State ex rel. Shade v. Coyne

• Decision Date: 17 July 1931
• Docket Number: No. 7287.,7287.
• Parties: STATE ex rel. SHADE v. COYNE, Secretary of State.
• Court: South Dakota Supreme Court

58 S.D. 493

237 N.W. 733

STATE ex rel. SHADE

v.COYNE, Secretary of State.

No. 7287.

Supreme Court of South Dakota.

July 17, 1931.

Original proceeding in mandamus by the State of South Dakota, on the relation of O. H. Shade, against Elizabeth Coyne, as Secretary of State of South Dakota.

Peremptory writ of mandamus denied, and the application dismissed.Bielski & Elliott and Boyce, Warren & Fairbank, all of Sioux Falls, for plaintiff.

M. Q. Sharpe, Atty. Gen., for defendant.

POLLEY, P. J.

The Legislature of 1931 enacted chapter 183, Laws 1931, entitled as follows: “An Act Defining and Classifying Motor Vehicles, Requiring Registration Thereof, and Fixing Compensation for the Use of Highways; Fixing Amount of License Fees for Registration Thereof by Residents and Non-residents, Fixing Penalties for the Violations Thereof; Providing for the Disposition of Registration Fees to Various Funds and Appropriating said Funds to Departments and Uses; and Repealing * * *” various sections of existing statutes. The act provides for the registration and licensing of motor vehicles of various classes for use on the public highways. It provides penalties for violations of its provisions and appropriates the proceeds of such license fees; in fact, it purports to be a complete motor vehicle code.

Within the time fixed by law for the filing of referendum petitions, certain parties tendered to the Secretary of State a petition signed by a number of electors sufficient to invoke the referendum clause in the Constitution, and requested that said petition be filed in that office and that the said law be placed upon the ballot to be voted on at the next general election. Acting upon the advice of the Attorney General, the Secretary of State refused to accept or file the said petition, which refusal was based upon the ground that the law in question was not subject to the referendum. Thereupon the said petitioners instituted this action, an original proceeding in mandamus in this court, seeking a peremptory writ directing the Secretary of State to file the petition and submit the said law to the voters at the next general election.

Section 1 of article 3 of the State Constitution reads as follows: “The legislative power of the state shall be vested in a legislature which shall consist of a senate and house of representatives, except that the people expressly reserve to themselves the right to propose measures, which measures the legislature shall enact and submit to a vote of the electors of the state, and also the right to require that any laws which the legislature may have enacted shall be submitted to a vote of the electors of the state before going into effect, except such laws as may be necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health or safety, support of the state government and its existing public institutions. * * *”

Under the provisions of this section all laws enacted by the Legislature may be submitted to the electors for a referendum vote except the two classes named in the last clause of the section: First: “such laws as may be necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health or safety,” and, second, “support of the state government and its existing public institutions.” It is the contention of the defendant that chapter 183, Laws 1931, is necessary for the support of one of the public institutions of the state government and falls within the latter class of laws and therefore not subject to the referendum clause of the Constitution.

[1] Chapter 183, Laws of 1931, is a revenue law. It fixes the license fees for every class of motor vehicle that is permitted to operate on the public highways of the state. The aggregate of such license fees is...