State ex rel. Pate v. Mooney

• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals
• Writing for the Court: Mary R. Russell
• Citation: State ex rel. Pate v. Mooney, 88 S.W.3d 37 (Mo. App. 2002)
• Decision Date: 20 August 2002
• Docket Number: No. ED 79816.,ED 79816.
• Parties: L. PATE, Relator/Respondent, v. Madison County Presiding Commissioner Robert MOONEY, Commissioner Don Myers, Commissioner Terry Hovis, and Treasurer Kay Rehkop, Respondents/Appellants.

88 S.W.3d 37

L. PATE, Relator/Respondent, v. Madison County Presiding Commissioner Robert MOONEY, Commissioner Don Myers, Commissioner Terry Hovis, and Treasurer Kay Rehkop, Respondents/Appellants.

No. ED 79816.

Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, Southern Division.

August 20, 2002.

Motion for Rehearing and/or Transfer to Supreme Court Denied October 22, 2002.

Application for Transfer Denied November 26, 2002.

M. Dwight Robbins, Fredericktown, MO, for appellant.

Morry S. Cole, St. Louis, MO, for respondents.

MARY R. RUSSELL, Judge.

Madison County Presiding Commissioner Robert Mooney, Commissioner Don Myers, Commissioner Terry Hovis, and Treasurer Kay Rehkop (collectively "County") appeal from a judgment of the Circuit Court of Madison County in favor of Madison County Public Administrator Kenneth L. Pate ("Public Administrator"). County alleges the trial court erred in finding that Public Administrator had "duly and timely" requested increased compensation for his work in 1997 and 1998. We agree with County and reverse.

The Madison County Salary Commission ("Salary Commission") met in October 1995, to set salaries for county officials, including the public administrator, whose terms would begin in January 1997.¹ Acting in accordance with section 50.333 RSMo (Supp.1995), the 1995 Salary Commission voted to set the salaries of all county officials at 85 percent of the maximum salary they could receive under their respective salary schedules. The 1995 Salary Commission set the salaries in this way pursuant to the section 50.333 RSMo (Supp.1995) provision that stated if a county salary commission voted to increase the compensation of a county official, it must pay all other officials whose salaries were being considered the same percentage of their "maximum allowable compensation."²

The 1995 Salary Commission then voted to set the public administrator's salary at $6,000. Public Administrator, who took office in 1997, testified at trial that the 1995 Salary Commission set his salary at $6,000 because it misinterpreted section 473.739 RSMo 1994.

Section 473.739 RSMo 1994, in relevant part, stated:

1. Each public administrator, except in counties of the first class with a charter form of government, who does not receive at least twenty-five thousand dollars in fees as otherwise allowed by law shall receive annual compensation of four thousand dollars and each such public administrator who does not receive at least twentyfive thousand dollars in fees may request the county salary commission for an increase in annual compensation and the county salary commission may authorize an additional increase in annual compensation not to exceed ten thousand dollars.

2. Two thousand dollars of the compensation authorized in this section shall be payable to the public administrator only if he has completed at least twenty hours of classroom instruction each calendar year relating to the operations of the public administrator's office when approved by a professional association of the county public administrators of Missouri unless exempted from the training by the professional association ....

According to Public Administrator, the 1995 Salary Commission interpreted section 473.739 RSMo 1994 as requiring it to pay him a $4,000 salary, plus an additional $2,000 if he completed 20 hours of professional coursework, which he had done.³

In 1997 and 1998, County paid Public Administrator an annual salary of $5,100, or 85 percent of the $6,000 salary approved by the 1995 Salary Commission. Public Administrator asserted that $5,100 was an improper salary amount, and maintained that he should have received an annual salary of $11,900, which represented 85 percent of the $14,000 maximum salary available to him under section 473.739 RSMo 1994. The $14,000 maximum salary figure represents the $4,000 salary that is guaranteed to a public administrator who does not collect at least $25,000 in fees annually under section 473.739.1 RSMo 1994, plus the $10,000 additional compensation that a public administrator can request from his county salary commission. Public Administrator maintained he was entitled to an $11,900 salary because the 1995 Salary Commission had agreed to pay all county officials 85 percent of their maximum allowable salary.

After he took office, Public Administrator met with the prosecuting attorney and the county commissioners several times to discuss proper compensation for his position. Public Administrator's attorney sent the county commissioners a letter on November 20, 1997, asserting that County was not paying Public Administrator his proper salary according to the 1995 Salary Commission's actions and under Missouri law. The letter indicated that section 473.739 RSMo 1994 set the maximum allowable compensation for public administrators at $14,000. The letter reasoned that pursuant to the 1995 motion to pay all county officials 85 percent of their maximum allowable salaries, Public Administrator should receive an annual salary of $11,900. The letter indicated that Public Administrator wanted the $11,900 salary to be retroactive to the start of his term in January 1997. County took no action.

Public Administrator filed a writ in the Madison County Circuit Court seeking increased salary in August 1998. He alleged that, pursuant to the statutory directives of sections 50.333 RSMo (Supp.1995) and 473.739 RSMo 1994,⁴ the Salary Commission had improperly established his salary at its 1995 meeting and that he was underpaid for his work in 1997 and 1998. Public Administrator sought a court order forcing County to pay him an $11,900 salary for 1997 and 1998 and an order prohibiting County from following the 1995 Salary Commission's decision to pay him only 85 percent of $6,000.

County filed a motion to dismiss in which it argued that section 473.739.1 set Public Administrator's salary at only $4,000. County argued that if section 50.333 required all county officials' salaries to be set at the same percentage of their maximum allowable compensation, then Public Administrator was entitled to no more than 85 percent of $4,000.

County further stated that Public Administrator had not offered proof that he had completed the required classes under section 473.739.2. County also asserted that Public Administrator had not requested the $10,000 maximum additional compensation authorized by section 473.739.1 from the 1995 Salary Commission and, therefore, was not entitled to it. Additionally, County argued that Public Administrator had handled only three new cases and four existing cases since assuming office in January 1997, and an $11,900 salary was excessive for such a small caseload.

Public Administrator responded by arguing that he had "demanded his lawful salary on several occasions, including [at] the October 1997 Salary Commission meeting," and that his caseload was irrelevant to his claim for additional compensation. The court denied County's motion to dismiss and a hearing on Public Administrator's case was held on March 22, 1999.

At trial, Public Administrator argued that the section 50.333 requirement that all county officials receive an equal percentage of their maximum allowable salary could be read in harmony with section 473.739.1 regarding public administrators' salaries. He suggested that the same percentage of the maximum allowable compensation requirement from section 50.333 should control any contrary provision in section 473.739 because section 50.333 was passed after section 473.739. He also asserted that any attempt to pay him less than 85 percent of his maximum allowable salary would be an unlawful attempt to treat him differently from other county officials.

County responded that the 1995 Salary Commission had correctly used section 473.739, rather than section 50.333, to set Public Administrator's salary. County maintained that section 50.333 requires the maximum allowable salary to be established pursuant to the statutory "salary schedule" for each office and that section 473.739 does not contain such a "salary schedule" for public administrators, rather it guarantees a $4,000 salary and allows a public administrator to request additional compensation to a maximum of $10,000. County argued that any remedy for Public Administrator was through legislative action and not through the judiciary.

The trial court issued its original judgment on June 2, 1999, finding the 1995 Salary Commission intended to "set [Public Administrator's] salary at $6,000 and to set compensation at 85 [percent] thereof." The court found that section 473.739 "does not provide a schedule as to salary beyond $4,000 and authorizes, but does not mandate, additional salary not to exceed $10,000.00." Because the court found such an increase to be strictly permissive, it held the Salary Commission could set Public Administrator's salary "within the range of $4,000 to $14,000," and thus found $5,100 was an acceptable annual salary for Public Administrator.

PUBLIC ADMINISTRATOR FILED APPEAL: PATE I

Public Administrator subsequently filed an appeal with this court. Pate v. Madison County Presiding Comm'r Robert Mooney ("Pate I"), 22 S.W.3d 766, 767 (Mo.App. 2000). Public Administrator alleged that the trial court erred in denying his petition because the Salary Commission had improperly compensated him pursuant to sections 50.333 and 473.739 by singling him out for a salary reduction and paying him an unequal percentage of his maximum salary as compared to other county officials. Pate I, 22 S.W.3d at 768.

In Pate I, we held that section 50.333 did not apply to the salaries of public administrators, which are instead independently controlled by section 473.739. Pate I, 22 S.W.3d at 769-70. We held that section 473.739 controls over section 50.333 because it is the more specific of the two statutes. Pate I, 22 S.W.3d at 769. Our decision in Pate I followed the Western District's interpretation of sections 50.333 and 4...