State ex rel. Pillers v. Maniccia, 69010

• Decision Date: 15 February 1984
• Docket Number: No. 69010,69010
• Citation: State ex rel. Pillers v. Maniccia, 343 N.W.2d 834 (Iowa 1984)
• Parties: STATE of Iowa, ex rel. G. Wylie PILLERS, III, Clinton County Attorney, et al., Appellants, v. Randall Eugene MANICCIA and Jon Michael Maniccia, Appellees.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Page 834

343 N.W.2d 834

STATE of Iowa, ex rel. G. Wylie PILLERS, III, Clinton CountyAttorney, et al., Appellants, v.Randall Eugene MANICCIA and Jon Michael Maniccia, Appellees.

No. 69010.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Feb. 15, 1984.

Kermit L. Dunahoo, Des Moines, and G. Wylie Pillers, III, County Atty., Clinton, for appellants.

John R. Sandre and Richard O. McConville of Scalise, Scism, Sandre & Uhl, Des Moines, for appelleeRandall Eugene Maniccia.

Considered by HARRIS, P.J., and McGIVERIN, LARSON, SCHULTZ, and CARTER, JJ.

HARRIS, Justice.

Can persons charged with crime be enjoined from disposing of property which might otherwise be used to reimburse their alleged victims or the county?The trial court held that no such injunction may issue and we agree.

When this suit was brought there were criminal charges pending against the defendants.The petition alleges that the defendants conspired to, and did, commit burglaries at two construction sites.A substantial amount of building materials was said to have been taken and delivered to defendants.When defendants undertook to hold a public auction the county attorney brought this suit by and on behalf of the citizens of the county and state, including the victims of the defendants' alleged criminal offenses.

The petition asked for an injunction to restrain the defendants from selling, disposing of, or converting any of their personal or real property, and from removing any property from the state without court approval.The petition asked that the injunction continue until the court determined, under the victim restitution statute, whether any of the defendants' property should be used to reimburse their alleged victims or the county for the cost of the state's criminal investigation and prosecution.

Under the restitution statute, Iowa Code chapter 910(1983), a convicted defendant must reimburse any person who has suffered pecuniary damages resulting from the defendant's criminal activities.When the defendant is reasonably able to do so, reimbursement is then to be made to the county for court costs, court-appointed attorney fees, or for the expense of a public defender.SeeIowa Code § 910.2.

A temporary injunction was issued but was later dissolved and the action was dismissed.The trial court concluded that the county attorney:

has no inherent power to commence civil litigation to preserve the status quo until criminal charges are resolved against these defendants, nor statutory or common law right to seek civil redress for an Iowa or non-resident citizen injured by these criminal defendants, either as an independent action or an adjunct to and extension of pending criminal proceedings.

For purposes of this appeal we can assume, without deciding, that the county attorney had both authority and standing to bring this equity suit.We think that a court of equity has no inherent power to issue the injunction requested by petitioner.

I.In Myers v. Caple, 258 N.W.2d 301, 304-05(Iowa1977), we said:

The equitable power to enjoin is exercised only under extraordinary circumstances.It is not a routine remedy.It is designed primarily to avoid irreparable damage and to afford relief when there is no adequate remedy at law.[Authorities.]

The party seeking an injunction has the burden to show not only a violation of his rights but also that he will suffer substantial damage unless one is granted.[Authorities.] In deciding whether an injunction is appropriate, we are committed to the "relative hardship" or "balance of convenience" standard.Kriener v. Turkey Valley Community School District, [212 N.W.2d 526, 536(Iowa1973),]andJohnson v. Pattison, [185 N.W.2d 790, 797(Iowa1971) ].In the latter case we said:

"Equity usually invokes its extraordinary injunctive power only...