State Ex Rel. Powell v. Leon County

Decision Date06 July 1938
Citation133 Fla. 68,182 So. 639
PartiesSTATE ex rel. POWELL, Justice of the Peace v. LEON COUNTY et al.
CourtFlorida Supreme Court

Original proceeding by the State of Florida, on the relation of W. H Powell, as Justice of the Peace of the Eighth Justice of the Peace District of Leon County, for a writ of mandamus to compel such county, A. Pichard and others, as chairman and members of and constituting the Board of County Commissioners thereof, and another, to pay relator's bill for costs incurred in connection with issuing process for arrest conducting preliminary examination, and binding over one accused of misdemeanor for trial in the county judge's court. On motion to quash an alternative writ.

Motion denied.

COUNSEL J. Lewis Hall, of Tallahassee, for relator.

William Blount Myers, of Tallahassee, for respondents.

OPINION

BUFORD Justice.

This cause is before us on motion to quash Alternative Writ of Mandamus seeking to coerce the Respondents to pay Relator's cost bill incurred in connection with issuing process and conducting a preliminary examination and binding accused over for trial on misdemeanor charge in County Judge's Court.

If chapter 18002, Acts of 1937, is valid, we think it cannot be construed to curtail the provisions of section 22, Article 5 of the Constitution, which reads as follows: 'Section 22. The Justices of the Peace shall have jurisdiction in cases at law in which the demand or value of the property involved does not exceed $100.00, and in which the cause of action accrued or the defendant resides in his district; and in such criminal cases, except felonies, as may be prescribed by law and he shall have power to issue process for the arrest of all persons charged with felonies and misdemeanors not within his jurisdiction to try, and make the same returnable before himself or the county judge for examination, discharge, commitment or bail of the accused. Justices of the peace shall have power to hold inquests of the dead. Appeal from Justices of the Peace Courts in criminal cases may be tried de novo under such regulations as the Legislature may prescribe. (Amended, Joint Resolution 4, Acts 1895; Adopted at general election, 1896),' so as to deprive the Justice of the Peace of his jurisdiction 'to issue process for the arrest of all persons charged with felonies and misdemeanors not within his jurisdiction to try, and make the same returnable before himself * * * for examination, discharge, commitment or bail of the accused'. And, assuming that this conclusion is correct, then when a Justice of the Peace issues process for the arrest of one charged with a misdemeanor he may exercise the powers of a committing magistrate and determine whether or not there is reasonable cause to believe the accused guilty as charged and if so to bind him over to the County Judge's Court for trial. Should he find reasonable cause to believe the accused guilty and bind him over to the County Judge for trial, then it becomes his duty to transmit to the County Judge's Court the affidavit, warrant and other papers filed in connection with the preliminary hearing and the accused should then be tried in the County Judge's Court on the affidavit filed before the Justice of the Peace, unless an amended affidavit for cause be filed in the County Judge's Court and in such cases as the one now before us, the Justice of the Peace is entitled to receive from the County the fees provided by statute for the services rendered by him, unless the accused, on conviction, pays the costs. See Sec. 1782, R.G.S., section 2833, C.G.L.

We do not think the committing magistrate's right in such cases to receive his fees is controlled by the second paragraph of the section just above referred to because when that statute was enacted there was no necessity for the Justice of the Peace to act as committing magistrate in misdemeanor cases triable before the County Judge and no provision is made for the filing of informations or indictments in such cases. As there is no authority for the filing of informations or indictments in the County Judge's Court, it certainly cannot be construed that a Justice of the Peace is to be deprived of his fees for services rendered in misdemeanor cases where he acts as committing magistrate under the provisions of the constitution and commits the accused to the County Judge's Court for trial.

Certainly a conviction in County Judge's Court in a case in which the County Judge has trial jurisdiction is tantamount, in effect, to the filing of an information or indictment in a county court, a criminal Court of Record or a Circuit Court.

Aside from this, it is a matter of common knowledge that the effect of taking trial jurisdiction in misdemeanor cases from the courts of Justices of the Peace and depriving them of fees in cases of this sort in counties of less than 50,000 population would be to practically abolish such courts because without this trial or committing jurisdiction the emoluments of the office would be so reduced that there would be few, if any competent persons who would be willing to be burdened with the duties otherwise incident to holding the office. But of that feature I shall speak later.

The office of Justice of the Peace is an ancient one. It is older than the courts of chancery.

In the case of People ex rel. Burby v. Howland et al., 155 N.Y. 270, 49 N.E. 775, 41 L.R.A. 838, the Court of Appeals of New York speaking through Mr. Justice Vann, said (page 776):

'The office of justice of the peace came down to us from remote times. It existed in England before the discovery of America, and it has existed here practically during our entire history, both colonial and state, at first with criminal jurisdiction only, but for more than two centuries past with civil jurisdiction also. 1 Col.Laws 226 (Act May 6, 1691); 2 Col.Laws 964 (Act Dec. 16, 1737); 3 Col.Laws 1011 (Act Dec. 7, 1954); 4 Col.Laws 296 (Act Dec. 16, 1758); 5 Col.Laws 209 (Act Feb. 16, 1771); Law Dict. tit. 'Justice of the Peace' (Tomlins, Burrill, Black, and Anderson). It exists in every state of the Union, and is regarded as of great importance to the people at large, as it opens the doors of justice near their own homes, and not only affords a cheap and speedy remedy for minor grievances as to rights of property, but also renders substantial aid in the prevention and punishment of crime. The office as it now exists in towns was established by the constitution, which does not, in express terms, say what a justice of the peace shall be. As, however, the office was well known when the constitution was adopted, it is presumed that the framers thereof and the people meant to establish it as an office with such civil and criminal jurisdiction, within the limitations of that instrument, as the legislature saw fit to confer upon it. As it has always had criminal jurisdiction, and was an existing office with such jurisdiction when each constitution was adopted, it is at least doubtful whether the legislature has any power to deprive it of criminal jurisdiction altogether, since that
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6 cases
  • Classy Cycles, Inc. v. Pan. City Beach
    • United States
    • Florida District Court of Appeals
    • November 13, 2019
    ...Oil , is a perfect match factually and legally to this one, but its legal principle fits nicely. See also State ex rel. Powell v. Leon Cty. , 133 Fla. 68, 182 So. 639, 642 (1938) ("It is fundamental and elementary that the legislature may not do that by indirect action which it is prohibite......
  • Anderson v. State
    • United States
    • Florida Supreme Court
    • July 6, 1938
    ... ... Error ... to Circuit Court, Okeechobee County; Elwyn Thomas, Judge ... Aaron ... Anderson was convicted of ... ...
  • Lewis v. The Florida Bar
    • United States
    • Florida Supreme Court
    • June 28, 1979
    ...and a tax immune body, constitutes an indirect tax upon the tax immune body. As stated by the Supreme Court in State ex rel. Powell v. Leon County, 133 Fla. 68, 182 So. 639 (1938), "It is fundamental and elementary that the legislature may not do that by indirect action which it is prohibit......
  • Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Jewell, No. 2D01-5714
    • United States
    • Florida District Court of Appeals
    • November 14, 2003
    ...the prohibition as limited to direct contracts while allowing contracting through an intermediary. Cf. State ex rel. Powell v. Leon County, 133 Fla. 68, 182 So. 639, 642 (1938) ("It is fundamental and elementary that the Legislature may not do that by indirect action which it is prohibited ......
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