State ex rel. Peck Co. v. Brown
Decision Date | 05 June 1937 |
Docket Number | No. 35322.,35322. |
Citation | 105 S.W.2d 909 |
Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
Parties | STATE OF MISSOURI at the relation and to the use of GEO. B. PECK COMPANY, a Corporation, Relator, v. DWIGHT H. BROWN, Secretary of State. |
Langworthy, Spencer, Terrell & Matz for relator.
(1) Taxing statutes are to be strictly construed against the taxing authority. State ex rel. Compton v. Buder, 308 Mo. 253, 271 S.W. 770; State ex rel. Ford Motor Co. v. Gehner, 325 Mo. 24, 27 S.W. (2d) 1; State ex rel. Natl. Life Ins. Co. v. Hyde, 292 Mo. 342, 241 S.W. 396; State ex rel. Kinloch Tel. Co. v. Roach, 269 Mo. 437, 190 S.W. 862. (2) Compliance with laws of 1931, page 297, is sufficient to enable a corporation formed under the General Laws of Missouri to extend its corporate existence. (a) In arriving at the intent of the Legislature it is permissible and appropriate to consider contemporaneous circumstances and the condition of the law prior to the passage of the act under consideration. State v. Eckhardt, 232 Mo. 49, 133 S.W. 321; State ex rel. Boonville v. Hackmann, 293 Mo. 313, 240 S.W. 135; Decker v. Diemer, 229 Mo. 296, 129 S.W. 936. (b) In the construction of amendatory acts it will be presumed that the Legislature intended to make a change in existing law. Holt v. Rea, 330 Mo. 1237, 52 S.W. (2d) 877; Reed v. Goldneck, 112 Mo. App. 310; United States v. Railroad Co., 230 Fed. 270; Mabie v. Fuller, 255 N.Y. 194, 174 N.E. 450. (c) The uniform course of corporate legislation in Missouri during the past decade has been toward relaxing the rigidity of the corporate laws of early years and towards rendering the corporate laws of the State attractive to corporations. Mo. Corp. Laws, p. 15; Laws 1921, pp. 264, 661; Laws 1923, pp. 315, 362; Laws 1927, p. 388; Laws 1929, p. 330. (d) The purpose of the enactment of laws of 1931, page 297, was to provide clearly and definitely a means for extension of corporate existence without payment of an organization fee or tax. To construe the act otherwise would be to render it meaningless and to make the corporation laws discriminatory in favor of corporations organized with perpetual existence. Sec. 4556, R.S. 1929; Laws 1931, p. 297.
Roy McKittrick, Attorney General, and Franklin E. Reagan, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
(1) The 1931 Act gave statutory sanction for extending the life of corporations whose charters had not expired. State ex rel. Equality Savs. & Bldg. Assn. v. Brown, 68 S.W. (2d) 55, 334 Mo. 781; Coates & Hopkins Realty Co. v. Ry. Co., 43 S.W. (2d) 817, 328 Mo. 1118; State ex rel. v. Davis, 284 S.W. 464, 314 Mo. 373; State v. Messino, 30 S.W. (2d) 750, 325 Mo. 743; State v. Naylor, 40 S.W. (2d) 1079, 328 Mo. 335; State ex rel. Kinlock Tel. Co. v. Roach, 269 Mo. 437, 190 S.W. 862. (2) The writ should be denied, because the petition alleges relator's refusal to pay the necessary fees due the State of Missouri. Sec. 4556, R.S. 1929; Cobbs & Mitchell v. Corporation Tax Appeal Board, 233 N.W. 386; State ex rel. Kinlock Tel. Co. v. Roach, 269 Mo. 437, 190 S.W. 862.
This is an original proceeding in mandamus to compel the respondent, Secretary of State, to accept and file a statement amending relator's articles of association by extending its corporate existence perpetually.
The relator is a Missouri corporation, organized March 12, 1889, for a period of fifty years. Under Section 4556, Revised Statutes 1929, the fee due the State of Missouri for the extension of the corporate existence of relator is $475, in addition to the incidental filing fees for certificate. The relator tendered to the respondent the incidental filing fees but refused to tender or pay the fee provided for in Section 4556, supra, and for this reason the respondent refused to accept and file the amendment to articles of association for the relator. It is the relator's contention that under an act of the Legislature passed in the year 1931, Laws of Missouri 1931, page 297, a method was provided for extending its corporate existence, and as this section was silent in regard to the payment of any fees, the relator was entitled to have its corporate existence extended perpetually without the payment of fees provided for under Section 4556, supra.
The relator states the question for our determination as follows: "... do the provisions of Section 4556, Missouri Revised Statutes, 1929, apply to proceedings had in compliance with Laws of Missouri, 1931, page 297?" In other words, does the law of 1931 repeal Section 4556, supra?
This act, Laws of 1931, page 297, is as follows:
Thus we see there is nothing in the title or the act itself that directly repeals Section 4556, supra. If this section is not now in full force and effect, it is because it is repealed by implication. To show that the two sections are not repugnant, we quote Section 4556, supra.
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