State Ex Rel. St. Louis v. Dist. Court of Eighth Judicial Dist., 3997.

• Decision Date: 13 August 1934
• Docket Number: No. 3997.,3997.
• Citation: 34 P.2d 1098,38 N.M. 451
• Parties: STATE ex rel. ST. LOUIS, ROCKY MOUNTAIN & PACIFIC CO.v.DISTRICT COURT OF EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT et al.
• Court: New Mexico Supreme Court

38 N.M. 451

34 P.2d 1098

STATE ex rel. ST. LOUIS, ROCKY MOUNTAIN & PACIFIC CO.

v.DISTRICT COURT OF EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT et al.

No. 3997.

Supreme Court of New Mexico.

Aug. 13, 1934.

Original proceeding for writ of prohibition by the State of New Mexico, on the relation of the St. Louis, Rocky Mountain & Pacific Company, against the District Court of the Eighth Judicial District, Honorable Livingston N. Taylor, judge of said court, and another.

Alternative writ of prohibition discharged.

Prohibition is proper remedy, where judge or court acts without jurisdiction.

Crampton & Robertson, of Raton, for relator.

Kiker & Fernandez, of Santa Fé, and Fred J. Voorhees, of Raton, for respondents.

WATSON, Chief Justice.

The petitioner in this original proceeding was defendant in a proceeding in the district court under the Workmen's Compensation Act (Comp. St. 1929, § 156-101 et seq.). It filed a demurrer to the amended claim, which was overruled. Prior to the making and entry of the overruling order, it objected to the taking of any action in the case on the ground that the court had no jurisdiction of the subject-matter; it appearing that the fatal injury of the claimant's husband occurred more than one year prior to the commencement of the proceeding. The court having assumed jurisdiction despite the objection, the petitioner sued out an alternative writ of prohibition. The matter is now before us on a demurrer interposed by the respondent.

Respondent contends that this is not a case for prohibition and that, if it is, the alternative writ was improvidently granted because of the existence of the remedy of appeal.

[1] The sole question, on the merits, which had developed in the district court, was whether the compensation proceeding had not been filed too late, according to the provisions of the statute. It is well-understood law that prohibition lies only to prevent action without jurisdiction. So the petitioner must show that the district courts are without jurisdiction in such a case. For present purposes we must assume that a recovery of compensation could not be upheld in this case, being barred by statute.

In Gilmore v. District Court, 35 N. M. 157, 291 P. 295, 297, we reviewed the matter generally and laid it down: “If the inferior court or tribunal has jurisdiction of both the subject matter and of the person where necessary, the writ of prohibition will not issue, but lacking such jurisdiction the writ will issue as a matter of right.”

Jurisdiction of the person is not here involved. Unquestionably the statute commits workmen's compensation litigation to the jurisdiction of the district courts. If the administration of the statute be the “subject matter” here involved, it is within the jurisdiction challenged, and the alternative writ should be discharged.

[2][3] But petitioner considers that it is not this general jurisdiction that we should inquire into, but jurisdiction of this particular case or claim. It is argued that “subject matter,” as the term is used in the Gilmore Case, means not jurisdiction of workmen's compensation litigation, but, to be specific, jurisdiction of claims filed within the statutory time. That is to say, the statute confers jurisdiction upon the district courts to award compensation to those entitled to it, not to those not entitled; to render some judgments, not others.

We consider the law settled to the contrary in this state. Here the test of jurisdiction is not the right or authority to render a particular judgment; it is...