State ex rel. Swoboda v. Mo. Comm'n on Human Rights
| Decision Date | 09 August 2022 |
| Docket Number | SC 99000 |
| Citation | 651 S.W.3d 800 |
| Parties | STATE EX REL. Jim SWOBODA, Respondent, v. MISSOURI COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, Appellant, Alisa Warren, Appellant, and Armstrong Teasdale, LLP, Appellant. |
| Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
The commission and its director were represented by David L. McCain Jr. of the attorney general's office in Jefferson City, (573) 751-3321.
The law firm was represented by Jeffery McPherson, Daniel K. O'Toole, Paul L. Brusati and Daniel R. O'Brien of Armstrong Teasdale LLP in St. Louis, (314) 621-5070.
Swoboda was represented by Alexander Edelman of Edelman, Liesen & Myers LLP in Kansas City, (816) 607-1529; and Kirk D. Holman and Aiman A. Dvorak of Holman Schiavone LLC in Kansas City, (816) 283-8738.
The Missouri Commission on Human Rights and its Executive Director, Alisa Warren, (collectively, the "Commission"), and Armstrong Teasdale, LLP (the "Law Firm") appeal the circuit court's judgment issuing a permanent writ of mandamus in Jim Swoboda's favor. As relevant here, Swoboda filed a charge of discrimination with the Commission against the Law Firm that was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. After Swoboda sought judicial review, the circuit court directed the Commission to rescind the dismissal, accept the charge, and conduct an investigation. Because Swoboda failed to establish he is entitled to mandamus relief, however, the circuit court's decision was erroneous. The judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded.
Swoboda filed a charge of discrimination against his employer, the Board of Police Commissioners of Kansas City (the "Board"), and the Law Firm in February 2019. The charge alleged that, in 2014, while Swoboda was a sergeant with the Kansas City Police Department, he opposed the purported discrimination against another officer and supported that individual in a formal legal claim against the Board. When Swoboda was deposed in the case, an attorney from the Law Firm, which represented the Board, allegedly informed him he should think about his career as he testified. Again, before Swoboda testified at trial, an attorney from the Law Firm again allegedly advised him to consider how his testimony could hurt the Board. After a mistrial, the other officer's claim was settled.
The charge indicated that, from October to December 2018, Swoboda took a leave of absence due to medication issues and stress related to involvement with the other officer's claim, stating he used 46 sick, vacation, and compensation days. Swoboda contended he received medical approval to return to full duty in December 2018 but was placed on limited duty until January 2019. He further posited that, during this period, he was 1) assigned menial tasks; 2) denied access to his vehicle, e-mail, and key card entry for certain facilities; 3) not allowed to wear his uniform or carry a gun; 4) restricted from accessing computers, confidential information, and records, despite being the custodian of records; 5) excluded from Fraternal Order of Police meetings, Commander meetings, department training, the unit holiday party, and work groups, committees, and projects; and 6) removed from his positions of information management unit commander and Custodian of Records.1 He also purportedly lost his office and was assigned to work from a storage closet. Swoboda believed all of these actions were taken against him in retaliation for participating in the discrimination case because, once the claim was settled, he regained access to his e-mail and restrictions on his key card entry were removed. Yet, at the time the charge was filed, his department vehicle had not been returned.
The charge named the Board as well as the Law Firm and listed retaliation, disability, and "[o]ther: [a]iding and [a]betting" as the types of discrimination.2 In March 2019, the Commission issued a letter regarding Swoboda's claims against the Law Firm:
The investigation of the [ ] complaint has determined that the [Commission] lacks jurisdiction over this matter because there is no employer-employee relationship between [Swoboda] and [the Law Firm]. Therefore, [the Commission] is administratively closing this case and terminating all [ ] proceedings relating to your complaint.
Swoboda filed a petition for a writ of mandamus in the circuit court, seeking to require the Commission to vacate its dismissal and accept and investigate his claim. The circuit court directed the Commission to respond to the petition. The Law Firm filed a motion to intervene, which the court later sustained without objection. The Commission and the Law Firm also filed motions to dismiss, alleging Swoboda failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The circuit court entered an order, judgment, and permanent writ of mandamus, finding the Commission erroneously dismissed Swoboda's charge without issuing a right-to-sue letter and directing the Commission to rescind its dismissal, accept the charge, and conduct an investigation.3 The Commission and the Law Firm appeal.4
If a circuit court, pursuant to section 536.150,5 grants relief from an administrative agency's decision, this Court reviews the ruling like any other court-tried case. Furlong Cos., Inc. v. City of Kan. City , 189 S.W.3d 157, 168 (Mo. banc 2006). The judgment will be affirmed unless it is not supported by substantial evidence, is against the weight of the evidence, erroneously declares the law, or erroneously applies the law. Id. Questions of law, including matters of statutory interpretation, are reviewed de novo. State ex rel. Tivol Plaza, Inc. v. Mo. Comm'n on Hum. Rts. , 527 S.W.3d 837, 841 (Mo. banc 2017) (expressing the rule in the context of reviewing the denial of a writ of mandamus).
The Commission and the Law Firm, for distinct reasons, contend the circuit court erred in entering judgment in Swoboda's favor and issuing a permanent writ of mandamus because such relief was inappropriate here.6 The Commission posits the decision to administratively close a complaint for lack of jurisdiction is a discretionary action that cannot be controlled by mandamus, while the Law Firm alleges mandamus was improper because Swoboda was attempting to establish a new right rather than enforce an existing right. This Court finds the Law Firm's argument dispositive.7
Regarding judicial review of administrative agency proceedings, article V, section 18 of the Missouri Constitution provides:
All final decisions, findings, rules and orders on any administrative officer or body existing under the constitution or by law, which are judicial or quasi-judicial and affect private rights, shall be subject to direct review by the courts as provided by law; and such review shall include the determination whether the same are authorized by law, and in cases in which a hearing is required by law, whether the same are supported by competent and substantial evidence upon the whole record. Unless otherwise provided by law, administrative decisions, findings, rules and orders subject to review under this section or which are otherwise subject to direct judicial review, shall be reviewed in such manner and by such court as the supreme court by rule shall direct and the court so designated shall, in addition to its other jurisdiction, have jurisdiction to hear and determine any such review proceeding.
Pursuant to this provision, reviewing courts, when a hearing is not held, are required to ascertain whether the decision of an administrative agency is authorized by law. Notably, article V, section 18, by dictating review is conducted "as provided by law," allows the legislature to create additional rules in this area.
The proceeding at issue constitutes a noncontested case, judicial review of which is governed by section 536.150. Subsection 1 of that statute provides the scope of review:
When any administrative officer or body existing under the constitution or by statute or by municipal charter or ordinance shall have rendered a decision which is not subject to administrative review, determining the legal rights, duties or privileges of any person, including the denial or revocation of a license, and there is no other provision for judicial inquiry into or review of such decision, such decision may be reviewed by suit for injunction, certiorari, mandamus, prohibition or other appropriate action, and in any such review proceeding the court may determine the facts relevant to the question whether such person at the time of such decision was subject to such legal duty, or had such right, or was entitled to such privilege, and may hear such evidence on such question as may be properly adduced, and the court may determine whether such decision, in view of the facts as they appear to the court, is unconstitutional, unlawful, unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious or involves an abuse of discretion[.]
In accordance with this provision, the administrative agency's decision may be reviewed by an action for an injunction, certiorari, mandamus, prohibition, or another appropriate suit. Regarding other possible proceedings, general petitions for review are often filed. See, e.g. , Kinzenbaw v. Dir. of Revenue , 62 S.W.3d 49, 51-53 (Mo. banc 2001) ; Spurgeon v. Mo. Consol. Health Care Plan , 481 S.W.3d 604, 606 (Mo. App. 2016) ; Ard v. Shannon Cnty. Comm'n , 424 S.W.3d 468, 474-75 (Mo. App. 2014). For some of the specified actions, the common law provides various rules. See, e.g. , State ex rel. Off. of Pub. Couns. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of Mo. , 236 S.W.3d 632, 635 (Mo. banc 2007) (discussing writs of mandamus); Hansen v. State, Dep't of Soc. Servs., Fam. Support Div. , 226 S.W.3d 137, 141 (Mo. banc 2007) (addressing writs of prohibition). Section 536.150.1 also includes several standards.
This case presents the following issue: When an individual seeks judicial review of a noncontested case by filing a petition for a writ of mandamus, must the party establish a clear,...
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