State ex rel. Sanborn v. Unified School Dist. 259

• Court: Kansas Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: MILLER; SCHROEDER
• Citation: State ex rel. Sanborn v. Unified School Dist. 259, 542 P.2d 664, 218 Kan. 47 (Kan. 1975)
• Decision Date: 08 November 1975
• Docket Number: No. 47696,47696
• Parties: The STATE of Kansas ex rel. Keith SANBORN, District Attorney of the 18th Judicial District and on behalf of Helen v. Woodman, Election Commissioner of Sedgwick County, Appellee, v. UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT 259 et al., Appellants.

Page 664

542 P.2d 664

218 Kan. 47

The STATE of Kansas ex rel. Keith SANBORN, District Attorney of the 18th Judicial District and on behalf of Helen v. Woodman, Election Commissioner of Sedgwick County, Appellee, v. UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT 259 et al., Appellants.

No. 47696.

Supreme Court of Kansas.

Nov. 8, 1975.

Syllabus by the Court

1. A school district which contests its liability for election expenses, either in whole or in part, is 'aggrieved' by a statement for such expenses and may appeal to the state election board under K.S.A. 25-2204.

2. By making an appeal to the state election board the 'exclusive remedy' for a political subdivision which is aggrieved by a statement of election expenses, the legislature intended to provide an administrative remedy which must be exhausted before resort may be had to the courts.

3. The fact that K.S.A. 25-2204 provides that an appeal to the state election board is the 'exclusive remedy' and that the board's determination is 'conclusive' is not inconsistent with ultimate judicial interpretation, since illegal acts by an administrative body may always be challenged by one of the extraordinary judicial remedies.

4. Failure to exhaust an available administrative remedy precludes a party from relitigating matters administratively determined, either as a plaintiff or by way of defense.

5. In a mandamus action to compel payment of election expenses it is held: because the defendant school district did not exhaust its administrative remedy and is precluded from challenging the election commissioner's assessment, the trial court's judgment ordering payment was correct.

Robert C. Foulston and Charles E. Cole, Jr., Foulston, Siefkin, Powers & Eberhardt, Wichita, argued the cause and were on the brief for appellants.

Clifford Bertholf, Asst. Dist. Atty., argued the cause, and Curt T. Schneider, Atty. Gen., and Keith Sanborn, Dist. Atty., were with him on the brief for appellee.

FOTH, Commissioner:

The ultimate issue in this case is whether Unified School District No. 259 (the Wichita school system) must reimburse Sedgwick County for the direct expenses of the general school election conducted by the county election commissioner on April 3, 1973. On that date general elections were held in all the various cities and school districts in Sedgwick County. On June 21, 1973, the county election commissioner billed the school district for the direct expenses of its election in the amount of $20,532.02. When the school district refused to pay, the district attorney instituted this mandamus action in the name of the state to compel such payment.

The election commissioner's bill to the school district was based on K.S.A. 25-2201(b), which at that time provided:

'The direct expenses of any primary, general and question submitted elections which are township, city, school or community junior college elections, except for such elections that are held on the same day in every precinct in the county, shall be reimbursed to the county by the township, city, school or community junior college district for which such expenses are incurred. Indirect expenses of such elections shall not be reimbursed to the county.' (Emphasis added.)

In the court below the school district contended that it was not liable because its election came within the exception contained in the emphasized portion of the statute. The state, through the district attorney, contended that the exception was not applicable, and further, that the district had waived its right to contest liability by failing to pursue an available administrative remedy. The district court ordered the school district to reimburse the county, based on a finding that the exception was inapplicable. The district has appealed, and the state has cross-appealed to preserve its procedural contention.

We are convinced the state is correct in its assertion that the administrative remedy is exclusive. The apportionment of election expenses among subdivisions of government is covered by one act, Laws 1968, ch. 53, as amended (K.S.A. 25-2201 through 25-2205). Sec. 1 (25-2201) requires apportionment and reimbursement; sec. 2 (25-2202) directs the county election officer to make the apportionment and submit statements for reimbursement; sec. 3 (25-2203) establishes a state election board to oversee the apportionment and adopt appropriate rules and regulations; sec. 4 (25-2204) affords a subdivision aggrieved by the county election officer's decision a right of appeal to the state election board. It provides:

'In the event that any subdivision of government receives a statement of apportionment of election expense from a county election officer and is aggrieved thereby, the governing body of such subdivision of government may within thirty (30) days after the receipt of such statement appeal to the state election board specifying such changes as it believes should be made in such statement. In accordance with its rules and regulations, the state election board shall receive and determine such appeal, with or without hearing, and issue an order confirming the statement as made or providing that certain changes be made in the statement. The determination of the state election board of any appeal under the provisions of this section shall be conclusive, and shall be the exclusive remedy in such cases. Mandamus action may be maintained to enforce any order of the state election board.' (Emphasis added.)

The school district did not appeal to the state election board, but instead sat back and waited to be sued. It takes the position that the board has jurisdiction only in cases where the amount of expenses is in dispute, but not in those where the question is whether liability exists at all. (The school district concedes that if it is liable, the amount claimed is correct.)

On this point the trial court agreed with the school district, holding that the appeal procedure was not exclusive. To hold otherwise, it said, 'would be to hold that the State Election Board is the sole judge of how the contested phrase in K.S.A. 25-2201(b) should be interpreted, and that is clearly a judicial function, not an administrative one.' The school district was therefore allowed to present its defense without having pursued the administrative remedy.

We believe this was error. The right of appeal is granted to any subdivision that is 'aggrieved' by a statement for expenses. Surely a school district is 'aggrieved' by receiving a bill it feels it does not owe just as much as by one it thinks is too high. The legislature, as it does when it creates any administrative board, sought to channel all problems of one type through one body so that all similar claims would be determined by the same standard. The legislative intent to keep election expense matters out of the courts is emphasized by the 'exclusive remedy' language of the statute; the clear import is that one must either bring his claim before the board or pay the specified expenses without challenge.

It is true, as the court below noted, that the courts must be the ultimate interpreters of any statute. The respective roles of agencies and courts in matters of law has been well defined by our decisions, and were recently summarized in Amoco Production Co. v. Armold, Director of Taxation, 213 Kan. 636, 518 P.2d 453:

'The interpretation of a statute is a question of law and it is the function of a court to interpret a statute to give it the effect intended by the legislature.'

'While the administrative interpretation of a statute should be given consideration and weight it does not follow that a court will adhere to the administrative ruling where the statute is clear and the administrative ruling is erroneous. The final construction of a statute rests within the courts.' (Syl. Nos. 4, 5.)

But the appeal statute's 'conclusive' and 'exclusive' language is not inconsistent with that concept. Prior to the enactment of K.S.A. 60-2101(a), prescribing the appellate jurisdiction of district courts generally, we consistently held that no appeal from an administrative decision would lie unless specifically provided for. City of Hutchinson v. Wagoner, 163 Kan. 735, 186 P.2d 243; In re Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co., 140 Kan. 465, 37 P.2d 7. That did not mean, however, that an administrative agency could be the ultimate interpreter of the law. If an agency acts beyond the scope of its powers, and no appeal is available, relief can always be sought in equity. Gray v. Jenkins, 183 Kan. 251, 326 P.2d 319. In City of Kansas City v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 187 Kan. 701, 360 P.2d 29, while holding that no appeal would lie from the particular order of the board of tax appeals there challenged, we observed:

'However, the courts are always open to hear meritorious complaints against illegal or oppressive acts of non-judicial public boards and officials, either at the instance of the state or of a private citizen especially aggrieved thereby; but not by appeal where no statute confers a right of appeal. In the absence of a statutory right of appeal, judicial redress for illegal, fraudulent or oppressive official conduct must be invoked through some appropriate extraordinary legal remedy recognized in our practice-injunction, mandamus or quo warranto. (In re Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co., supra, 140 Kan. p. 468, 37 P.2d 7; State ex rel. v. Davis, 144 Kan. 708, 710, 62 P.2d 893.)' (P. 703, 360 P.2d p. 31.)

The state election board is therefore not the final arbiter of the statute, despite its language; if the board acts beyond its authority, hence 'illegally,' it is subject to judicial review through a proper action.

The requirement that a litigant must have exhausted his administrative remedies is most commonly encountered by plaintiffs. In Moore v. Starkey, 185 Kan. 26, 340 P.2d 905, a discharged teacher sued to recover salary for the term remaining since he saw no just cause for removal. Plaintiff had not appealed the dismissal...