State ex rel. Sparks v. State Bank & Trust Co.

• Decision Date: 17 December 1909
• Docket Number: 1,812.
• Citation: 105 P. 567,31 Nev. 456
• Parties: STATE ex rel. SPARKS et al., Board of Bank Com'rs, v. STATE BANK & TRUST CO. et al.
• Court: Nevada Supreme Court

105 P. 567

31 Nev. 456

STATE ex rel. SPARKS et al., Board of Bank Com'rs, v. STATE BANK & TRUST CO. et al.

No. 1,812.

Supreme Court of Nevada

December 17, 1909

On rehearing. Petition denied.

For former opinion, see 103 P. 407.

PER CURIAM.

Counsel for appellants have filed a petition for a rehearing, in which it is contended that our former decision in this case is at variance with two recent decisions of this court, viz Bell v. District Court, 28 Nev. 280, 81 Pac, 875, 1 L. R. A. (N. S.) 843, 113 Am. St. Rep. 854, and State v Gibson, 31 Nev. --, 96 P. 1057. To hold that the act involved in this case is constitutional, we do not think has made necessary any different construction of the provisions of section 17 of article 4 of the Constitution than that applied in former decisions of this court. Sometimes expressions may occur in an opinion not essentially necessary to its determination, and, taken alone, might be susceptible of too broad or too restricted a construction, but, viewed in the light of the entire decision, cannot be said to modify an established rule. The two cases, supra, we think are clearly distinguishable from the case at bar. The gist of the opinion in Bell v. District Court, supra, is contained in the following extract: "The subject of the act in question is elections. Its purpose and object is the orderly electing of public officers by the qualified voters of the state. The trial of an officer, after he has been so elected, for malfeasance in office, his removal, and the appointment of his successor because of such removal has no proper connection whatever with the subject of elections." The case of State v. Gibson, involved the constitutionality of section 2 of an act entitled "An act to provide for the appointment of stenographers upon the hearing of preliminary examinations before committing magistrates in this state, and to regulate the compensation therefor" (Act 1907, p. 59 c. 32), which reads: "When such report is made, the same, when transcribed and sworn to as aforesaid, shall be deemed a correct statement of the evidence and proceedings given and had therein, and shall be admissible in evidence on the trial of the case, as prescribed in section 151 of the criminal practice act of the state of Nevada." In that case we said: "An examination of the title to the act in question reveals that it has reference only to the appointment of a stenographer, and fixing the compensation therefor. Nowhere in the title of the act is there any reference to the testimony being thereafter used as evidence or at all. Section 2 of said act, therefore, clearly violates section 17 of article 4 of the Constitution of our state because the subject-matter is not embraced in the title of the act, nor can it be said that the subject-matter of section 2 is germane to the subject-matter defined in the title of the act." The above section was held, also, to violate other provisions of the Constitution not in question in the case at bar.

The contention of counsel for appellant that in this case we have departed from established precedents is clearly without merit. A few extracts from former decisions of this court will be sufficient answer to this contention. In the case of State v. Ah Sam, 15 Nev. 27, 27 Am. Rep. 454, this court, by Beatty, C.J., said: "But in dealing with this particular objection to parts of statutes, which, as a whole embrace but one subject of legislation, the courts of the different states have adopted an exceedingly liberal rule of construction in favor of their validity. The decisions on the point are very numerous, but it would be unnecessary and unprofitable to attempt a review of them; for in scarcely a single instance is an attempt made to lay down any rule or principle more definite than is to be gathered from the remark of Judge Cooley (Con. Lim. 146) that 'there has been a general disposition to construe the constitutional provision liberally, rather than to embarrass legislation by a construction, whose strictness is unnecessary to the accomplishment of the beneficial purposes for which it has been adopted.' The 'beneficial purposes' designed to be accomplished by the provision in question are...