State ex rel. Schuerman v. Ripley County Council

Decision Date29 October 1979
Docket NumberNo. 1-179A24,1-179A24
Citation395 N.E.2d 867,182 Ind.App. 616
PartiesSTATE of Indiana ex rel. John P. SCHUERMAN, Prosecuting Attorney for the 80th Judicial Circuit of Indiana, Appellant-Relator, v. The RIPLEY COUNTY COUNCIL, Robert Behlmer, President, Paul Voss, Ralph Dunbar, Joe Becker, Herbert Aufderheide, Charles Baylor, George Ammerman, Members, and Gerald Asche, Auditor of Ripley County, Appellees-Respondents.
CourtIndiana Appellate Court

John P. Schuerman, Versailles, for appellant-relator.

John D. Gay, Gay & Gay, Versailles, for appellees-respondents.

ROBERTSON, Judge.

This appeal arises out of the trial court's judgment refusing to mandate the Ripley County Council (Council) and Auditor to appropriate funds to compensate the Ripley County prosecuting attorney's investigator for the last nine months of 1978. We reverse and remand.

The facts, briefly stated, are that the Ripley County prosecutor requested funds for a prosecutor's investigator position in his 1978 budget. The investigator had been employed in this capacity since 1973. The Council refused to appropriate the funds and the investigator terminated his employment on March 31, 1978. The prosecutor commenced this mandate action to compel the Council to fund the position. The trial court denied the request and the prosecutor brings this appeal.

As shown by a memorandum filed with the judgment, the trial court concluded that under Brown v. State ex rel. Brune, (1977) Ind.App., 359 N.E.2d 608, the County Council had discretion to determine whether the investigator's position was necessary, and therefore, the court was limited in reviewing the Council's action. Although Ind. Code 33-14-6-1 provides that the Council can not unilaterally reduce the number of investigators or their compensation without the prosecuting attorney's permission once an investigator is approved and hired, the trial court also concluded that the request for funds was, in effect, a first request which would require the Council's approval under IC 33-14-6-1. The trial court made this first request determination, in spite of the fact that the investigator had been continuously employed since 1973, because the County for the first time had to fund the position entirely itself instead of using primarily federal funds.

We first set out the relevant statutes.

IC 33-14-7-2 provides in pertinent part:

There shall also be appropriated annually by the various county councils . . . for investigators . . ., an amount as may be necessary for the proper discharge of the duties imposed by law upon the office of the prosecuting attorney of each judicial district.

IC 33-14-6-1 provides:

The prosecuting attorney of any judicial circuit of this state is hereby authorized to appoint one or more investigators with the approval of the county council or councils, who work under the direction of the prosecuting attorney and whose duties shall be to conduct such investigations and assist in the collecting and assembling of such evidence as, in the judgment of the prosecuting attorney, may be necessary for the successful prosecution of any of the criminal offenders of the judicial circuit; any such investigator so appointed shall give bond in the sum of five thousand dollars ($5,000) and shall have and possess the same police powers within the county authorized by law to all police officers. In each judicial circuit the salary or other compensation to be paid each such investigator shall be set by the county council or councils. In no event shall a county council or councils reduce the number of investigators or compensation of any investigator as heretofore established by law without approval of the prosecuting attorney. (Emphasis added)

In Brown, we held that IC 33-14-7-2 gives the County Council discretion in appropriating funds for the prosecutor's office. The statute delegates the determination of what is "necessary" to the County Council. Thus, the power to mandate and the standard of review is limited because of the discretionary nature of the Council's action. We reaffirm this holding.

Brown did not consider, however, the effect of IC 33-14-6-1. This statute provides for authorization of the office of investigator by both the prosecutor and the County Council, but additionally provides that the office, once created, can not be reduced in number of investigators or in compensation by the Council "without approval of the prosecuting attorney."

It is a basic rule of statutory construction that statutes relating to the same general subject matter are in Pari materia and should be construed together so as to produce a harmonious system. Economy Oil Corp. v. Indiana Department of State Revenue, (1974) 162...

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9 cases
  • Adult Group Properties, Ltd. v. Imler, 48A02-8604-CV-124
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of Indiana
    • 24 Marzo 1987
    ...say as it is to recognize what it does. Van Orman v. State (1981), Ind.App., 416 N.E.2d 1301, 1305; State ex rel. Schuerman v. Ripley County Council (1979), Ind.App., 395 N.E.2d 867, 870. B. The Covenants A careful reading of IC 16-13-21 demonstrates a legislative intent to treat cases wher......
  • New Trend Beauty School, Inc. v. Indiana State Bd. of Beauty Culturist Examiners, 49A02-8602-CV-55
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of Indiana
    • 3 Febrero 1988
    ...59, 65, 295 N.E.2d 379, 383; Van Orman v. State (1981) 3d Dist. Ind.App., 416 N.E.2d 1301; State ex rel. Schuerman v. Ripley County Council (1979) 1st Dist., 182 Ind.App. 616, 395 N.E.2d 867. The act is wholly silent upon the matter of judicial stays, unlike the provisions in other statutes......
  • Williams v. State, 1-880A220
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of Indiana
    • 27 Enero 1981
    ...to be construed together so as to harmonize and give effect to each, because they are in pari materia. State ex rel. Schuerman v. Ripley County Council, (1979) Ind.App., 395 N.E.2d 867. In re-enacting reckless homicide, it is presumed that the legislature, even though removing it from IC 9-......
  • Grisell v. Consolidated City of Indianapolis, 2-880A268
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of Indiana
    • 8 Septiembre 1981
    ...it is just as important to recognize what a statute does not say as it is to recognize what it does." State, ex rel. Schuerman v. Ripley County Council, (1979) Ind.App., 395 N.E.2d 867. Further, the legislature has authorized the Chief to design the directives according to which the Board o......
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