State ex rel. State Park and Recreation Commission v. New Mexico State Authority

Decision Date28 February 1966
Docket NumberNo. 7650,7650
Citation411 P.2d 984,1966 NMSC 33,76 N.M. 1
PartiesSTATE of New Mexico ex rel. STATE PARK AND RECREATION COMMISSION and Floyd Cross, Superintendent, and John A. Elliott, John L. Gray, William H. Carr, Grady Coan, Clarence L. Forsling, Jacob D. Martinez and T. B. White, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. NEW MEXICO STATE AUTHORITY and M. M. Hardin, James E. Sperling, James M. Murray, J. W. Eaves and George Stanley, Defendants-Appellees.
CourtNew Mexico Supreme Court

Earl E. Hartley, Atty. Gen., Thomas A. Donnelly, Asst. Atty. Gen., Santa Fe, for appellants.

Standley, Kegel, Campos & Cook, Santa Fe, for appellees.

PER CURIAM.

The motion for rehearing is denied; however, upon consideration of the motion, the original opinion heretofore filed is withdrawn and the following substituted therefor.

CHAVEZ, Justice.

This case involves an appeal from a decision of the district court which held that the State Revenue Bond Act, Ch. 271, Laws 1963, Sec. 11-10-1 et seq., N.M.S.A., 1963 Pocket Supp., is unconstitutional. The State Revenue Bond Act will hereinafter be referred to as the 'Bond Act,' and the New Mexico State Authority will be referred to as the 'Authority.'

Plaintiffs-appellants, State of New Mexico, ex rel. State Park and Recreation Commission

and its superintendent and members, filed suit for a declaratory judgment against defendants-appellees, the Authority and its members, seeking an adjudication of the validity of the Bond Act and an adjudication that the refusal of appellees to approve a proposal of appellants for the issuance of revenue bonds constituted an arbitrary and illegal refusal under said Bond Act.

Appellees filed an answer admitting that appellants and appellees are both duly constituted governmental agencies of the state of New Mexico; that appellants and appellees are proper members and officers of such state agencies; that appellants adopted a resolution calling for the issuance of revenue bonds, pursuant to said Bond Act, to construct a boat dock facility at Bluewater Lake State Park; that appellants sought to gain approval from appellees either to issue such bonds themselves or, in the alternative, that appellees issue revenue bonds itself and lease the facility to appellants, utilizing the proceeds from the dock facility to pay the revenue bonds; and that appellees refused to authorize or approve such bonds and rejected appellants' proposals, based on nine main grounds stated in a resolution adopted by appellees.

Following a hearing, the trial court entered its decision adopting findings of fact and conclusions of law favorable to appellees, holding that the Bond Act is unconstitutional upon twenty-one grounds, and entered judgment dismissing appellants' complaint.

The parties stipulated the following material facts: That appellants adopted a resolution calling for the issuance of revenue bonds in the amount of $12,000 for the financing of a proposed boat dock facility at Bluewater Lake State Park, and adopted another, resolution proposing, in the alternative, that revenue bonds be issued by appellees for the same purpose and that such facilities be leased to appellants; that under the proposals the income from the operation of such facilities be used to repay the bonds; that accompanying the proposals was a resolution indicating the financial feasibility of such project, the amount of the bonds to be issued, a detailed schedule of retirement of such bonds, and studies indicating projected proposed income from the use of such facility; that thereafter appellees adopted a resolution refusing the authorization of the revenue bonds and refusing the alternative proposal; that the proposed facilities are intended for use of the general public for recreational and park facilities; that appellants have proposed additionally to expend public funds acquired by appellants from park and lake use fees for the payment of certain operation and maintenance expenses of such facilities, and for maintenance of a reserve for such revenue bonds; that the sole basis for appellees' refusal to authorize the issuance of the bonds, or issue the bonds itself, is predicated upon the grounds set out in Exhibit 'A' attached to appellants' complaint.

Appellants contend under their first point that conclusion of law No. 4 is erroneous and that the Bond Act does not constitute an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority.

The challenge to the Bond Act's validity by appellees is that it constitutes an unlawful delegation of legislative power, contrary to Art. III, Sec. 1, of our constitution.

The trial court held the Bond Act unconstitutional because it vests in the parties here involved and other state agencies legislative power involving the exercise of broad discretion for determining the location and character of projects to be constructed, the manner of operating such projects, the financing and cost thereof, or details respecting the bonds issuable thereunder and the security therefor, and other legislative powers constituting an unlawful delegation of legislative powers to executive agencies, in contravention of Art. III, Sec. 1, of our constitution, which provides:

'The powers of the government of this state are divided into three distinct departments, the legislative, executive and judicial, and no person or collection of persons charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of these departments, shall exercise any powers properly belonging to either of the others, except as in this Constitution otherwise expressly directed or permitted.'

In approaching the problem submitted under this point we examine the rules laid down by other courts, as well as the rule followed by this court, upon the question of unlawful delegation of legislative powers. One of the earliest decisions on this question, which is still being cited, is found in the case of Cincinnati W. & Z. Railroad Co. v. Commissioners of Clinton County (Ohio Sup.Ct.1852), 1 Ohio St. 77, wherein the court stated:

'* * * The true distinction, therefore, is, between the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring an authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection can be made.'

See also, Crain v. First National Bank of Oregon, Portland (D.C.D.Or.1962), 206 F.Supp. 783.

In State ex rel. Young v. Duval County, 76 Fla. 180, 79 So. 692, it is said:

'* * * Where a statute defines the general outlines for its operation, and therein provides that stated persons, officers, or tribunals shall, within designated limitations, perform acts or ascertain facts upon which the statute by its own force will operate to accomplish the lawmaking intent, the action by the persons, officers, or tribunals within the stated limitations may be administrative and not exclusively legislative, executive, or judicial in its nature and essence. When the functions so assigned are administrative in their nature or are not exclusively legislative, executive, or judicial in character, the statute does not delegate legislative power or confer executive or judicial power and authority * * *.'

In 16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law Sec. 138(17), p. 615, we find this statement:

'While the legislature cannot empower executive officers to incur unlimited debts and liabilities chargeable against the general fund of the state, it may authorize them to exercise a limited discretion in borrowing money for a purpose specified by the legislature.

'Issuing bonds. Thus, the legislature may authorize, or particular statutes have been held not invalid as delegating legislative power which authorize, executive agencies to issue, and to enter into agreements with reference to the payment of, bonds for specified purposes; to fix the terms of bonds and terms on which bids may be made; to determine the sufficiency of revenue before the issuance of bonds; to determine whether interim certificates shall be issued, and the character thereof; and to approve bond issues of local units of government.'

The Connecticut supreme court, in St. John's Roman Catholic Church v. Town of Darien, 149 Conn. 712, 184 A.2d 42, quoted Jennings v. Connecticut Light & Power Co., 140 Conn. 650, 103 A.2d 535, and stated:

'* * * 'The challenge of unconstitutional delegation of legislative power is successfully met if the * * * [ordinance] declares a legislative policy, establishes primary standards for carrying it out or lays down an intelligible principle to which the agency must conform with a proper regard for the protection of the public interest, * * *."

In People ex rel. Adamowski v. Chicago Land Clearance Commission, 14 Ill.2d 74, 150 N.E.2d 792, the court stated:

'The legislature cannot delegate its power to make a law, but it can make a law delegating a power to determine some facts or state of things upon which the law makes, or intends to make, its own action depend. 'Delegation of power to make the law is forbidden, as necessarily involving a discretion as to what the law shall be; but there can be no valid objection to a law which confers an authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law itself.' City of Chicago v. Stratton, 162 Ill. 494, 44 N.E. 853, 855, 35 L.R.A. 84. * * *'

In Application of Oklahoma Turnpike Authority, 203 Okl. 335, 221 P.2d 795, the Oklahoma supreme court ruled that the Oklahoma act creating a state authority and granting said authority the power to issue turnpike revenue bonds was not an unlawful delegation of legislative authority, saying:

'This act in appropriate language provides that the Authority may construct and build toll roads, and fix and collect tolls, and issue and sell bonds, and pay them from tolls collected. That in general is the purpose of the Authority and its powers. It is...

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