State ex rel. Staton v. Common Pleas Court

• Decision Date: 29 December 1965
• Docket Number: No. 39650,39650
• Citation: 5 Ohio St.2d 17,34 O.O.2d 10,213 N.E.2d 164
• Parties: , 34 O.O.2d 10 The STATE ex rel. STATON, Appellee, v. COMMON PLEAS COURT of Franklin County et al., Appellants.
• Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Page 17

5 Ohio St.2d 17

213 N.E.2d 164, 34 O.O.2d 10

The STATE ex rel. STATON, Appellee, v. COMMON PLEAS COURT of Franklin County et al., Appellants.

No. 39650.

Supreme Court of Ohio.

Dec. 29, 1965.

Syllabus by the Court

1. The jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals to issue a writ of prohibition does not extend to an interlocutory matter arising during the proceedings in a cause before an inferior tribunal, which has jurisdiction of the cause, unless such interlocutory matter involves a usurpation of judicial power.

2. In an action instituted under the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act in the Court of Common Pleas to determine whether the claimant is entitled to participate in the State Insurance Fund, where there is presented to the trial court a motion for an interlocutory order directing claimant to submit to an examination by a physician specializing in neurology and psychiatry, such examination upon the advice of the physician to be conducted in the absence of claimant's counsel, the trial court is authorized and empowered to pass upon such interlocutory motion in the exercise of its discretion, and the exercise of such discretion may not be disturbed or prohibited by the issuance of a writ of prohibition by the Court of Appeals.

Relatrix commenced an action in the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County on appeal under the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act to establish her right to participate in the benefits of the State Insurance Fund, as a result of a claimed injury to the relatrix while engaged in the scope of her employment by General Motors Corporation, the action being Staton v. Young, Admr., Bureau of Workmen's Compensation, et al., case No. 216785.

In the preparation of its defense, counsel for General Motors sought to have relatrix examined by a physician specializing in neurology and psychiatry and desired to exclude counsel for the relatrix from such examination. The physician in question advised that the nature of such an examination required the exclusion of everyone excepting the relatrix, the examining physician and his assistant.

Relatrix refused to submit to such examination under the prescribed conditions.

Whereupon General Motors Corporation, by its counsel, presented a formal motion to Judge Holden of the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County, Requesting the examination under the conditions herein set out, contending that by reason of the history of neurological and psychiatric episodes experienced by relatrix, her complaints may have arisen from a mental condition rather than as a result of the accidental injury suffered while working. Relatrix contended that as the petition alleged only a physical injury, there was no occasion for a neurological or psychiatric examination.

Judge Holden sustained the motion, but, before an order was journalized, relatrix instituted the instant action in prohibition in the Court of Appeals for Franklin County to restrain Judge Holden and the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County from journalizing the proposed order.

Upon formal hearing, the Court of Appeals issued a writ of prohibition permanently enjoining, restraining and prohibiting respondents from journalizing the entry ordering relatrix to submit to said examination under the conditions proposed.

Respondents, Judge Holden and the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County, perfected an appeal to this court, seeking to reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

Cohen & Rosenbloom and Joseph L. Rosenbloom, Columbus, for appellee.

Vorys, Sater, Seymour & Pease, John C. Elam, Jacob Davis, II, Columbus, and C. Howard Johnson, Jr., Pros. Atty., for appellants.

HERBERT, Judge.

The respondents, Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County and Judge Holden, a member thereof, were vested with jurisdiction of the subject matter of the action by statute. Sections 4123.01 to 4123.99 of the Revised Code of Ohio. The relatrix voluntarily submitted herself to this jurisdiction in order to secure the benefits provided by the Workmen's Compensation Act for injured employees.

It follows, therefore, that the Court of Common Pleas has jurisdiction of both the subject matter of the action and the person of the relatrix in the cause now pending before it.

The authorities appear to be in general agreement upon the function of a writ of prohibition under the circumstances and conditions here. The first two paragraphs of the syllabus of State, ex rel. Winnefeld v. Court of Common Pleas of Butler County, 159 Ohio St. 225, 112 N.E.2d 27, are:

'1. Prohibition is a writ to prevent a tribunal from proceeding in a matter in which it seeks to usurp or exercise a jurisdiction with which it has not been invested by law.

'2. A writ of prohibition will be awarded only where there is no other adequate remedy, and, where a court has full and complete jurisdiction of the subject matter of an action pending therein, a writ of prohibition will not be awarded to prevent an anticipated erroneous judgment.'

Kelley, Judge v. State ex rel. Gellner, 94 Ohio St. 331, 114 N.E. 255, states the law, as follows, in the third paragraph of the syllabus:

'The proper function of the writ of prohibition is to restrain inferior courts and tribunals from exceeding their jurisdiction and to confine them to the exercise of those powers legally conferred. It is not an appropriate remedy for the correction of errors, and does not lie to prevent an erroneous decision in a case which the court is authorized to adjudicate.'

At page 341, 114 N.E. at page 258 in the opinion, the late Judge Edward S. Matthias, speaking for the court, said:

'In all cases where an inferior court has jurisdiction of the matter in controversy and keeps within the limits prescribed by law for its operation, the superior court should refuse to interfere by prohibition, for it should not consider whether the court below erred in the exercise of its powers, since it has nothing to do with the correctness of the rulings of the inferior court, but only with its exercise of jurisdiction.' (Emphasis added.)

In State ex rel. Booth v. Robinson, Judge, 120 Ohio St. 91, at page 94, 165 N.E. 574, at page 575, Judge Matthias, speaking for a unanimous court, said:

'The office of a writ of prohibition has been stated in numerous cases. It is a process by which a superior court prevents an inferior court or tribunal from usurping or exercising a jurisdiction with which it has not been vested by law. It is an extraordinary writ, and issues only when the party seeking it is without other adequate means of redress for the wrong about to be inflicted by the act of the inferior tribunal. 2 Spelling on Injunctions and Other Extraordinary Remedies (2d Ed.) § 1716.

'It...