State, ex rel. Stephan v. Martin, 53477
Decision Date | 27 February 1982 |
Docket Number | No. 53477,53477 |
Citation | 230 Kan. 747,641 P.2d 1011 |
Court | Kansas Supreme Court |
Parties | STATE of Kansas, ex rel., Robert T. STEPHAN, Attorney General, Petitioner, v. Philip W. MARTIN, Director of Property Valuation, Kansas Department of Revenue, Respondent. |
Syllabus by the Court
1. In a proper case an original action in quo warranto is an appropriate procedure to question the constitutionality of a statute.
2. We start with the proposition that the constitutionality of a statute is presumed; that all doubts must be resolved in favor of its validity, and before the statute may be stricken, it must clearly appear the statute violates the Constitution. It is the court's duty to uphold the statute under attack, if possible, rather than defeat it. If there is any reasonable way a statute may be construed constitutionally permissible, that should be done. Following Board of Greenwood County Comm'rs v. Nadel, 228 Kan. 469, Syl. P 1, 618 P.2d 778 (1980).
3. A liberal construction of statutes in order to effectuate their purpose is the established policy of this court. The function of liberal construction is called into use where there is ambiguity in the language of the statute or, in other words, where there are one or more interpretations which may fairly be made. Where clarification is required, judicial interpretation is made that will give life to the statute rather than the one which will nullify it. Errors plainly clerical in character, mere inadvertences of terminology, and other similar inaccuracies or deficiencies will be disregarded or corrected where the intention of the legislature is plain and unmistakable. Following Russell v. Cogswell, 151 Kan. 793, 101 P.2d 361 (1940).
4. The words "and" and "or" are frequently misused. The courts will construe "and" to mean "or" and vice versa when necessary to reflect the true meaning and intent of a statute.
5. The legislature may prescribe the manner in which certain property shall be appraised for taxation in order to arrive at fair market value.
6. In an action in quo warranto seeking to oust the Director of Property Valuation from utilizing the provisions of K.S.A.1981 Supp. 79-331 on the grounds that the statute is unconstitutional, it is held : Based upon the limited stipulation of facts and record before this court, we cannot find that K.S.A.1981 Supp. 79-331 is unconstitutional as violating either Article 2, Section 14, or Article 11, Section 1, of the Kansas Constitution and the petition for a writ of quo warranto is denied.
Rodney J. Bieker, Asst. Atty. Gen., argued the cause and Robert T. Stephan, Atty. Gen., and Dan Biles, Asst. Atty. Gen., were with him on the brief for petitioner.
Carol B. Bonebrake, of the Dept. of Revenue, Legal Services, Topeka, argued the cause and was on the brief for respondent.
This is an original action in quo warranto filed in this court on the petition of the Attorney General of Kansas, to oust the Director of Property Valuation from valuing and assessing oil and gas leases and properties in accordance with K.S.A.1981 Supp. 79-331 as enacted by the 1979 Legislature. The Attorney General contends the statute, as amended in 1979, is unconstitutional.
This action was brought by the State on the relation of the Attorney General pursuant to Article 3, Section 3 of the Kansas Constitution and K.S.A. 60-1202. This court has recognized on several occasions that in a proper case an original action in quo warranto is an appropriate procedure to question the constitutionality of a statute. See State ex rel. Tomasic v. Kansas City, Kansas Port Authority, 230 Kan. 404, 636 P.2d 760 (1981); State ex rel. Stephan v. Carlin, 229 Kan. 665, 630 P.2d 709 (1981); State ex rel. Frizzell v. Dwyer, 204 Kan. 3, 460 P.2d 507 (1969). The matter has been submitted to this court on an agreed statement of facts and we find the respondent's attack upon the standing of the attorney general to bring this action to be without merit. The court has determined that it will take jurisdiction of the controversy.
K.S.A. 79-331 (Weeks 1977) provided:
The first paragraph of the foregoing statute was first enacted in 1917 and the second paragraph was enacted in 1969. In 1979 the Legislature amended the statute by adding subsections (b) and (c) effective January 1, 1980, and as enrolled and signed by the Governor it reads:
"(c) The provisions of subsection (b) of this section shall not apply in the case of any production from any direct offset well or any subsequent well on the same lease." L.1979, ch. 310. (Emphasis added.)
The 1979 amendments were adopted by the legislature in an attempt to address a problem of ad valorem tax valuation which is peculiar to the oil and gas industry. It has long been recognized that when a new well is completed it will ordinarily produce at a far greater rate than will be customary for that particular well after only a few weeks or months have elapsed. This initial excessive production is referred to as "flush production" and, if used as one of the factors for determining value, is misleading and often results in excessive valuation and assessment for the initial year of taxation. Prior to the amendments, local assessors often failed or refused to take into consideration the "flush production" feature of new wells and for wells completed late in the year would merely annualize the initial "flush production" and arrive at a greatly inflated production factor resulting in excessive valuation and assessment along with other consequences detrimental not only to the oil and gas producers and royalty owners but to the public at large. The problems as testified to before the legislature and as summarized in the parties' stipulation of facts were:
Additional stipulations include:
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...appropriate procedure to question the constitutionality of a statute. E.g., State ex rel. Stephan v. Martin, 230 Kan. 747, Syl. p 1, 641 P.2d 1011 (1982). It is true that K.S.A. 77-434 establishes a procedure by which persons whose interests are affected by the threatened application of the......
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