State ex rel. Smith v. Smith

• Decision Date: 07 January 1953
• Citation: 197 Or. 96,252 P.2d 550
• Parties: STATE ex rel. SMITH et al. v. SMITH, County Assessor, Multnomah County et al.
• Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Page 550

252 P.2d 550

197 Or. 96

STATE ex rel. SMITH et al. v. SMITH, County Assessor, Multnomah County et al.

Supreme Court of Oregon.

Argued and Submitted Dec. 2, 1952.

Decided Jan. 7, 1953.

Howard E. Roos, Asst. Atty. Gen., for plaintiff. With him on the briefs were George Neuner, Atty. Gen., and Samuel B. Stewart, Asst. Atty. Gen.

Dan M. Dibble, Deputy Dist. Atty., and Nathan L. Cohen, of Portland, for defendants. With them on the brief were John B. McCourt, Dist. Atty., James J. Kennedy and George D. Leonard, Deputy Dist. Attys., of Portland.

R. R. Bullivant and Allan Hart, of Portland, filed a brief as amici curiae.

Before BRAND ^*, C. J., and HAY ^**, ROSSMAN, LATOURETTE ^***, WARNER and TOOZE, JJ.

WARNER, Justice.

This is an original mandamus proceeding brought by the state of Oregon on the relation of Ray Smith, Carl Chambers and Robert D. Maclean, who collectively constitute the State Tax Commission of the state of Oregon (hereinafter referred to as the 'Commission'). The defendants are Wiley W. Smith, as the county assessor of Multnomah county, Oregon (hereinafter referred to as the 'assessor'), and Terry D. Schrunk, as the sheriff and tax collector of the same county (hereinafter referred to as the 'tax collector').

The assessor assessed the value of all real and personal property situated in Multnomah county belonging to the Reynolds Aluminum Company (hereinafter referred to as the 'Company') for the tax year 1951 in amounts totaling $7,099,145. Thereafter, the Company petitioned the Multnomah county board of equalization for a reduction of these values. Its petition was denied, and the Company on July 3, 1951, applied to the Commission for relief.

While this appeal was pending, the assessor on October 12, 1951, turned over the assessment roll to the tax collector; and on November 14, 1951, the Company paid the sheriff the amount of the tax charged to it, less the discount allowed by law.

The Commission held a hearing on the Company's appeal on October 16, 1951, and on March 27, 1952, issued its opinion and order No. AT-52-4 modifying the 1951 assessment roll. The order predicated upon the opinion referred to reads:

'Now, upon the statement of facts, issues and evidence, and the opinion set forth herein and due consideration having been had, it is hereby,

'Ordered, that the present assessed valuation as shown on the assessment roll, insofar as appellant is concerned, be and the same hereby is modified in the following respects:

'1. That the assessed valuation of the personal property be reduced from $4,574,865 to $4,117,380.

'2. That the assessed valuation of the improvements be reduced from $2,404,280 to $2,163,850.

'3. That the assessed value of the land be reduced from $120,000 to $34,200.'

The various assessments fixed by the assessor, requested by the Company and ordered by the Commission are summarized for comparison as follows:

                                                 Requested     Ordered
                                    Fixed by      by Com-      by Com-
                                    Assessor       pany        mission
                                   ----------  -------------  ----------
                Land               $  120,000   $  44,969.98  $   34,200
                Improvements        2,404,280   1,851,284.25   2,163,850
                Personal property   4,574,865   2,786,592.49   4,117,380
                                   ----------  -------------  ----------
                    Total          $7,099,145  $4,682,846.72  $6,315,430
                

On April 1, 1952, the Commission transmitted its opinion and order to the assessor with the following letter:

'Enclosed herein please find a copy of State Tax Commission's Opinion and Order, At-52-4 and At-52-5 regarding the assessed valuation of the property of Reynolds Aluminum Company and Reynolds Metals Company respectively.

'Trusting that you will take such steps as are necessary to comply herewith, we are

'Very truly yours'.

A copy of the order of March 27 was sent to the tax collector on April 21, 1952. Both of the county officers named refused to comply.

An alternative writ of mandamus was issued in this matter on the application of the Commission and served upon both defendants, commanding them to perform immediately their several and respective duties by adjusting the assessment roll of properties in accordance with the opinion and order of the Commission dated March 27, 1952, or show cause in this court why they had not done so.

The assessor and tax collector made separate returns to the writ. Their answers are substantially the same in content and form. After making certain admissions and denials, each answer sets up eight separate defenses. These they summarize with the statement that 'an absolute lack of jurisdiction in the Commission over the Assessor and Tax Collector is the basic contention raised by the defendants.'

The Commission demurred to these returns on the ground that each separate defense failed to state sufficient facts to constitute a defense and, in the alternative, moved for judgment on the pleadings.

The writ poses two questions. First, has the Commission power to make the order in question? Second, is the order mandatory upon the assessor and tax collector?

It is well to observe at the outset that the defendants do not challenge the validity of the statutes which vest the Commission with power to act in matters of this kind, nor do they make any contention that the property which is the subject of the order is not amenable to the jurisdiction of the Commission.

When we examine the eight separate defenses, we find that certain of them have elements in common. This permits a convenient grouping in terms of these relationships as follows:

First. Defenses one, two, three and eight challenge the authority or jurisdiction of the Commission to make the instant order, either as a mandatory direction to the defendants or to make such order as of the date and in the form made.

Second. Defenses four, five and six have a common purpose in assailing the methods employed by the Commission in determining the valuation reflected by its order.

Third. The seventh defense rests upon the claim that this proceeding is moot.

We shall consider and discuss the several defenses in terms of the grouping which we have made above.

Defendants' First, Second, Third and Eighth Defenses

The gravamen of the defendants' first defense is that the Commission's order imposes no direction, instruction or duty upon either of them with reference to or pertaining to the assessments against the Company's properties for the tax year of 1951-1952.

The gist of defendants' second and third defenses, taken together, may be stated as follows: The order of the Commission is unlawful and void insofar as the Commission was without lawful authority to impose any duty upon the defendants to alter or amend the assessment roll of 1951 and for the further reason that defendants had no duty or authority to alter the roll. We will later make a fuller reference to the eighth defense.

Both defendants concede that the Commission is an agency superior to the assessor. The tax collector, however, asserts that he is beyond the reach of the Commission's authority in the instant matter.

By their answers, both defendants admit that they had actual notice of the Commission's opinion and order of March 27, 1952, by reason of its transmission to the assessor on April 1, 1952, and to the tax collector on April 21, 1952.

The alternative writ commands them 'to adjust the assessment roll of properties located in Multnomah County, Oregon, in accordance with the order and direction of the State Tax Commission as contained in its Opinion and Order AT-52-4, dated March 27, 1952 * * *.' The objections made against the form of the Commission's order are obviously not applicable to the form of the writ, which, in our opinion, is sufficient and adequately supplies whatever may be claimed to be deficiencies in the form of the order.

The first reason assigned by the defendants in support of their first defense rests upon the erroneous assumption that an order from the Commission, like the one here, must be addressed to the defendants by name or title and must include a further mandatory direction to implement the order mechanically, in a manner reflecting the modified assessment on the tax roll.

Generally, a public administrative body in the performance of its quasi-judicial functions operates unhampered by technical exactness in pleadings and procedures or in respect to the form in which its orders and final determinations are expressed. By reason thereof, orders of such bodies are liberally construed to effectuate the intent of the body issuing them. This rule is well expressed in 73 C.J.S., Public Administrative Bodies and Procedure, § 143, p. 475, where it is said:

'While an order or regulation providing for punishment for violation thereof must be strictly construed, generally the orders of administrative bodies should be liberally construed, in order to effectuate the legislative intent, so as to make them operative if possible, particularly where such bodies are composed of men unlearned in technical requirements; and they should be so interpreted as to prevent conflicts with statutes, rules, or ordinances, provided such interpretation does no violence to the language used.'

Also see State v. Public Service Commission of Missouri, 232 Mo.App. 1018, 114 S.W.2d 161, where it reads at page 167:

'Courts do not view the orders of the Commission technically, but they are to be liberally construed so as to make them operative if possible. State ex rel. v. Public Serv. Comm. of Missouri, supra, 277 Mo. 175, loc. cit. 192, 193, 210 S.W. 386. * * *'

In La Grange Hydraulic Gold Min. Co. v. Carter, 142 Cal. 560, 76 P. 241, plaintiff challenged an increased assessment of its properties because of the informality of the order of the board of equalization directing the increase. In holding against the taxpayer, the court observed, 76 P. at page 243:

'* * * If we were to adopt the...