State ex rel. Styles v. Baeverstad

• Decision Date: 03 December 1903
• Docket Number: 6731
• Citation: 97 N.W. 548,12 N.D. 527
• Court: North Dakota Supreme Court

97 N.W. 548

12 N.D. 527

STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA EX REL WESLEY STYLES v. BEAVERSTAD

No. 6731

Supreme Court of North Dakota

December 3, 1903

Wesley Styles, after a preliminary examination before a committing magistrate, was held to answer upon a charge of manslaughter in the first degree, committed upon the person of one Peter J. Selseth. He was committed in default of bail, and petitions for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that there was not sufficient or probable cause to justify his commitment and detention.

Writ denied.

Writ denied.

Asa J Styles, Tracy R. Bangs and Guy C. H. Corliss, for petitioner cited ex parte Stevens, 82 Cal. 245, 23 P. 38.

C. L Lindstrom, state's attorney, and John A. Sorley, for respondent.

OPINION

COCHRANE, J.

Wesley Styles petitioned this court for a writ of habeas corpus. A stipulation was entered into in open court by the counsel for respective parties, whereby the entire matter is to be disposed of upon the petition for the writ. The physical presence of petitioner before the court was waived, and it was agreed that if, upon a hearing, the court should determine that petitioner was entitled to his release, the writ should forthwith issue; otherwise its denial should be taken as a finale to this proceeding.

Petitioner was arrested and taken before a justice of the peace of Benson county, in this state, upon a complaint accusing him of the crime of murder. After a preliminary examination before such magistrate, in which all the testimony taken was reduced to writing in the form of depositions, pursuant to section 7960, Rev. Codes 1895, said justice found that the offense of manslaughter in the first degree had been committed, and that there was sufficient cause to believe the defendant, Wesley Styles, guilty thereof, and did order that the defendant be held to answer said charge, and that he be allowed to give bail in the sum of $ 5,000 for his appearance. The defendant was committed to the custody of the sheriff of Benson county in default of bail, and he prays for his release upon habeas corpus.

No question is raised as to the regularity of his examination or commitment, and it is admitted that the examining magistrate literally and fully complied with the statute as to the conduct of such examination and the making and certifying of the proceedings thereon and return thereof. The only particular wherein petitioner claims that his restraint is illegal is in that the evidence not only failed to show that any offense had been committed, but as he claims, fully and clearly establishes that, if the death of Peter J. Selseth was in any way caused by the act or agency of petitioner, the same evidence discloses the act to have been committed under such circumstances as constitute excusable homicide. Counsel stipulated that the depositions taken upon the preliminary examination, referred to in and made a part of the petition, contain all the evidence of which the prosecuting counsel had any knowledge, and that these depositions should be referred to by this court as containing all the evidence in the case. An application was made to the judge of the district court of the Second judicial district for a writ of habeas corpus, and the writ was granted upon a petition setting forth the same facts as appear in the petition made to this court. A return was made to such writ by the sheriff of Benson county, showing that he held petitioner by virtue of a commitment, a copy of which was attached; that upon a full hearing before said district judge the writ was discharged, and defendant remanded to the custody of respondent. Counsel for respondent urges as a preliminary consideration that the order of the district court discharging and remanding the petitioner renders the matters inquired into res adjudicata; that petitioner's remedy was by appeal. These questions were severally resolved against respondent's present contention in Carruth v. Taylor, 8 N.D. 166, 77 N.W. 617. A majority of the court, as now constituted, adhere to the ruling that an order discharging the writ and remanding the petitioner, when made by a district judge, is not an appealable order; and all members of the court are agreed that the order of remand was not res adjudicata, but that relator is entitled to have his petition for a second writ upon the same facts considered by this court, notwithstanding such order of the district judge. The statute provides that when it appears on the return of a writ of habeas corpus that the party is in custody by virtue of process from any court of this state or judge or officer thereof, such person may be discharged when he has been committed on a criminal charge without reasonable or probable cause. Subdivision 7 of section 8662, Rev. Codes 1899.

Petitioner claims that he is so committed without reasonable or probable cause, and asks this court to examine the proofs against him, and determine whether or not there is probable cause for his detention. This presents for determination the question to what extent the court, on habeas corpus, will go behind the commitment of a magistrate, and examine the evidence to determine whether there was probable cause for holding one accused to answer upon a charge of having committed a crime. The examination of offenders is intrusted to magistrates, whose jurisdiction is defined and limited by the statute. The function exercised by the magistrate in such examination is a judicial one, and the finding and determination made by him, if the statutory bounds and requirements have been observed and followed, is entitled to the same respect and is of the same binding force as against collateral attack by habeas corpus as is the judgment of a court of general jurisdiction. People v. Protectory, 106 N.Y. 604, 612, 13 N.E. 435. In the conduct of examinations witnesses must be examined in the presence of the defendant. Section 7960, Rev. Codes 1899. After hearing the evidence on behalf of the respective parties, if it appears either that a public offense has not been committed, or that there is no sufficient cause to believe the defendant guilty thereof, he must be discharged. If, however, it appears from the examination that a public offense has been committed, and that there is sufficient cause to believe the defendant guilty thereof, the magistrate must indorse on the complaint an order signed by him to the effect: "It appearing to me that the offense in the within complaint mentioned (naming it) has been committed, and that there is sufficient cause to believe the within-named guilty thereof, I order that he be held to answer the same." Sections 7964, 7966, Rev. Codes 1899. It is apparent from this statute that the magistrate must act upon evidence, and that it must appear from the evidence taken before him that an offense has been committed, and that there is sufficient cause to believe that the accused committed it. It is plain, therefore, that the order binding one over to answer for crime without the taking and hearing of evidence by the magistrate, unless an examination is waived by the accused, would be a void order, made contrary to the authority of the statute, and, consequently, without jurisdiction. It is equally plain that, when the evidence has been taken and heard, the magistrate is the judicial officer who must pass upon its sufficiency, and decide from the evidence taken before him whether an offense has been committed, and determine whether it shows sufficient cause to believe that the defendant committed it. The determination and order based on such evidence is a judicial determination by a court of competent jurisdiction in this behalf, and the commitment of one accused, based upon such evidence and finding, is lawful, because made upon reasonable and probable cause. Of course, the evidence taken must be legal and competent evidence to prove the facts, and must sustain the findings based thereon; otherwise the findings are without evidence to sustain them. State v. Huegin, 110 Wis. 189, 85 N.W. 1046, 1058.

Upon habeas corpus the court ordinarily will inquire no further than to ascertain whether the court or officer issuing the process on which the prisoner is detained had jurisdiction of the case, and acted within that jurisdiction in issuing the process. Church on Habeas Corpus, section 233; Cooley's Const. Lim. 430; note to Koepke v. Hill, 87 Am. St. Rep. 172. Mere errors or irregularities of procedure not affecting the question of jurisdiction, are never reviewable on habeas corpus; and, where the process is regular and valid upon its face, the inquiry will go only to the question of jurisdiction. Church on Habeas Corpus, section 236. The statutes of this state do not change or enlarge the function of the habeas corpus remedy. Under it the investigation must be confined to jurisdictional matters. The jurisdictional inquiry, however, will extend to the power of the court or magistrate to make the commitment. ...