State ex rel. Romley v. Superior Court In and For County of Maricopa, CV-90-0271-PR

Citation168 Ariz. 167,812 P.2d 985
Decision Date21 May 1991
Docket NumberNo. CV-90-0271-PR,CV-90-0271-PR
PartiesSTATE of Arizona, ex rel., Richard M. ROMLEY, Maricopa County Attorney, Petitioner, v. SUPERIOR COURT of the State of Arizona, In and For the COUNTY OF MARICOPA, Honorable Stephen Ventre, a judge thereof, Respondent Judge. Richard Eugene STEWART, Real Party in Interest.
CourtSupreme Court of Arizona
OPINION

GORDON, Chief Justice.

The State petitioned for review of the court of appeals' decision declining special action jurisdiction. The petition for review raised the issue of whether a criminal defendant may waive a preliminary hearing over the objection of the State, even though Ariz.R.Crim.P. 5.1(b), 17 A.R.S., requires the prosecutor's signature on the waiver form. We remanded the matter to the trial court for a preliminary hearing and granted review with an opinion to follow. This is that opinion. We have jurisdiction pursuant to Ariz. Const. art. 6, § 5(3), and A.R.S. 12-120.24.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Richard Eugene Stewart (defendant) was charged with first degree murder by direct complaint in Maricopa County Superior Court. Defendant advised the court that he intended to waive his preliminary hearing. Defense counsel did not want to go forward with the preliminary hearing because by doing so he felt he would lose his chance to interview the witnesses at a later date. He also stated he wanted to waive the hearing in order to prevent a witness identification of his client under what would be unduly suggestive circumstances.

The State objected and the prosecutor refused to sign the waiver form. The prosecutor claimed his purpose in insisting that the hearing go forward was to preserve witnesses' testimony and to provide for their safety. He also indicated he would allow defense counsel to interview the witnesses again at a later date. He responded to the identification issue by claiming that the only witness who would identify defendant was someone who had known him for twenty years.

The trial court accepted the waiver form without the prosecutor's signature. Citing State v. Clark, 126 Ariz. 428, 616 P.2d 888 (1980), cert. denied 449 U.S. 1067, 101 S.Ct. 796, 66 L.Ed.2d 612 (1980), it stated that the purpose of preliminary hearings is not discovery. It concluded that the State's reasons for wishing to hold the preliminary hearing were discovery-related and, therefore, not legitimate.

The State filed a petition for special action in the court of appeals. It then sought and received a ruling from the trial court suspending Ariz.R.Crim.P. 8, 17 A.R.S., (speedy trial) due to extraordinary circumstances. This court approved that finding and the trial court stayed the trial. The court of appeals declined special action jurisdiction.

DISCUSSION

The issue before us requires the construction of a court rule. Rule 5.1(b) states that "[a] preliminary hearing may be waived by written waiver, signed by the defendant, his counsel and the prosecutor." Ariz.R.Crim.P. 5.1(b), 17 A.R.S.

The Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure

are intended to provide for the just, speedy determination of every criminal proceeding. They shall be construed to secure simplicity in procedure, fairness in administration, the elimination of unnecessary delay and expense, and to protect the fundamental rights of the individual while preserving the public welfare.

Ariz.R.Crim.P. 1.2, 17 A.R.S.; see also State v. Reidhead, 152 Ariz. 231, 233, 731 P.2d 126, 128 (App.1986), overruled on other grounds by State v. Georgeoff, 163 Ariz. 434, 437, 788 P.2d 1185, 1188 (1990). Aside from following this general policy statement, we also subject court rules to the principles of statutory construction. See Cabrera v. Plager, 195 Cal.App.3d 606, 611, 241 Cal.Rptr. 731, 734 (1987). When construing a rule, we may look at a variety of elements, including the rule's context, the language used, the subject matter, the historical background, the effects and consequences, and its spirit and purpose. See Martin v. Martin, 156 Ariz. 452, 457, 752 P.2d 1038, 1043 (1988). However, when the rule's language is not subject to...

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