State ex rel. Public Service Commission v. Marion Circuit Court

Decision Date04 October 1961
Docket NumberNo. 30106,30106
Citation177 N.E.2d 397,242 Ind. 145
PartiesSTATE of Indiana, on the relation of the PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION of Indiana, Relator, v. MARION CIRCUIT COURT, John L. Niblack, Judge, Respondent.
CourtIndiana Supreme Court

Edwin K. Steers, Atty. Gen., and Donald M. Mosiman, Deputy Atty. Gen., for Public Service Commission of Indiana.

Wm. M. Evans, Indianapolis, for respondent.

ACHOR, Judge.

This is an original action for a writ of mandate and prohibition. The facts giving rise to this action are as follows:

Pursuant to an action before the Public Service Commission of Indiana, that Commission entered an order on March 7, 1961, to the effect that certain new rates established by the Chicago and Eastern Illinois Railroad Company be permanently suspended. Thereafter, pursuant to the terms of Acts of 1957, ch. 189, § 4, p. 395 [§ 54-446, Burns 1951 Repl. (1961 Supp.)], the Railroad filed in the Appellate Court its 'Application to Enjoin Temporarily Enforcement of the Order of the Public Service Commission of Indiana.' On April 5, 1961, the Appellate Court, pursuant to a hearing and briefs submitted thereon, denied the Railroad's application to enjoin temporary enforcement of the order of the Public Service Commission.

Thereafter, on April 10, 1961, the Railroad filed its verified complaint for restraining order and injunction in the Marion Circuit Court, which action was entered as Cause No. C61-441 in said court. Pursuant to said complaint for injunctive relief, the Marion Circuit Court issued a temporary restraining order on said date, without notice. Thereafter, on April 17, 1961, relator filed its motion to dissolve said temporary restraining order and dismiss the cause of action on the ground that the Marion Circuit Court was without jurisdiction in the cause. On May 24, 1961, the Marion Circuit Court overruled relator's motion to dissolve and dismiss and thus assumed jurisdiction of the cause.

Relator here challenges the jurisdiction in the Marion Circuit Court over the subject matter in said Cause No. C61-132. This court, on the 13th day of June, 1961, pursuant to the facts above presented, issued a temporary writ of prohibition and alternative writ of mandate.

The jurisdiction of the Marion Circuit Court in this action is subject to challenge for two separate and distinct reasons. First, because of the fact that the Acts of 1957, ch. 189, §§ 1-11, p. 395 [§§ 54-443-54-453, Burns 1961 Cum.Supp.] provided for a completely new and different procedure to be followed in the judicial review of the orders of the Public Service Commission. Because of the new and comprehensive character of this enactment it must be presumed that the legislature intended that the procedure therein provided for should be exclusive. Section 1 [§ 54-443, Burns 1961 Cum.Supp.] provides in part as follows:

'Any person, firm, association, corporation, city, town or public utility adversely affected by any final decision, ruling, or order of the public service commission of Indiana, may, within thirty days from the date of entry of such decision, ruling, or order, appeal to the Appellate Court of Indiana for errors of law under the same terms and conditions as govern appeals in ordinary civil actions, except as otherwise herein provided, and with the right in the losing party or parties in the Appellate Court to apply to the Supreme Court for a petition to transfer the cause to said Supreme Court as in other cases.'

The Appellate Court of Indiana, in Boone County R. E. M. C. et al. v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 1958, 129 Ind.App. 175, 185-186, 155 N.E.2d 149, 154, discussed the jurisdictional aspect of § 1 [§ 54-443, supra], in the following language:

'Thus, it appears the Statute provides that any final decision, ruling or order of the Public Service Commission be 'appealed' to the Appellate Court for errors of law. Strictly speaking, it is not an 'appeal', but it is a judicial review by the Appellate Court, which is the court of exclusive original jurisdiction. (See, § 1, 54-443, Burns', supra.) 'It is correct to say that the orders of an administrative body are subject to judicial review; and they must be so to meet the requirements of due process. Such review is necessary to the end that there may be an adjudication by a court of competent jurisdiction that the agency has acted within the scope of its powers; * * * and that its determination comports with the law applicable to the facts found.' Warren v. Indiana Telephone Co., supra, at page 105.' [217 Ind. 93, 26 N.E.2d 399, 404.]

Additionally, § 7 [§ 54-449, Burns, supra] provides that:

'The Appellate or Supreme Court, as the case may be, shall also have jurisdiction, upon application of the commission or any party, to order or enjoin temporarily or permanently the enforcement of any determination, ruling or order of the commission made in the cause.'

However, in support of his position, respondent asserts although the Appellate Court acquired jurisdiction to issue injunctions by the 1957 Act, supra, said act does not deprive the respondent of the power to grant injunctions and therefore that the Marion Circuit Court continues to have both inherent and statutory power to grant injunctions for the protection of property rights. In support of this position, respondent cites the cases of Vandalia R. Co. v. Schnull, 1919, 188 Ind. 87, 122 N.E. 225; Department of Treasury v. Ridgely, Executrix, 1936, 211 Ind. 9, 4 N.E.2d 557, 108 A.L.R. 1067; State ex rel. Nicely v. Wildey et al., 1935, 209 Ind. 1, 197 N.E. 844, and Evans v. International...

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