State ex rel. Prater v. 2010 Toyota Corolla

• Court: United States State Court of Appeals of Oklahoma. Court of Civil Appeals of Oklahoma
• Writing for the Court: JOHN F. FISCHER, Presiding Judge.
• Citation: State ex rel. Prater v. 2010 Toyota Corolla, 350 P.3d 409, 2015 OK CIV APP 48 (Okla. Civ. App. 2015)
• Decision Date: 30 January 2015
• Docket Number: 112,092., Released for Publication by Order of the Court of Civil Appeals of Oklahoma, Division No. 2.
• Parties: STATE of Oklahoma, ex rel., David W. PRATER, District Attorney of the Seventh Prosecutorial District, Plaintiff/Appellee, v. 2010 TOYOTA COROLLA, VIN# 1NXBU4EE4AZ313776, Defendant, and Larry H. Miller Toyota and Capital One Auto Finance, Claimants/Appellants.

350 P.3d 409

2015 OK CIV APP 48

STATE of Oklahoma, ex rel., David W. PRATER, District Attorney of the Seventh Prosecutorial District, Plaintiff/Appellee

v. 2010 TOYOTA COROLLA, VIN# 1NXBU4EE4AZ313776, DefendantandLarry H. Miller Toyota and Capital One Auto Finance, Claimants/Appellants.

112,092.

Released for Publication by Order of the Court of Civil Appeals of Oklahoma, Division No. 2.

Court of Civil Appeals of Oklahoma, Division No. 2.

Jan. 30, 2015.

Certiorari Denied May 4, 2015.

David W. Prater, District Attorney, Lean Paczowski, Assistant District Attorney, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Plaintiff/Appellee.

Jared A. Looper, Michael L. Loyd & Associates, Bethany, Oklahoma, for Claimants/Appellants.

Opinion

JOHN F. FISCHER, Presiding Judge.

¶ 1 This is an appeal by an automobile dealership and finance company from the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the State in an action involving forfeiture of an automobile. The appeal has been assigned to the accelerated docket pursuant to Oklahoma Supreme Court Rule 1.36(b), 12 O.S.2011, ch. 15, app. 1, and the matter stands submitted without appellate briefing. Because the district court incorrectly determined that the automobile should be forfeited to the State free and clear of the security interest asserted by the dealership and finance company, we reverse that decision.

BACKGROUND

¶ 2 Kyle Ruston Goff, a resident of Arkansas, was stopped and arrested while driving a 2010 Toyota Corolla, VIN# 1NXBU4EE4AZ313776 (the Vehicle), in Oklahoma City. The State seized the Vehicle. On February 21, 2012, the State filed a notice of the seizure and intended forfeiture of the Vehicle pursuant to 63 O.S.2011 §§ 2–503(A)(4), 2–503(A)(6) and 2–503(B) of the forfeiture statutes, on grounds that the Vehicle was used to transport and/or conceal one or more dangerous substances in violation of the Uniform Controlled Dangerous Substances Act. 63 O.S.2011 & Supp.2014 §§ 2–101 through 2–701. Larry H. Miller Toyota and Capital One Auto Finance (Claimants) asserted a claim against the Vehicle, the purchase of which had been financed pursuant to a Retail Installment Sale Contract (the Contract). The parties stipulated to the following facts:

1. On December 28, 2011, Larry H. Miller Toyota, an automobile dealership in Albuquerque, New Mexico, sold [the Vehicle] to Sidney D. Goff and Kyle Goff, two residents of the State of Arkansas. The purchasers of the Vehicle borrowed from [C]laimants $11,901.31 for the purchase of the Vehicle, which was financed via a retail installment contract. Under the terms of said contract, the purchasers agreed to pay 3.99% APR on their loan, with monthly payments of $201.49, beginning on February 11, 2012. The contract also provided that the purchasers gave Larry H. Miller Toyota a security interest in the Vehicle.

2. On February 11, 2012, pursuant to 63 O.S. § 2–503 et seq., the State seized the vehicle on grounds that it was being unlawfully used to traffic controlled dangerous substances.

3. Claimants had no knowledge or reason to believe that the Vehicle would be used for unlawful purposes.

4. At the time the State seized the Vehicle, Larry H. Miller Toyota had not properly perfected its lien upon the Vehicle with the State of Arkansas.

5. The current value of the Vehicle is approximately $11,780.00.

¶ 3 Claimants filed a motion for summary judgment with a copy of the Contract attached. Based on the parties' stipulations, Claimants maintained that the only issue before the district court was a legal issue, which they identified as whether Claimants or the State have a prior, superior interest in the Vehicle. Claimants argued that pursuant to the terms of 63 O.S.2011 §§ 2–506(H) and 2–506(I), they should be granted immediate possession of the Vehicle.¹ Those subsections provide:

H. The claimant of any right, title, or interest in the property may prove a lien, mortgage, or conditional sales contract to be a bona fide or innocent ownership interest and that such right, title, or interest was created without any knowledge or reason to believe that the property was being, or was to be, used for the purpose charged.

I. In the event of such proof, the court shall order the property released to the bona fide or innocent owner, lien holder, mortgagee or vendor if the amount due him is equal to, or in excess of, the value of the property as of the date of the seizure, it being the intention of this section to forfeit only the right, title or interest of the purchaser.

¶ 4 The State also sought summary judgment, arguing that, because Claimants had failed to perfect their security interest in the Vehicle, their rights were “subordinate” to the State's rights and they were not protected from forfeiture pursuant to section 2–506(H). The district court denied Claimants' motion, granted judgment in favor of the State, and ordered the Vehicle forfeited to the State. Claimants appeal.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 5 “Summary judgment settles only questions of law.” City of Jenks v. Stone, 2014 OK 11, ¶ 6, 321 P.3d 179, 181 (citing Pickens v. Tulsa Metro. Ministry, 1997 OK 152, ¶ 7, 951 P.2d 1079, 1082 ). Determining “the meaning and intent of legislative enactments” also involves a question of law. State ex rel. Dep't of Human Servs. v. Baggett, 1999 OK 68, ¶ 4, 990 P.2d 235, 238. Questions of law are “subject to de novo review ... i.e., a non-deferential, plenary and independent review of the trial court's legal ruling.” Heffron v. District Court of Oklahoma County, 2003 OK 75, ¶ 15, 77 P.3d 1069, 1076 (citation omitted). We affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment only if we determine that there is no dispute as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Stone, 2014 OK 11, ¶ 6, 321 P.3d at 181.

ANALYSIS

¶ 6 The controversy before us centers on provisions of the Uniform Controlled Dangerous Substances Act, particularly the forfeiture provisions, and requires us to determine the meaning of 63 O.S.2011 §§ 2–506(H) and 2–506(I), which provide relief from forfeiture. Forfeitures are not favored in law: “[T]he law abhors forfeitures and statutes authorizing forfeiture of private property are to be strictly construed.” State ex rel. Redman v. $122.44, 2010 OK 19, ¶ 16, 231 P.3d 1150, 1155 (citing State ex rel. Dep't of Pub. Safety v.1985 GMC Pickup, 1995 OK 75, ¶ 8, 898 P.2d 1280, 1282 ). “Forfeiture will not be allowed except when required by clear statutory language.” Id.

¶ 7 Further, we are constrained in our analysis by fundamental rules of statutory construction. The primary goal in construing a statute is to give effect to the legislative intent. Winston v. Stewart & Elder, P.C. , 2002 OK 68, ¶ 12, 55 P.3d 1063, 1068.

It is presumed that legislative intent is expressed in a statute's text and that the law-making body intended that which it expressed. Where the statute is plain and unambiguous, there is no room for judicial construction which would extend its ambit beyond the scope of the plain and unambiguous language.

Bronson Trailers & Trucks v. Newman, 2006 OK 46, ¶ 9, 139 P.3d 885, 890 (footnotes

omitted). The statute “will receive the effect its language dictates.” Jobe v. State ex rel. Dep't of Pub. Safety, 2010 OK 50, ¶ 13, 243 P.3d 1171, 1175 (footnote omitted). Another equally well-settled rule is that, “[i]n construing a statute, we begin with the statutory language itself.” State ex rel. Macy v. Freeman, 1991 OK 59, ¶ 8, 814 P.2d 147, 153 (footnote omitted) (construing provisions of the Controlled Dangerous Substances Act).

¶ 8 Section 2–506(H) of the forfeiture statutes provides: “The claimant of any right, title, or interest in the property may prove a lien, mortgage, or conditional sales contract to be a bona fide or innocent ownership interest.” The term “lien” is a general term referring to a right in property. Young v. J.A. Young Mach. & Supply Co., 1950 OK 303, ¶ 10, 224 P.2d 971, 973–74. In Title 42, a lien is defined as “a charge imposed upon specific property, by which it is made security for the performance of an act.” 42 O.S.2011 § 1. In its general definitions section, the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) provides a similar definition for the term “security interest.” 12A O.S.2011 § 1–201(35) (“Security interest” means an interest in personal property or fixtures which secures payment or performance of an obligation.”). Liens may be created by contract or by operation of law. 42 O.S.2011 § 6. The Contract between Claimants and the Goffs regarding purchase of the Vehicle provides: “Security Interest. You are giving a security interest in the vehicle being purchased.” The parties also stipulated that, pursuant to the Contract, the Goffs “gave Larry H. Miller Toyota a security interest in the Vehicle.” We find that the Contract between the Goffs and Larry H. Miller Toyota created a contractual lien, enforceable between those parties.²

¶ 9 In its summary judgment briefs, the State did not dispute that Claimants had a security interest or lien that they could enforce against the Goffs. The State argued, however, that the provisions of sections 2–506(H) and 2–506(I) afforded Claimants no protection from forfeiture of the Vehicle because Claimants had not perfected their security interest prior to the State's seizure of the Vehicle. The State further argued that, even if Claimants' unperfected security interest did fall within section 2–506(H), the State's interest as a “lien creditor” would have priority over Claimants' unperfected security interest. According to the State, sections 2–506(H) and 2–506(I) are designed to protect only those secured creditors who have created and perfected their interest in property prior to its seizure.

¶ 10 The primary authority relied on by the State in support of its arguments in the district court is In re Notice of Seizure and Intended Forfeiture of One 1985 Two Door BMW Model 325, VIN No. WBAAB640F1210839, 1985 Texas License Tag 96 PNH, 1991 OK CIV APP 108, 819 P.2d 722. In...