State ex rel. Stockton v. Lane

• Decision Date: 25 February 1916
• Docket Number: No. 22939.,22939.
• Citation: 184 Ind. 523,111 N.E. 616
• Parties: STATE ex rel. STOCKTON v. LANE et al.
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

184 Ind. 523

111 N.E. 616

STATE ex rel. STOCKTON

v.LANE et al.

No. 22939.

Supreme Court of Indiana.

Feb. 25, 1916.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Jasper County; Moses Leopold, Special Judge.

Action by the State of Indiana, on the relation of Jay W. Stockton, against Edward P. Lane and others. From a judgment for defendants, relator appealed to the Appellate Court, and it transferred the cause under Burns' Ann. St. 1914, § 1405. Reversed, with directions.

See, also, 182 Ind. 249, 105 N. E. 147.

John A. Dunlap, of Rensselaer, and William W. Lowry, of Indianapolis, for appellant. George A. Williams, of Rensselaer, for appellees.

LAIRY, J.

This was an action on the bond of a township trustee, for damages alleged to have been caused to relator on account of the failure of such trustee to furnish transportation for relator's children to school in accordance with section 6423, Burns 1914. The complaint was in one paragraph, and a demurrer thereto was sustained by a special judge. Relator declined to plead further, and judgment was rendered against him for costs. From this judgment relator appeals, assigning as error the action of the trial court in overruling appellant's objection to the jurisdiction of the special judge and in sustaining the demurrer to the complaint.

The complaint alleged facts showing, in substance, that appellee Edward P. Lane was the duly elected, qualified, and acting trustee of Newton township, Jasper county, Ind., and that his codefendants were his bondsmen; that relator had been for the two years last past a resident householder of what was formerly district No. 1 of such township, and was the father of three children, who resided with him, and who, during the time for which complaint is made of the neglect of the trustee, were between the ages of six and twelve years, unmarried, and free from infectious disease; that school district No. 1 was abandoned by the trustee, and that by reason thereof relator's children were transferred to district No. 4 in such township, and compelled to attend Blue Grass School in such district, which school was more than 1 1/2 miles from the home of relator and his children; and that a legal and sufficient appropriation of funds had been made to defray the expense of transporting all of the school children in the township required to be transported, including the children of relator, and such funds were at all times available for that purpose and in the hands of the trustee. The complaint further alleged that the relator repeatedly requested the defendant trustee to furnish means of transportation for relator's children to and from such school or some part of such distance, but that the defendant trustee maliciously refused to furnish such means of transportation, by reason whereof relator was obliged to and did provide such transportation at his own expense, to his damage.

[1] The first objections to the complaint raised by appellee under the demurrer thereto were that the pleading did not allege that the relator or his children ever asked to be or ever was attached to or enumerated in district No. 1, or that relator was a patron of such district and entitled to participate in school elections therein; that it failed to allege the circumstances under which the district was abandoned, and did not show a legal and valid appropriation to enable the defendant trustee to transport the children of relator. All questions raised under these objections were discussed in Greenlee v. Newton School Township, 55 Ind. App. 630, 104 N. E. 610, and there decided adversely to the contention of appellee. Without taking up further space it is sufficient to say that under the authority of that case this complaint was not defective, for the reasons above advanced.

Appellee urges the further objections that it is not disclosed by the complaint that the trustee failed or refused to discharge or perform any duty which he owed the relator; that the duty of transporting school children to school is imposed upon the township trustee, if at all, for the benefit of the public and not for the benefit of private individuals; and that if this duty is imposed for the benefit of private individuals, it must be held that it is solely for the benefit of the school children and not for the benefit of their parents or guardians.

[2] Although every failure of an officer to perform his duty is a breach thereof, it is not on that account alone actionable at the suit of every individual member of the community. A private person can recover from the officer only when he can show that he has a direct interest in the duty to be performed, and that a special damage to himself has resulted as the natural consequence of the wrongful act or failure to act, and it is immaterial that the duty is primarily imposed on public grounds. The right of action springs from the fact that the private individual receives a special injury from the neglect of the performance of a duty which it was the purpose of the law to impose partly for his benefit. Insurance Co. v. Harris, 89 Ind. 363, 46 Am. Rep. 169;Raynsford v. Phelps (1880) 43 Mich. 342, 5 N. W. 403, 38 Am. Rep. 189;Butler v. Kent, 19 Johns. (N. Y.) 223, 10 Am. Dec. 219.

[3] Granting that the duty to transport children from an abandoned school district was primarily imposed on the public ground of furnishing educational facilities to the public, still it must be held that the statute imposes a duty on the trustee to furnish such facilities to all persons coming within its provisions, and that it provides for such transportation for the special benefit of those individuals who were so located as to be personally entitled to these privileges.

While it is true that under the statute...