State ex rel. Reed v. Schwab
Court | Supreme Court of Oregon |
Writing for the Court | HOWELL |
Citation | 600 P.2d 387,287 Or. 411 |
Decision Date | 25 September 1979 |
Parties | , 24 A.L.R.4th 422 STATE of Oregon ex rel. John M. REED, Plaintiff-Relator, v. Herbert M. SCHWAB, Robert Y. Thornton, Jason Lee, Jacob Tanzer, William Richardson, John H. Buttler, George M. Joseph, W. Michael Gillette, Betty Roberts, and J. R. Campbell, Judges of the Court of Appeals of the State of Oregon, Defendants. SC 26199. |
Page 387
v.
Herbert M. SCHWAB, Robert Y. Thornton, Jason Lee, Jacob
Tanzer, William Richardson, John H. Buttler, George M.
Joseph, W. Michael Gillette, Betty Roberts, and J. R.
Campbell, Judges of the Court of Appeals of the State of
Oregon, Defendants.
Decided Sept. 25, 1979.
Page 388
[287 Or. 412-A] John M. Reed, argued the cause and filed briefs pro se.
Thomas H. Denney, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salem, argued the cause for defendants. With him on the brief were James A. Redden,
Page 389
Atty. Gen., and Walter L. Barrie, Sol. Gen., Salem.Charles F. Hinkle, Portland, filed an amicus curiae brief for the American Civil Liberties Union.
[287 Or. 413] HOWELL, Justice.
This is an original proceeding in mandamus in which relator, who is not an attorney, seeks to compel the judges of the Oregon Court of Appeals to allow him to present oral argument on his own behalf in four cases pending before that court. At issue is the validity of a rule of internal practice adopted by the Court of Appeals that provides in part:
" * * * When a litigant represents himself without counsel, the case will be ordered submitted on brief without oral argument by any party."
Relator argues that this rule violates various provisions of the state and federal constitutions. Relator also argues that certain statutory provisions limiting the practice of law to certified members of the bar are unconstitutional. The American Civil Liberties Union, appearing as amicus curiae, contends that relator has a statutory right to argue his own case and, alternatively, that such a right exists under Article I, Section 20 of the Oregon Constitution. We reject each of these contentions and uphold the validity of the rule.
Relator was the claimant in four workers' compensation claims pending in the Court of Appeals. Relator filed motions asking for permission to argue the cases orally. The Court of Appeals denied the motions, and ordered the cases submitted on briefs and without oral argument. Relator then brought this mandamus proceeding, which lies within the original jurisdiction conferred upon this court by Article VII (Amended), Section 2 of the Oregon Constitution. On May 2, 1979, this court issued an alternative writ directing the Court of Appeals to either allow oral argument in the four cases or show cause why it had not done so.
The initial question here is whether the challenged rule is consistent with Oregon statutes. The authority to make rules is vested in the Court of Appeals by ORS 2.560(6), which provides:
[287 Or. 414] "The Court of Appeals may make and enforce all rules necessary for the prompt and orderly dispatch of the business of the court * * *."
We think the challenged rule clearly falls within the authority granted the Court of Appeals by ORS 2.560(6). The statute authorizes the promulgation of any rules that will facilitate the processing of appeals. The Court of Appeals apparently has determined that the benefits that could be obtained from hearing oral arguments by parties appearing In propria persona are outweighed by the costs in time to the members of that court. Accordingly, we hold that the rule falls within the court's rule-making power as defined in ORS 2.560(6).
The next question is whether the rule, although within the court's general rule-making power, is inconsistent with some specific statutory right guaranteed to relator. The relator and amicus rely on ORS 9.320, which provides:
"Any action, suit, or proceeding may be prosecuted or defended by a party in person, or by attorney * * *."
There is nothing in the language of the statute that requires the Court of Appeals to allow oral argument on appeal, and we decline to so extend the statute, particularly when ORS 2.560(6) allows the Court of Appeals to make its own rules of procedure.
Relator contends that he has a right to oral argument under Article I, Section 10 of the Oregon Constitution and the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution.
Article I, Section 10 of the Oregon Constitution provides:
Page 390
"No court shall be secret, but justice shall be administered, openly and without purchase, completely and without delay, and every man shall have remedy by due course of law for injury done him in his person, property, or reputation."
[287 Or. 415] We fail to see how the challenged rule in any way violates the rights guaranteed relator by this provision of the constitution. It cannot seriously be contended that the elimination of oral argument makes the Court of Appeals a "secret" court. If a part of the decision-making process is eliminated, such as oral argument, it necessarily is not concealed. Nor do we believe that relator is denied any remedy "by due course of law" when the appellate court decides upon the validity of a legal claim upon written rather than oral arguments.
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State v. Clark, No. TC
...individuals or groups. 7 See City of Klamath Falls v. Winters, 289 Or. 757, 619 P.2d 217 (1980), quoting State ex rel. Reed v. Schwab, 287 Or. 411, 417, 600 P.2d 387 (1979). 8 The original concern of article I, section 20, with special privileges or "monopolies" was the basis of early decis......
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City of Klamath Falls v. Winters, No. 76-259
...those of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States. Thus, as we said recently in State ex rel. Reed v. Schwab, 287 Or. 411, 417, 600 P.2d 387 (1979) quoting from an earlier opinion by this court: 'The provisions of the state Constitution are the antithesis of the fou......
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Compensation of Williams, Matter of
...has been said to be the "antithesis" of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. State ex rel. Reed v. Schwab, 287 Or. 411, 417, 600 P.2d 387 (1979) cert. denied 444 U.S. 1088, 100 S.Ct. 1051, 62 L.Ed.2d 776 (1980); State v. Savage, 96 Or. 53, 59, 184 P. 567, 189 P. 427 (191......
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Ad'+ 'Soil, Inc. v. County Com'rs of Queen Anne's County, No. 143
...258 N.W.2d 34, 37-38 (1977); Byrd v. Columbia Falls Lions Club, 183 Mont. 330, 599 P.2d 366, 367-68 (1979); State ex rel. Reed v. Schwab, 287 Or. 411, 600 P.2d 387, 390 (1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1088, 100 S.Ct. 1051, 62 L.Ed.2d 776 (1980). This principle is, we think, clearly applicabl......
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City of Klamath Falls v. Winters, 76-259
...those of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States. Thus, as we said recently in State ex rel. Reed v. Schwab, 287 Or. 411, 417, 600 P.2d 387 (1979) quoting from an earlier opinion by this court: 'The provisions of the state Constitution are the antithesis of the fou......
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State v. Clark, TC
...individuals or groups. 7 See City of Klamath Falls v. Winters, 289 Or. 757, 619 P.2d 217 (1980), quoting State ex rel. Reed v. Schwab, 287 Or. 411, 417, 600 P.2d 387 (1979). 8 The original concern of article I, section 20, with special privileges or "monopolies" was the basis of early decis......
-
Compensation of Williams, Matter of
...has been said to be the "antithesis" of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. State ex rel. Reed v. Schwab, 287 Or. 411, 417, 600 P.2d 387 (1979) cert. denied 444 U.S. 1088, 100 S.Ct. 1051, 62 L.Ed.2d 776 (1980); State v. Savage, 96 Or. 53, 59, 184 P. 567, 189 P. 427 (191......
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Ad'+ 'Soil, Inc. v. County Com'rs of Queen Anne's County, 143
...258 N.W.2d 34, 37-38 (1977); Byrd v. Columbia Falls Lions Club, 183 Mont. 330, 599 P.2d 366, 367-68 (1979); State ex rel. Reed v. Schwab, 287 Or. 411, 600 P.2d 387, 390 (1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1088, 100 S.Ct. 1051, 62 L.Ed.2d 776 (1980). This principle is, we think, clearly applicabl......