State ex rel. Rice, Atty. Gen. v. Louisiana Oil Corporation

• Decision Date: 20 January 1936
• Docket Number: 32028
• Citation: 174 Miss. 585,165 So. 423
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE ex rel. RICE, ATTY. GEN., v. LOUISIANA OIL CORPORATION

165 So. 423

174 Miss. 585

STATE ex rel. RICE, ATTY. GEN., v. LOUISIANA OIL CORPORATION

No. 32028

Supreme Court of Mississippi

January 20, 1936

Division A

1. LICENSES. In suit for motor fuel oil tax and penalty, bill held sufficient to state cause of action (Laws 1932, chapter 93, sections 2, 6, 10; Code 1930, section 5565).

Bill alleged that defendant had paid insufficient tax on motor fuel oil of specified test and in specified amounts retailed for use in propelling tractors which were motor vehicles over roads and highways of state, and that tractors were used in helping to repair and maintain existing highways.

2 STATUTES.

Tax laws are to be construed in favor of taxpayer, and may not be extended beyond terms of statute.

3 LICENSES. "Tractor" generating motive power from motor fuel oil held "motor vehicle" within statute imposing tax on dealer in motor vehicle fuels to be used on highways (Laws 1932, chapter 93, sections 2, 6, 10, 22; Code 1930, section 5565).

A "tractor" is defined as that which draws or is used for drawing as a traction engine, or an automotive vehicle used for drawing or hauling something as a vehicle, plow harrow, or reaper.

4 LICENSES.

Statute defining "motor vehicle" for purpose of regulating motor vehicles held not persuasive in interpretation of term "motor vehicle" as used in statute imposing motor vehicle fuel tax (Code 1930, section 5565; Laws 1932, chapter 93, sections 2, 6, 10).

5. APPEAL AND ERROR.

Departmental construction of motor vehicle fuel tax statute regarding imposition of tax upon motor fuel used in tractors operated on highways held not available on appeal to support judgment dismissing complaint in suit for tax and penalty on sale of fuel to be used in tractors (Laws 1932, chapter 93, sections 2, 6, 10, 22).

6. LICENSES.

Tractors used in repair of existing roads held "used upon highways" within statute imposing tax on sale of motor vehicle fuel used on highways (Laws 1932, chapter 93, sections 2, 6, 10, 22).

7. LICENSES.

Liability of dealer for motor vehicle fuel tax sold for use in tractors used in repairing highways under contract with county held not affected by fact that imposition of tax imposed additional burden on county (Laws 1932, chapter 93, sections 2, 6, 10, 22).

8. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.

State held not estopped from collecting motor vehicle fuel tax and penalties on sale of fuel for use in tractors used in repair of highways under contract with county because contract was entered into under departmental construction of tax statute under which such fuel would be subject to lower rate of tax than that sued for as against contention that collection of higher rate of tax would constitute impairment of obligation of contract (Laws 1932, chapter 93, sections 2, 6, 10, 22).

9. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. Licenses.

Statute imposing tax of six cents per gallon on gasoline sold for use on highways in internal combustion engines or for any commercial purposes held not unconstitutional as denying equal protection (Laws 1932, chapter 93, sections 2, 6, 10, 22; Const. U.S. Amend. 14).

HON. V. J. STRICKER, Chancellor.

APPEAL from the chancery court of Hinds county HON. V. J. STRICKER, Chancellor.

Bill in equity by the state, on the relation of Greek L. Rice, Attorney-General, against the Louisiana Oil Corporation. From a decree dismissing the bill, the relator appeals. Reversed and remanded.

Reversed and remanded.

Wm. H. Maynard, Assistant Attorney-General, for appellant.

Reduced to its final and simplest analysis, the only question presented by this suit is whether the fuel oil involved here was used "for motor vehicle purposes," within the meaning of chapter 93 of the 1932 Laws of Mississippi.

It is sound to say that in construing a particular section of a statute the entire statute of which it is a part should be considered in arriving at the intention of the Legislature.

Robertson v. Texaco Oil Co., 141 Miss. 356, 106 So. 449; Dresser v. Hathorn, 144 Miss. 24, 109 So. 23.

The provisions of a statute must be construed together to make a reasonable scheme.

Universal Life Ins. Co. v. Catchings, 169 Miss. 26, 152 So. 817.

In view of the "refund" provisions applicable to gasoline, we adopt the common sense view of the statute under consideration that the definition for "motor vehicle purposes" means fuel oil used for the purpose of propelling a motor vehicle upon a public highway or road of the state of Mississippi.

The bill of complaint alleges that the fuel oil in the instant case was used to propel motor vehicles, to-wit: Motor tractors, upon the public highways of Mississippi. The first question to be determined is whether a motor tractor is a motor vehicle, within the meaning of this statute. A careful search of the authorities reveals only one case which has decided this question. Fortunately, that case involved the construction of a gasoline tax statute and although from another state should be useful in deciding this question.

The case referred to is State of Louisiana v. Cedar Grove Refining Co., 152 So. 531.

This Louisiana case clearly holds that motor tractors are motor vehicles, within the meaning of a motor fuel excise tax law. This definition is reasonable and logical because motor tractors have become so mobile as to allow their free and easy passage over highways. This definition also coincides with the meaning of motor vehicles in our fuel tax statute.

By expressly including in the refund provisions tractors used exclusively for agricultural purposes the Legislature excluded from this refund tractors used for any other purposes, such as in repairing highways for an express exception in a statute excludes all other exceptions.

Town of Purvis v. Lamar County, 161 Miss. 454, 137 So. 323; 59 C. J., Statutes, sec. 543; Equit. Assur. Society v. Clements, 140 U.S. 226, 36 L.Ed. 497.

As the tax on gasoline and fuel oil is similar, as previously shown, then fuel oil used to propel tractors on the highways is subject to the tax contended for by appellant although such tractors are used to help repair the roads.

The fact having been established that tractors are motor vehicles and appellee having admitted by its demurrer that said tractors were driven over an existing highway of the state of Mississippi there would seem to be no question but that appellant is entitled to a decree against appellee if the proof sustained appellant's bill of complaint. This being true, appellee's demurrer should have been overruled.

The argument that the county might have to pay more for having its roads worked if the contractor is made to pay more for his fuel oil is not a sound ground for striking out this tax. In the first place, the gasoline excise tax is placed upon the distributor or retail dealer and not on the county employing a contractor who buys from the dealer.

Treas v. Price, 167 Miss. 121, 146 So. 630; Price v. Independent Oil Co., 168 Miss. 292, 150 So. 521.

Secondly, although we do not think that this question is involved here, even if the county actually paid the tax it would not have a legal ground for complaint.

City of Jackson v. State, 156 Miss. 306, 126 So. 2.

The third and complete answer to appellee's argument that fuel oil used to propel motor tractors used in repairing existing highways is not subject to the six (6) cents per gallon tax is that the tax was imposed by the Legislature on motor fuel used in all motor vehicles operated on the public highways and no exception was made by the Legislature for motor vehicles operated in the manner in which the ones were in the case at hand.

Abbott v. State, 106 Miss. 340, 63 So. 667.

The Legislature did not even see fit to except from its gasoline tax provision gasoline which was used in motor tractors other than those tractors used for agricultural purposes.

Sections 22, 23 and 24, chapter 93, Laws of 1932.

By expressly excepting motor tractors used for agricultural purposes it was shown that all other motor tractors used for other purposes would not be excepted. Where a statute contains exceptions in express language, this is admonition to the court that the express exceptions are the only ones contemplated and that further exceptions should not be engrafted.

Town of Purvis v. Lamar County, 161 Miss. 454, 137 So. 323.

The Legislature had the right to construe the words "motor vehicle purposes" as meaning fuel oil used to propel a motor vehicle upon a public highway. The wording of the statute is plain and words should be construed by the court in their usual and ordinary meaning.

Chattanooga Pipe Works v. Dumler, 153 Miss. 276, 120 So. 450.

The court, in construing a statute of doubtful meaning, should consider the consequences of any particular construction, whether good or bad.

Conard Furniture Co. v. Miss. State Tax Commission, 160 Miss. 185, 133 So. 652.

Statutes should be construed so that their operation will be consistent and practical.

Miers v. Miers, 160 Miss. 746, 133 So. 133.

Appellee's demurrer to appellant's bill of complaint should have been overruled for appellee admitted, by said demurrer, that it had sold fuel oil, knowing it was to be used to propel a motor vehicle over an existing public highway of the state of Mississippi and that on said fuel oil only one (1) cent tax was paid.

Thus, under the express language of the statute, appellee is liable to appellant for a tax of five (5) cents per gallon, which is the amount remaining unpaid, and to an additional twenty-five (25%) per cent penalty.

Green, Green & Jackson, of Jackson, for appellee.

The sole desire of the defendant and appellee in this case is to have a judicial construction of this taxing act, and if this court shall hold that it is liable for...