State ex rel. State Tax Commission v. First Judicial Dist. Court
Decision Date | 06 November 1961 |
Docket Number | No. 7054,7054 |
Citation | 1961 NMSC 157,366 P.2d 143,69 N.M. 295 |
Parties | STATE of New Mexico ex rel. STATE TAX COMMISSION, Petitioner, v. FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT of the State of New Mexico; and The Hon. Samuel Z. Montoya and James M. Scarborough, as Judges thereof, Respondents, Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Company, Real Party in Interest. |
Court | New Mexico Supreme Court |
Adolf J. Krehbiel, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., for petitioner.
Bigbee & Stephenson, Santa Fe, Akolt, Turnquist, Shepherd & Dick, Denver, Colo., for respondents and real party in interest.
Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Company filed an appeal to the First Judicial District Court of Santa Fe County, from the valuation, for tax purposes, of its property fixed by the petitioner. An order allowing the appeal was signed by a judge designated by the chief justice of the supreme court, by reason of the fact that neither of the resident judges were at that time available. The order, in addition to granting the appeal, also provided as follows:
'It is further ordered that Defendants-Appellees refrain from any further action in said matter and refrain from certifying said assessments to the County Assessors of the State of New Mexico, or any of them, until the final determination of this cause, in this Court, or if appealed pursuant to statute, in the Supreme Court.'
Petitioner immediately sought and was granted an alternative writ of prohibition to restrain the respondents from interfering with the petitioner's duty of certifying the tax valuations of Mountain States to the various county assessors of the state.
We must first determine if prohibition in its usual sense is a proper remedy. It is quite apparent that petitioner seeks to undo an act already performed, not to prevent a further act. Thus, petitioner seeks to correct, not to prevent, and this is not the purpose of prohibition. See, State ex rel. Parks v. Ryan, 1918, 24 N.M. 176, 173 P. 858; and State ex rel. Davis v. District Court of Fifth Judicial District, 1960, 67 N.M. 215, 354 P.2d 145. A seeming exception to the rule, as stated in State ex rel. Delgado v. Leahy, 1924, 30 N.M. 221, 231 P. 197, 199, '* * * where something remains to be done, and where it is necessary in order to effectuate the object of the writ, that which has already been done may be undone' is not applicable to the facts of this case. Therefore, we hold that prohibition is not proper.
However, this is a matter of primary public interest and affects the very foundations of our state government. It is an interference with the processes of taxation. The courts will not ordinarily intervene in such matters, absent a clear mandate from the legislature. See, State ex rel. Lynch v. District Court of McKinley County, 1937, 41 N.M. 658, 73 P.2d 333, 113 A.L.R. 746; and In re Blatt, 1937, 41 N.M. 269, 67 P.2d 293, 110 A.L.R. 656. Is there such a mandate here, warranting a stay or injunction? We believe not. Therefore, we would be derelict in our duty if we did not view the proceedings before us in the light of whether we should exercise our right of superintending control over the district courts. See, N.M.Const. art. 6, Sec. 3; and 112 A.L.R. 1370.
Very briefly, the ad valorem taxing process as determined by the legislature provides that the various county assessors place valuations on all taxable property in their respective counties, with the exception of certain corporations, which are to be valued by the petitioner. Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph falls within this latter classification. After corporate valuations are fixed by the petitioner, it then certifies them proportionately to the various counties in which the property is located, and at that time the assessors complete the tax rolls and compute the levy of taxes. It is to be noted that until the corporate valuations are in the hands of the assessors, the tax rolls cannot be fully completed, and, in addition, inability to be able to place on the tax rolls the assessment values of a large corporation, such as Mountain States, may, in several counties, adversely affect the budgets which are already in operation and have been since July first of this year. Until 1959, the legislature had not specifically provided for an appeal to the courts of the tax commission's valuation. Theretofore, the only statutory remedy was for the corporation to pay its taxes under protest to each county and file separate suits in respect thereto. However, by Sec. 2, Ch. 354, Session Laws of 1959 (Sec. 72-6-8.2, N.M.S.A., 1959 Pocket Supp.), the legislature apparently attempted to remedy this oversight. Insofar as pertinent, the above-mentioned section provides:
Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Company, answering for itself and respondents, claims that it clearly follows from a reading of the statute that a stay or supersedeas is contemplated, although it is admitted that the specific words to this effect are not present. It is, however, urged that the provision allowing the court to require a surety bond bolsters the claim that stay or supersedeas was intended under the statute.
The argument is that actually no order was really necessary, and that the order which was obtained was done so because of a desire to be cautious as to procedural matters.
The exact meaning of the statute is not as plain and unambiguous as respondents would have us determine. If a stay or supersedeas had been contemplated, words to such effect could have easily been utilized.
It is difficult to believe that the legislature intended that the entire taxing process, at least as to any corporation appealing the commission's order, should be brought to a halt. The ad valorem tax structure is such that unless the various steps are taken by certain fixed dates, the entire taxing process is in danger. Even this instant proceeding will, in part, interfere with the statutory time schedule of the various taxing officials, and a stay, such as claimed by Mountain States, would very possibly prevent the placing of any valuation on Mountain States' property for a period of months and perhaps years. In any event, we do not believe that the statute evidences a clear mandate, such as would authorize the court to interfere with the certification by petitioner, by stay or by injunction.
If the statute does not authorize the stay, we then reach the ultimate question of the inherent power of the court to enjoin a claimed illegal assessment.
Mountain States' claim, upon which they seek equitable relief, is based, generally, upon an alleged inequality of valuation of its property as...
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