State ex rel. Schultz v. Wellens
| Decision Date | 11 February 1997 |
| Docket Number | No. 96-0415,96-0415 |
| Parties | STATE of Wisconsin ex rel. Cindy SCHULTZ and the Wisconsin Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, Petitioners-Appellants, v. Victoria WELLENS, Executive Director of the Wisconsin Humane Society, and the Wisconsin Humane Society, Respondents-Respondents. d |
| Court | Wisconsin Court of Appeals |
For the petitioners-appellants the cause was submitted on the briefs of Weaver Law Office, with Kathryn Weaver of Milwaukee.
For the respondents-respondents the cause was submitted on the briefs of von Briesen, Purtell & Roper, S.C., with James C. Reiher and Timothy W. Feeley of Milwaukee.
Before WEDEMEYER, P.J. and SCHUDSON and CURLEY, JJ.
Cindy Schultz and the Wisconsin Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (WSPCA) appeal from the trial court judgment quashing their petition for an alternative writ of mandamus that had sought to compel the Wisconsin Humane Society and its executive director, Victoria Wellens, to disclose public records of dog impoundment and disposition. Because we conclude that "public record[s]" of dog impoundment and disposition under § 174.046(4), STATS., must be made available for disclosure to the public, we reverse.
On May 8, 1995, the WSPCA submitted an open records request under § 19.35, STATS., of the Wisconsin open records law to the Wisconsin Humane Society for all dog impoundment records maintained by the Humane Society since May 1, 1992. The Humane Society denied the request on the grounds that it was not an "authority" required to disclose records under § 19.32(1), STATS. As a result, on June 19, 1995, the WSPCA commenced a mandamus action asserting that "[t]he documents ... are all public records as provided for in Section 174.046(4), STATS., and are, therefore, subject to public access pursuant to Sections 19.32 through 19.37, STATS." The trial court concluded that "[a]lthough the petitioners have a right to seek dog pound records that are designated 'public' under sec. 174.046(4), STATS., they must also do this within the disclosure requirements of the Open Records law" that, the trial court determined, did not authorize disclosure of the requested records.
"A motion to quash a writ of mandamus is treated as a motion to dismiss a complaint." Mazurek v. Miller, 100 Wis.2d 426, 430, 303 N.W.2d 122, 125 (Ct.App.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 896, 102 S.Ct. 395, 70 L.Ed.2d 212 (1981). Therefore, the "facts pleaded and all reasonable inferences from the pleadings must be taken as true, but legal conclusions and unreasonable inferences need not be accepted." Morgan v. Pennsylvania Gen. Ins. Co., 87 Wis.2d 723, 731, 275 N.W.2d 660, 664 (1979). In the instant action, the motion to quash was resolved entirely on the basis of statutory interpretation. We review a trial court's statutory interpretation de novo. Kwiatkowski v. Capitol Indem. Corp., 157 Wis.2d 768, 774-775, 461 N.W.2d 150, 153 (Ct.App.1990). 1
As applicable to this case, § 174.046, STATS., provides that "[a] county board may designate a humane society or other organization to provide a pound for strays or unwanted dogs in the county." It is undisputed that the Wisconsin Humane Society is such a society. Section 174.046(4) provides:
RECORDS. The officer or pound who is notified or to whom a dog is delivered shall keep a record of each dog, giving a description of the dog, the dates of its impoundment, if any, and the disposition of the dog. If the dog is kept by or released to a person the record shall include the name, address and date of delivery of the dog. This record is a public record.
(Emphasis added.)
The trial court concluded that because the Wisconsin open records law governs disclosure of public records, and because the Humane Society was not an "authority" required to disclose records under the open records law, disclosure was not required. On appeal, the WSPCA does not challenge the trial court's conclusion that the Humane Society is not an "authority" required to disclose under the open records law. The WSPCA argues, however, that the open records law must not be read to preclude disclosure of records the legislature had previously designated as "public record[s]" under § 174.046(4), STATS. 2 We agree.
We must interpret clear and unambiguous statutes to effectuate the "express intention of the legislature by giving the language its ordinary meaning," DNR v. Wisconsin Power & Light Co., 108 Wis.2d 403, 408, 321 N.W.2d 286, 288 (1982), and we must construe statutes to avoid absurd results, Kwiatkowski, 157 Wis.2d at 775, 461 N.W.2d at 152. The Humane Society's statutory interpretation would close public access to "public record[s]" that presumably had been available to the public before enactment of the open records law. Such an interpretation, if not absurd, is inconsistent with law for two reasons.
First, nothing in the open records law or its history suggests any legislative intent to abrogate existing law providing public access to public records. The legislature is presumed to know the relationship between new and existing statutes. Wood v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 148 Wis.2d 639, 646, 436 N.W.2d 594, 597 (1989), overruled in part on other grounds, Matthiesen v. Continental Cas. Co., 193 Wis.2d 192, 202, 532 N.W.2d 729, 733 (1995). The Wisconsin open records law, enacted in 1981, does not mention the dog impoundment records law, enacted in 1979. Such statutory silence indicates that the legislature did not intend to repeal or reduce the operation of an existing statute. See Maxey v. Redevelopment Auth. 120 Wis.2d 13, 24-25, 353 N.W.2d 812, 818 (Ct.App.1984).
Second, while not explicitly referring to the dog impoundment records law, the open records law implicitly supports its continuing viability. Section 19.35(1), STATS., specifically provides that "[s]ubstantive common law principles construing the right to inspect, copy or receive copies of records shall remain in effect." In Wisconsin, under common law, the public has enjoyed the "right to inspect and copy public records." See Linda de la Mora, Comment, The Wisconsin Public Records Law, 67 MARQ.L.REV. 65, 66 (1983). 3 Indeed, as our supreme court has emphasized, "[t]here is a presumption that the public has the right to inspect public records unless an exception is found." State ex rel. Richards v. Foust, 165 Wis.2d 429, 433, 477 N.W.2d 608, 609 (1991). Further, the legislature's declaration of policy in § 19.31, STATS., mandates that the open records law "shall be construed in every instance with a presumption of complete public access, consistent with the conduct of governmental business." (Emphasis added.) In this instance, it would be ironic to construe the open records law to preclude public access to statutorily designated "public record[s]" of a society designated by a county board to impound and dispose of dogs. See § 174.046, STATS.
Accordingly, we reverse the judgment and remand this case to the trial court for entry of an order granting the WSPCA petition to compel disclosure of the requested records maintained under § 174.046(4), STATS., by the Wisconsin Humane Society. 4
Judgment reversed and cause remanded with directions.
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