State ex rel. Patton v. Gates

• Decision Date: 23 February 1898
• Citation: State ex rel. Patton v. Gates, 143 Mo. 63, 44 S.W. 739 (Mo. 1898)
• Parties: State ex rel. Patton et al. v. Gates, Judge
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

44 S.W. 739

143 Mo. 63

State ex rel. Patton et al. v. Gates, Judge

Supreme Court of Missouri, First Division

February 23, 1898

Peremptory writ denied.

Botsford Deatherage & Young, J. M. Cleary and Brown, Hadley & Swift for relators.

(1) The order of appeal, as made by the court, does not operate to suspend or supersede the order granting a new trial.R. S 1889, secs. 2246, 2247, 2248, 2249 and 4744;Laws of 1891, p 70;23 Am. and Eng. Ency. of Law, p. 285;Komerick v. Castleman,21 Mo.App. 587;Railroad v. Atkinson,17 Mo.App. 486;Lewis v. Railroad,59 Mo. 495;State ex rel. v. Meeker,19 Neb. 444;State ex rel. v. Mayor,44 N.W. 90;State ex rel. v. Hirzel et al.,37 S.W. 921;State ex rel. v. Lewis,76 Mo. 370;State ex rel. v. Dillon,98 Mo. 90;State ex rel. v. Woodson,128 Mo. 497.(2) The fact that an order granting a new trial is not a money judgment, furnishes no reason why an appeal bond, if the appellant desires to supersede the order, should not be given.Appeal bonds are taken under our appellate system in very many different cases where no money judgment or decree is or can be given.The word "execution," in the supersedeas statute, does not mean the writ of execution.State v. v. Lewis,76 Mo. 370;State v. Klein,39 S.W. 272;State ex rel. v. Woodson,128 Mo. 497;State ex rel. v. Hirzel, 37 S.W. 921.

Lathrop, Morrow, Fox & Moore for respondent.

(1) An inspection of the record of this proceeding shows that the relators applied to the trial court for a trial during the April term, and the application was refused; there is nothing in the record, under the motion for a peremptory mandamus, to show any abuse of the discretion conferred on the trial court by statute in relation to such matters.Mandamus will not lie to control the discretion of the lower court in its judicial capacity.State ex rel. v. Smith,104 Mo. 661;State ex rel. v. Neville,110 Mo. 345;Barthelow v. Campbell,56 Mo. 117;State v. Whitton,68 Mo. 91;Bank v. Williamson,61 Mo. 259;State v. Burns,54 Mo. 274;Leabo v. Goode,67 Mo. 126;Blair v. Railroad,89 Mo. 383.(2) Not until this court affirms or reverses the action of the trial court in granting a new trial, will the lower court be in position to determine the matter.State ex rel. v. Flad,26 Mo.App. 500;State ex rel. v. Draper,50 Mo. 24; Spelling on Extr.Rel., sec. 1439.(3) After an appeal without bond, the lower court may proceed to execute the affirmative commands of its record, and to that end issue process in its ministerial capacity.But it is without jurisdiction to proceed further in its judicial capacity until the appeal is determined.Burgess v. O'Donoghue,90 Mo. 299; McQuillin's Plead. and Prac., sec. 2013;Brill v. v. Meek,20 Mo. 358;Ladd v. Couzins,35 Mo. 513;DeKalb Co. v. Hixon,44 Mo. 341;State ex rel. v. Campbell,25 Mo.App. 635;Trundle v. Ins. Co., 54 Mo.App. 188.

Brace, P. J. Robinson and Williams, JJ., concurring.

OPINION

Mandamus.

Brace P. J.

-- On the twenty-sixth of December, 1895, the relators brought an action in the circuit court of Jackson county, at Kansas City, against the Grand Avenue Hotel Company, to recover damages for the death of their father, Fred C. Patton, who was killed on the twenty-seventh of December, 1894, while in the service of said company, operating its boiler and furnace, by the explosion thereof.The cause coming on for trial at the April term, 1896, of said court, before division number 3 thereof, after hearing all the evidence the court instructed the jury to return a verdict for the defendant company, which was accordingly done.Thereupon the plaintiffs in due time filed their motion for a new trial, which coming on to be heard at the October term, 1896, was sustained on the ground that the court erred in instructing the jury to return a verdict for said defendant company.Thereupon the hotel company, in due form, took an appeal to this court from said order of the circuit court granting a new trial.Afterward, at the April term, 1897, of said circuit court, the plaintiffs, relators herein, applied to the respondent as judge of said court presiding in division number 3, by motion, for a trial of said cause notwithstanding the appeal, which motion was then and there overruled and refused.Afterward application by petition filed on the twenty-sixth of June, 1897, was made to this court by relators for a writ of mandamus requiring the respondent to proceed with the trial of said cause notwithstanding said appeal, on the ground that no appeal bond having been given on said appeal, such proceeding was not thereby stayed.To the petition respondent appeared, waived issue of alternative writ, and made return setting up the facts aforesaid and admitting that no bond was given on said appeal as alleged in the petition.Thereupon the relators filed two motions, first, to strike out a part of the return; and, second, for a peremptory writ upon the facts stated in the petition.

1.That part of the return to which the motion to strike out is directed, consists simply of the remarks made by the judge presiding in division number 3, in explanation and support of his action in sustaining the motion for a new trial, which being impertinent to the real issue tendered by the return, that motion will be sustained.

2.The question raised by the second motion is whether under the statute an appeal from an order of the circuit court granting a new trial without bond stays the trial of the cause in the circuit court, pending such appeal in the appellate court.

By the statute governing the case it is provided as follows:

"Section 2246.Any party to a suit aggrieved by any judgment of any circuit court, in any civil cause, from which an appeal is not prohibited by the Constitution, may take his appeal to a court having appellate jurisdiction from any order granting a new trial, or in arrest of judgment, or order refusing to revoke, modify or change an interlocutory order appointing a receiver or receivers, or dissolving an injunction, or from any interlocutory judgments in actions of partition which determine the rights of the parties, or from any final judgment in the case, or from any special order after final judgment in the cause; but a failure to appeal from any action or decision of the court before final judgment shall not prejudice the right of the party to have the action of the trial court reviewed on an appeal taken from the final judgment in the case.The Supreme Court shall summarily hear and determine all appeals from orders refusing to revoke, modify or change an interlocutory order appointing a receiver or receivers, and for that purpose shall on motion advance the same on its docket."Sess. Acts 1895, p. 91.

"Section 2249.Appeals shall stay execution, when.-- Upon the appeal being made, the court, from which an appeal is prayed, shall make an order allowing the appeal, and such allowance thereof shall stay the execution in the following cases, and no others: First, when the appellant shall be an executor or administrator, guardian or curator and the action shall be by or against him as such; second, when the appellant or some responsible person for him, together with two sufficient securities, to be approved by the court, shall, during the term at which the judgment appealed from was rendered, enter into a recognizance to the adverse party, in a penalty double the amount of whatever debt, damages and costs have been recovered by such judgment, together with the interest that may accrue thereon, and the costs and damages that may be recovered in any appellate court upon appeal, conditioned that the appellant will prosecute his appeal with due diligence to a decision in the appellate court, and shall perform such judgment as shall be given by such court, or such as the appellate court may direct the circuit court to give, and if the judgment of such court or any part thereof be affirmed, that he will comply with and perform the same, so far as it may be affirmed, and will pay all damages and costs which may be awarded against the appellant by any appellate court.Provided, however, that the court may, at the time of granting an appeal, by order of record, fix the amount of the appeal bond and allow appellant time in vacation, not exceeding ten days, to file the same, subject to the approval of the clerk, and such appeal bond, approved by the clerk and filed within the time specified in such order, shall have the effect to stay the execution thereafter, and if any execution shall have been taken prior to the filing of said...