State ex rel. Savarese v. Buckeye Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn., No. 95-876

• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Ohio
• Writing for the Court: PER CURIAM; MOYER
• Citation: 660 N.E.2d 463,74 Ohio St.3d 543
• Parties: , 106 Ed. Law Rep. 871 The STATE ex rel. SAVARESE, Appellant, v. BUCKEYE LOCAL SCHOOL DISTRICT BOARD OF EDUCATION, Appellee.
• Docket Number: No. 95-876
• Decision Date: 14 February 1996

Page 543

74 Ohio St.3d 543 660 N.E.2d 463, 106 Ed. Law Rep. 871 The STATE ex rel. SAVARESE, Appellant,
v.
BUCKEYE LOCAL SCHOOL DISTRICT BOARD OF EDUCATION, Appellee. No. 95-876. Supreme Court of Ohio. Submitted Jan. 9, 1996.
Decided Feb. 14, 1996.

Lancione, Davis & Lloyd Law Office Co., L.P.A., and D. William Davis, Bellaire, for appellant.

Means, Bichimer, Burkholder & Baker Co., L.P.A., and Richard W. Ross, Columbus, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

In order to be entitled to a writ of mandamus, Savarese had to establish a clear legal right to a supplemental contract as high school girls basketball coach for the 1994-1995 school year, a corresponding clear legal duty on the part of the board to provide the foregoing supplemental contract, and a lack of an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law. State ex rel. Carter v. Wilkinson (1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 65, 637 N.E.2d 1. Additionally, Civ.R. 56(C) provides that before summary judgment may be granted, it must be determined that (1) no genuine issue as to any material fact remains to be litigated; (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law; and (3) it appears from the evidence that reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion, and viewing the evidence most strongly in favor of the nonmoving party, that conclusion is adverse to the nonmoving party. State ex rel. Stiller v. Columbiana Exempted Village School Dist. Bd. of Edn. (1995), 74 Ohio St.3d 113, 114, 656 N.E.2d 679, 680.

Savarese asserts in his propositions of law that the court of appeals erred in granting the board's motion for summary judgment and denying the writ. Savarese concedes that there is no genuine issue of material fact. However, Savarese claims the board is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Savarese initially contends that the board failed to follow the procedures set forth in R.C. 3313.18, which provides:

Page 545

"A majority of the members of a board of education shall constitute a quorum. Upon a motion to adopt a resolution authorizing the purchase or sale of real or personal property, or to employ a superintendent or teacher, janitor or other employee, or to elect or appoint an officer, or to pay any debt or claim, or to adopt any textbook, the treasurer of the board shall publicly call the roll of the members composing the board and enter on the records the names of those voting 'aye' and the names of those voting 'no.' * * * " (Emphasis added.)

In construing a statute, the court's paramount concern is legislative intent. State ex rel. Solomon v. Police & Firemen's Disability & Pension Fund Bd. of Trustees (1995), 72 Ohio St.3d 62, 65, 647 N.E.2d 486, 488. "In determining legislative intent, the court first looks to the language in the statute and the purpose to be accomplished." State v. S.R. (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 590, 594-595, 589 N.E.2d 1319, 1323. If the meaning of the statute is unambiguous and definite, it must be applied as written and no further interpretation is necessary. State ex rel. Herman v. Klopfleisch (1995), 72 Ohio St.3d 581, 584, 651 N.E.2d 995, 997.

In New Concord School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Best (1894), 52 Ohio St. 138, 39 N.E. 694, syllabus, the court...