State ex rel. Progressive Sweeping Contrs., Inc. v. Ohio Bur. of Workers' Comp., 92-2622

• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Ohio
• Citation: 68 Ohio St.3d 393,627 N.E.2d 550
• Docket Number: No. 92-2622,92-2622
• Parties: The STATE EX REL. PROGRESSIVE SWEEPING CONTRACTORS, INC. v. BUREAU OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION et al.
• Decision Date: 02 March 1994

Page 393

68 Ohio St.3d 393

627 N.E.2d 550

The STATE EX REL. PROGRESSIVE SWEEPING CONTRACTORS, INC. v. BUREAU OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION et al.

No. 92-2622.

Supreme Court of Ohio.

Submitted Nov. 9, 1993.

Decided March 2, 1994.

Eastman & Smith, John T. Landwehr, Thomas J. Gibney and Kimberly S. Stepleton, Toledo, for relator.

Lee I. Fisher, Atty. Gen., Gerald H. Waterman and Janie D. Roberts, Asst. Attys. Gen., for respondents.

PER CURIAM.

The bureau must "classify occupations or industries with respect to their degree of hazard[.]" R.C. 4123.29(A)(1); State ex rel. Minutemen, Inc. v. Indus. Comm. (1991), 62 Ohio St.3d 158, 580 N.E.2d 777. At issue is PSC's classification from January 1, 1988 through June 30, 1991.

In examining PSC's occupational classification, we are mindful of two points: (1) absolute precision in occupational classification is often impossible, and (2) judicial deference to respondents' occupational classification is required in all but the most extraordinary circumstances. As to the former, Professor Young explains:

"Industry is used in the sense of occupation. Normally, it is a horizontal rather than a vertical categorization, that is, it is a particular activity rather than an entire process. Welding would be an industry for purposes of classifications as contrasted to the steel industry. Precision in this method of classification would result in an unmanageable number of categories; thus some classifications contain multiple occupations or industries." Young, Workmen's Compensation Law of Ohio (2 Ed.1971), Section 16.2.

Recognizing this difficulty, we have generally deferred to the commission's expertise in premium matters:

"The experience of men, expert in this department of investigation, whose reports are founded upon experience touching the various hazards of industries and occupations, should be given important consideration[.]" State ex rel. Reaugh Constr. Co. v. Indus. Comm. (1928), 119 Ohio St. 205, 209, 162 N.E. 800, 802.

Judicial intervention in premium matters has traditionally been warranted only where classification has been arbitrary, capricious or discriminatory. Id.; Minutemen, supra. See, generally, 4 Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law (1990), Section 92.67. Given this high threshold, we have been--and will continue to be--reluctant to find an abuse of discretion merely because the employer's actual risk does not precisely correspond with the risk classification assigned.

However, where the degree of occupational hazard encountered by a given industry differs from that of the classification as a whole to the extent found by the bureau's own underwriters in this case, we are compelled to find that the classification is indeed arbitrary. PSC is accordingly entitled to a rate adjustment. See State ex rel. Able Temps, Inc. v. Indus. Comm. (1993), 66 Ohio St.3d 22, ...