State ex rel. Steinfort v. District Court of Fourth Judicial Dist. in and for Ravalli County
| Decision Date | 04 December 1940 |
| Docket Number | 8134. |
| Citation | 107 P.2d 890,111 Mont. 216 |
| Parties | STATE ex rel. STEINFORT v. DISTRICT COURT OF FOURTH JUDICIAL DIST. IN AND FOR RAVALLI COUNTY et al. |
| Court | Montana Supreme Court |
Proceeding by the State of Montana, on the relation of Mary S Steinfort, administratrix of the estate of John P. Steinfort deceased, against the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the State of Montana, in and for the County of Ravalli, and the Honorable C. E. Comer, a Judge thereof, for writ of supervisory control or other appropriate writ.
Writ issued.
O'Hara Madeen & Grant, of Hamilton, and C. E. Pew, of Helena, for relatrix.
J. D. Taylor, of Hamilton, for respondents.
For the second time the matter of the claim of Mary Steinfort against the Estate of John R. Steinfort, deceased, comes before this court on petition for writ of supervisory control or other appropriate writ. On the first occasion, upon the application of Mary Steinfort, a sister of deceased and a claimant against his estate, this court issued a writ directing the district court to permit an amendment of her amended claim after the time for presenting claims had expired. In this proceeding Mary A. Steinfort, the daughter of deceased and administratrix of his estate, seeks a writ directing the district court to annul an order by which after the final amendment it required her "to at once allow or disallow said amended claim of said Mary Steinfort, as in her judgment may appear proper, and file a report of what she does in the premises."
The claimant appeared herein only by demurrer and motion to quash, and no questions of fact are involved.
Claimant has given three versions of her claim, in each of which she demanded $4,972 and interest from about May 1, 1939, although each version disclosed different amounts paid and therefore different amounts still due. Her claim is upon two notes dated May 1, 1924, aggregating $2,827.13 in amount, and due one and two years later, respectively, with interest at the rate of 6% per annum. The first sworn claim presented and rejected on July 29, 1939, showed no credits, but as fifteen years had passed, the principal and interest, if entirely unpaid, would have aggregated $5,371.55, and the claim for $4,972 indicates a credit of $399.55. The "amended claim," presented, rejected and filed on August 4, 1939, two days before the time for presenting claims expired, shows payment of interest to May 1, 1927, at times not stated; three years' interest amounts to $508.88, which is $109.33 more than shown by the original claim, and would reduce the debt to $4,862.67 as of May 1, 1939, although $4,972 was still demanded. The amendment of the amended claim was first sought to be made on September 20, 1939, more than six weeks after the time for presentation of claims had expired and sets forth certain payments on undisclosed dates in 1931, 1932, 1933, 1934, 1935 and 1936, and on stated dates in 1925, 1926, 1927 and 1937, aggregating $1,058.89, which is $550.01 more than shown by the amended claim, and reduces the debt to $4,312.66 as of May 1, 1939, although $4,972 is still demanded. The first two versions of the claim suggest that is barred by the statute of limitations, but the final version shows payments which, if proven, would evade the bar.
Claimant's motion for leave to amend her amended claim so as to show these additional payments, was denied by the district court, but on application for writ of supervisory control this court on December 4, 1939, ordered that a peremptory writ issue directing the district court "to set aside the order denying and to enter an order permitting the amendment as sought." State ex rel. Steinfort v. District Court, 109 Mont. 410, 97 P.2d 341, 345.
No petition for rehearing was filed, but apparently claimant did nothing to give effect to this court's decision until after the administratrix on April 23, 1940, had filed her final account and had it set for hearing. Claimant then on April 26, 1940, obtained a peremptory writ from this court pursuant to its decision of December 4, 1939, and on May 2, 1940, served the writ upon the trial judge. On the same day the latter made an order reading:
"Pursuant to the direction of the Supreme Court, the order made by this court on September 28th, 1939, denying the right of Mary Steinfort to file certain amendments to a claim she had presented to the above estate, is hereby reversed, and it is ordered that the said claimant be and she is hereby granted the right and authority to amend such claim by adding thereto and thereon, to be endorsed upon the two notes upon which her claim is based the following endorsements, to-wit:
March 26, 1925, received $160.00
March 23, 1926, received 135.00
Feb. 15, 1927, received for balance of interest up to May 1, 1924 213.89
1931, received 100.00
1932 " 100.00
1933 " 100.00
1934 " 100.00
1935 " 50.00
1936 " 50.00
May 28, 1937, received 50.00
Done this 2nd day of May, 1940.
(Signed) Albert Besancon
Judge of the District Court"
Subsequently on June 20, 1940, the district court ordered the administratrix to "at once allow or disallow said amended claim of the said Mary Steinfort," and it is that order against which the application of the administratrix for a writ of supervisory control is now directed.
The sole issue is whether the administratrix can and should be compelled to act again upon the claim as finally amended, and in determining it we must consider the cognate questions of the claimant's right and the administratrix' power and duty.
The proper purpose of probate proceedings is to administer and settle decedents' estates expeditiously and efficiently. It is not the accomplishment but the failure of these purposes which have in the past aroused most of the criticism of probate proceedings. The result has been the enactment by legislatures of probate codes and especially of statutes like sections 10171 and 10173, Revised Codes, providing that creditors' claims must be filed within four months after the first publication of notice to creditors in estates of this size, and absolutely barring claims not so presented (with two exceptions not here in point); and section 10176, providing that in case of the administrator's failure or refusal to act upon a claim within ten days after its presentation, the claimant has the option to consider the non-action equivalent to a rejection on the tenth day; and section 10178, providing that a rejected claim is barred unless suit is brought within three months after the rejection and filing. As noted above, the original "amended claim" was presented, rejected and filed on August 4, 1939, two days before the time for presentation expired. Three months later, on November 4, 1939, expired the time for filing suit, which was claimant's only recourse for the disallowance. Sec. 10178, Rev.Codes; In re Bette's Estate, 171 Cal. 583, 153 P. 949.
The statutes are mandatory and unambiguous. The administratrix has no power to waive them or to estop herself from setting them up (Vanderpool v. Vanderpool, 48 Mont. 448, 138 P. 772), and the court has no power to waive them or to authorize the administratrix to do so. State ex rel. Paramount Publix Corp. v. District Court, 90 Mont. 281, 1 P.2d 335, 76 A.L.R. 1371, 1377. This applies not only to the allowance or payment of a claim barred by the non-claim statute or by the general statutes of limitation; it necessarily applies to any other method by which the benefit of the defenses might be lost to the estate, such as the settlement or compromise of an action not filed within the statutory period after rejection, or to a new rejection of a claim after the time has expired, for the purpose of starting the suit period running again. The courts have recognized the fact that these are matters for legislative determination and have not tried to usurp the legislative functions by overruling the statutes even in case of hardship; for every non-claim or limitation statute is a hardship upon those barred by it.
But without assuming to overrule statutes the courts will wherever possible construe them so as to prevent hardship. Thus if a claim has been rejected because insufficiently presented, it has been held that the claimant may again present it in proper form if he acts in time. An instance is the case of Lindsay v. Hogan, 56 Mont. 583, 185 P. 1118, in which this court said, after quoting the special statute of limitation of actions on rejected claims (now section 10178):
And even where the time for presentation of claims has expired the courts have seized upon statutes like section 9187 Revised Codes, authorizing the amendment of "any pleading or proceeding," to permit the amendment of a claim which was filed in time, where the amendment merely...
To continue reading
Request your trial