State ex rel. Rolston v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Company

• Decision Date: 10 December 1912
• Citation: 152 S.W. 28,246 Mo. 512
• Parties: THE STATE ex rel. ALLEN ROLSTON, Prosecuting Attorney, Appellant, v. CHICAGO, BURLINGTON & QUINCY RAILROAD COMPANY
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

152 S.W. 28

246 Mo. 512

THE STATE ex rel. ALLEN ROLSTON, Prosecuting Attorney, Appellant, v. CHICAGO, BURLINGTON & QUINCY RAILROAD COMPANY

Supreme Court of Missouri, Second Division

December 10, 1912

Appeal from Schuyler Circuit Court. -- Hon. Nat M. Shelton, Judge.

Affirmed.

Allen Rolston, Dean Davis and Fogle & Fogle for appellant.

This Act does not deny to the defendant the equal protection of the laws. Railroad v. Humes, 115 U.S. 523, 29 L.Ed 463; Barbier v. Connelly, 113 U.S. 27, 28 L.Ed. 923; Hing v. Crowley, 113 U.S. 703, 28 L.Ed. 1145.

O. M Spencer, Palmer Trimble and Higbee & Mills for respondent.

BLAIR C. Roy C., concurs.

OPINION

BLAIR, C. --

This is a proceeding under Secs. 3223-3225, R.S. 1909, to recover from the Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Company accumulated penalties for abandoning a depot and station at Guinn, Missouri, without being authorized by the Board of Railroad and Warehouse Commissioners so to do.

The trial court gave judgment for defendant and plaintiff appealed. In the answer it is averred that the statute under which the action was instituted denies defendant the equal protection of the laws, deprives it of its property without due process of law and impairs the obligation of its contract with one Dean who, the petition alleges, in 1887 conveyed certain land to defendant's predecessor in title in consideration of the erection of a depot on the line of railway now owned and operated by defendant.

In the view we take of the case there is but one question it is necessary to discuss. State and Federal Constitutions guarantee defendant the equal protection of the laws and the right to such protection it is necessary to maintain. The first section of the act the constitutionality of which is drawn in question in this case reads as follows:

"Sec. 3223. Depots to be maintained at agreed places. -- Where the right of way for the construction of a railroad has been granted over and across any tract or tracts of land in this State, or any donations made to and accepted by any railroad corporation in consideration of the location of a depot at a specified place upon such railroad, and such depot has been constructed at the place so agreed upon and a postoffice has been established there and a village or town built at said place, it shall be the duty of the company managing and operating any such railroad (whether it be the original corporation to which said grant or donation was made, or a corporation succeeding to the rights of such original company) to keep and maintain a depot in charge of a resident agent at said place or places, and to furnish all proper and suitable facilities for the shipment of freight and the transportation of passengers to and from said station."

The second section provides that before abandoning a depot of the class defined, a hearing must be had before the Board of Railroad and Warehouse Commissioners and an order permitting the abandonment secured. It is also provided that the liability of the company to the donor of right of way, etc., shall not be affected by the act. The third section prescribes heavy penalties for abandoning a depot without complying with the provisions of the second section, authorizes an action to recover such penalties and empowers the court to allow an attorney's fee in case of a recovery.

It is to be observed that though a depot has been erected at a given place, a postoffice established and a village or town built there, the act is yet inapplicable unless there is present one further element, i. e., the depot must be one which has been erected in consideration of a donation of lands to the railway company. The constitutional prohibitions against class legislation and the denial of equal protection of the laws in no wise deprive the Legislature of all discretion in the matter of defining the classes to which its enactments shall apply, and it is only when the classification attempted is arbitrary, unreasonable and unjust that these constitutional provisions inhibit such legislative action. The Legislature's broad discretion with respect to the classifying of persons and objects for the purposes of legislation is not at all subject to revision by the courts, however unwisely it may seem to have been exercised in an occasional particular instance. When however, it clearly and beyond a reasonable doubt appears that the legislative power has been transcended and that a particular act arbitrarily, unjustly and unreasonably marks particular persons or things as the objects of burdensome legislation and exempts therefrom others of the same natural class it is necessary to point out that fact and give to the constitutional provisions in question their intended effect. It is settled law that a classification for legislative purposes "must always rest upon some difference which bears a reasonable and just relation to the act in respect to which the classification is proposed, and can never be made arbitrarily and without any such basis" ( Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fe Railway Company v. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150, 41 L.Ed. 666, 17 S.Ct. 255; Billings v. Illinois, 188 U.S. 97, 47 L.Ed. 400, 23 S.Ct. 272; State v. Loomis, 115 Mo. 307, 22 S.W. 350; ...