State Ex Rel. Smith v. Highway Commission of State

• Decision Date: 07 February 1931
• Docket Number: 29,481
• Citation: 132 Kan. 327,295 P. 986
• Parties: THE STATE OF KANSAS, ex rel. WILLIAM A. SMITH, Attorney-general, Plaintiff, v. THE HIGHWAY COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF KANSAS, Defendant
• Court: Kansas Supreme Court

295 P. 986

132 Kan. 327

THE STATE OF KANSAS, ex rel. WILLIAM A. SMITH, Attorney-general, Plaintiff, v. THE HIGHWAY COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF KANSAS, Defendant

No. 29,481

Supreme Court of Kansas

February 7, 1931

Decided January, 1931.

Original proceeding in mandamus;

SYLLABUS

SYLLABUS BY THE COURT.

1. HIGHWAYS--Construction by State--Repayment of County Expenditures on State System. Where the several counties of the state were engaged in constructing and improving public roads included in the state highway system when chapter 225 of the Laws of 1929 took effect, which statute transferred the powers and duties relating to such road building theretofore exercised by the boards of county commissioners to the state highway commission, a resulting duty devolved upon that body to adjust and settle with the counties for moneys expended by them on roads of the state system, which moneys had been advanced from miscellaneous county funds when the fund properly chargeable therewith was temporarily depleted; and the performance of that duty may be required in mandamus, although an accounting incidental thereto may be necessary before settlement between the counties and the highway commission can be effected.

2. SAME--Construction by State--Adjustment of Funds. The transfer of authority for state road building heretofore exercised by the several boards of county commissioners to the state highway commission by the statute of 1929 (ch. 225) involved no substantial diversion of moneys raised by taxation from one purpose to another, and was merely a measure of legislative expediency; but the effect of that statute was to create certain complications in the financial affairs of the counties (outlined in the opinion) which required cooperative action by the highway commission, as successor to the powers and duties theretofore vested in the county boards, for the proper adjustment thereof.

3. STATUTES--Administrative Interpretation as Aid to Construction. Where statutory enactments or amendments thereto create a situation where official duties which must be performed which are not clearly defined or prescribed in detail, the operative interpretation given thereto by the officers and official boards whose duties are to carry the legislative policy into effect is helpful, and may be entitled to controlling significance, when the scope and limitations of such powers must be determined in judicial proceedings--following Harrison v. Benefit Society, 61 Kan 134, 59 P. 266.

4. COUNTIES--Reimbursement of Funds for Expenditures on State Highways. When chapter 225 of the Laws of 1929 took effect McPherson county was engaged in the construction and improvement of public roads included in the state highway system and it paid for such construction by overdrawing its county and state road fund and by borrowing from other funds of the county, in anticipation of the prompt receipt of motor-fuel tax moneys levied and in process of collection for that express purpose. The enactment of chapter 225 of the Laws of 1929 changed the method of disbursing funds for state road building. Held, that the state highway commission should reimburse McPherson county for the moneys advanced by it to pay warrants properly chargeable to state road construction in that county.

5. REFERENCES--Review of Report. Various objections and exceptions to the report of the commissioner, and to the evidence and exhibits submitted to him, and to his findings of fact and conclusions of law based thereon, considered and not sustained.

Robert O. Mason, assistant attorney-general, James L. Galle, county attorney, and Thomas Amory Lee, of Topeka, for the plaintiff.

John A. Hall and Ralph M. Hope, attorneys for the state highway commission, for the defendant.

H. S. Rogers, county attorney of Pawnee county, as amicus curiae.

Dawson J. Smith, J., not sitting.

OPINION

DAWSON, J.:

This is an original proceeding in mandamus in which the state's department of justice and its highway commission invoke the aid of this court to unravel certain financial snarls which have arisen out of the transfer to the state highway commission of certain responsibilities which heretofore rested on county boards and local officials relating to the construction of the state highway system.

On April 1, 1929, chapter 225 of the session laws of that year took effect. By its terms it became the duty of the several boards of county commissioners then and theretofore engaged in constructing roads and bridges included in the state highway system to surrender to the authorized representatives of the state highway commission all machinery, equipment and road materials which had been purchased with moneys of the several county and state road funds. It was also provided that--

". . . On April 1, 1929, the state highway commission shall assume the rights and liabilities of the various counties on all existing contracts for the construction, improvement, reconstruction or maintenance of state highways and bridges and for the purchase of machinery, equipment or material for use on state highways." (Sec. 19.)

The statute also provided that there should be redelivered over to the state treasurer and credited to the state highway fund all unexpended balances of certain funds in the several county treasuries, and that outstanding warrants issued by any county for the construction of roads included in the state highway system, and certain benefit-district costs, should be paid by the state highway commission. (Sec. 17.)

At the time this act took effect and for a considerable period prior thereto the several counties of the state were engaged in the construction, improvement and reconstruction of roads and bridges, some of which were included in the state highway system and others which were merely county or township roads. The funds for use on these different roads, or roads and bridges, were not always handled with uniformity and precision as to methods of bookkeeping. It was not uncommon for county boards to draw on one road fund to pay warrants properly chargeable on another road fund; and in some instances warrants chargeable to the county and state road fund were paid out of general balances of miscellaneous county funds if the county and state road fund happened to be temporarily exhausted. The abundant stream of revenues which was constantly flowing to the counties from the proceeds of automobile licenses and gasoline sales taxes made the matter of temporary overdrafts in any particular fund seem to be of trivial consequence, as the road fund overdrawn to-day would have a plethora of money to-morrow. In some counties the county board would occasionally make an "order" directing the county treasurer to make temporary transfers of money from one road fund to another to meet obligations on the latter. Such practices were general. It was done with the knowledge and countenance, if not actual encouragement, of the state highway commission itself. Statutory restraints were disregarded for what was conceived to be the object of paramount importance--he early completion of the state highway system "to lift Kansas out of the mud." Probably all such practices were in violation of law. This court cannot approve of them. But our present concern is to state the situation which actually existed in many counties when chapter 225 of the Session Laws of 1929 took effect. The new statute provided that the counties should transmit certain state-road moneys in the county treasuries to the state treasurer for disbursement by the state highway commission. Of more immediate concern, however, was the predicament of counties which had temporarily overdrawn their various local road and bridge funds or miscellaneous county funds to pay warrants properly chargeable to expenditure for roads included in the state highway system. The new statute put an end to the flow of money to the counties which would have reimbursed the funds temporarily overdrawn in the prosecution of the state highway projects.

Confronted with this situation, the state highway commission undertook to make adjustments with the various counties, and within a year had made settlements with over half the counties. Instances of peculiar complexity arose, however, where the methods of bookkeeping in vogue in certain counties were so intricate or unusual that the commission would not assume responsibility for making settlement without judicial determination of the matters in controversy between itself and the county authorities. One of the counties where the effect of the new statute was to throw into chaos its financial accounts was McPherson county. Owing to its zeal in prosecuting the work of state road building the McPherson county board had drawn on local road funds and other county funds to pay warrants for work done on the state road system. The county board also caused to be transferred moneys from other funds to the county and state road fund, in reliance on its own power to return the "borrowed" or overdrawn money upon receipt of remittances from the gasoline sales taxes as such remittances had been accustomed to arrive in conformity with existing statutes. When the new act took effect, and those remittances ceased to arrive, the accounts of the county could not be put to rights without the cooperation of the state highway commission.

The state on the relation of the attorney-general seeks to disentangle this mess by mandamus, on the theory that the state highway commission is the legal successor of the board of county commissioners to whatever extent the highway commission has taken over the powers and duties of the county in road building and matters pertaining thereto, and in consequence it becomes the duty of the highway commission to make the proper...