisdiction in all matters and causes not excepted in this Constitution, and such jurisdiction of special cases and proceedings as may be conferred by law, and appellate jurisdiction of all cases originating in inferior courts and tribunals in their respective districts, and supervisory control over the same. The district courts or any judge thereof, shall have power to issue writs of habeas corpus, mandamus, injunction, quo warranto, certiorari, prohibition, and all other writs, remedial or otherwise in the exercise of their jurisdiction; provided, that no such writs shall issue directed to judges or courts of equal or superior jurisdiction. The district courts shall also have the power of naturalization in accordance with the laws of the United States. Until otherwise provided by law, at least two terms of the district court shall be held annually in each county, at the county seat.” The argument culminates with the proposition that this court must take jurisdiction of the case, otherwise the relator will be remediless.

We think the argument for relator faulty in several particulars. In the first place, the grant of jurisdiction to this court is not exclusive in terms. Had the constitutional convention intended to make the jurisdiction exclusive, it is to be presumed that it would have clearly so indicated. It refrained from so doing.

It is further urged that the grant of jurisdiction to this court is specific, while the grant to district courts is general, and the principle, sometimes applied in the interpretation of conflicting sections of statutes or Constitutions, that specific terms will not be controlled by general words in another part of the statute or Constitution, or in a subsequent statute, is invoked. It is evident to our minds, however, that this principle has no application in this connection. It is to be remembered that this court is fundamentally a court of review. The mere name Supreme Court, in the light of the history of our institutions, thus establishes its character. It is expressly given plenary power of review and superintending control over all inferior courts. It is made the final arbiter of the rights of our citizens and of the state. Such powers and jurisdiction are inconsistent, to the professional mind, with the exercise of any original jurisdiction. It became necessary, therefore, when it was deemed wise to confer upon this court certain original jurisdiction, to specifically point out its scope and specifically define its limits. In no other way could the result desired be accomplished. It seems clear that this grant is not, in legal contemplation, a specific grant of original jurisdiction, in the sense that it will exclude jurisdiction of other courts, but is, rather, a grant of original jurisdiction, which is merely specifically defined and limited. On the other hand, the grant of original jurisdiction to the district courts is general and comprehensive and extends to every kind and form of controversy not excepted in the Constitution, and includes specifically quo warranto. The grant of original jurisdiction to this court in this class of cases can in no sense be said to be an exception within the meaning of the Constitution and does not operate to exclude the district courts under their general powers.

We have then a case of a grant of original jurisdiction to two courts in two separate sections of the Constitution over the same subject-matter, in such a case the jurisdiction will be held to be concurrent. Jones v. Reed, 3 Wash. 57, 27 Pac. 1067.

2. This court, as well as the district courts, having jurisdiction, the question next arises whether it is necessary or proper for this court to exercise the jurisdiction in all cases of this character when invoked.

[2] Previous to the statute of Anne (9...