State ex rel. Symms v. Collier
| Citation | 454 P.2d 56,93 Idaho 19 |
| Decision Date | 09 May 1969 |
| Docket Number | No. 10339,10339 |
| Parties | The STATE of Idaho ex rel. R. Doyle SYMMS, Howard B. Thomason and C. Ed Flandro, Idaho Board of Highway Directors, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Emerson J. COLLIER and Marie J. Collier, husband and wife and Lilah D. Holden, Defendants-Respondents. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Idaho |
Anderson, Kaufman, Anderson & Ringert, Boise, for defendants-respondents.
June 12, 1967, plaintiff (appellant) State of Idaho instituted this action in eminent domain against defendants-respondents 1 Emerson and Marie Collier, husband and wife, to acquire 25.47 acres of land located in Ada County for the purpose of constructing thereon an interchange between Broadway Avenue, Boise, and Interstate Highway 80N. The property to be acquired was part of a 40 acre tract belonging to defendants. The land remaining in possession of defendants after the taking was approximately 14.5 acres divided into five separate tracts. The entire area was characterized as undeveloped, dry graze land. The best use for the land apparently was industrial.
The evidence shows that the Colliers agreed to purchase the property on August 23, 1961. By the middle of November, 1961, the planned route of the interstate and the planned location of its interchanges in the Boise area were known to the public. Defendants, residents of Portland, Oregon, first acquired actual knowledge that their property was in the path of the proposed route in the fall of 1962.
February 10, 1967, the State of Idaho and defendants entered into an agreement by which the State was granted possession of the property as of Arpil 1, 1967. It was also agreed that:
1. The state would institute a condemnation action within 90 days of February 10th;
2. The state would pay into court $12,224.00 for the use of defendants;
3. The state would pay interest from April 1, 1967, at the rate of 6% per annum on any award to defendants for the taking over and above $12,224.00.
Originally, by way of answer, defendants claimed both compensation for the property taken and severance damage to the property remaining to them. However, after the jury was chosen but before any witnesses were called the defendant moved to strike his second affirmative defense regarding severance damages. The state made no objection and the same was granted by the court.
At trial, expert opinion as to the fair market value on April 1, 1967, of the acreage taken by the State varied between approximately $20,000.00 and $58,000.00. The jury returned a verdict finding just compensation for the property actually taken to be $38,205.00. It is not argued on appeal that the record fails to support the verdict.
The court entered judgment April 15, 1968, as follows:
$38,205.00 _____________ compensation
(-) 12,224.00 _____________ deposit
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25,981.00
(k) 1,623.81 _____________ 6% interest on $25,981.00 from April 1
1967 until April 15, 1968
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27,604.81
69.00 _____________ costs and disbursements
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$27,673.81 _____________ Total
Interest at the rate of 6% on the sum of $27,673.81 was allowed from the date of judgment until payment. A motion by the state to amend the judgment, so that simple interest at 6% per annum would accrue on the sum of $25,981.00 from April 1, 1967 until date of payment, was denied.
The state now appeals to the Supreme Court of Idaho.
Plaintiff first argues that the trial court erred in disallowing admission into evidence of two exhibits: one, a brochure prepared by the Highway Department in November, 1961, and the other, a transcript of a hearing conducted by the Highway Department on November 13, 1961. Plaintiff offered the exhibits for the purpose of showing the date on which the proposed location of the highway interchange was known publicly and the amount of public interest in the location.
The order of trial 2 directed by the court in this case was the following:
1. The state was to present evidence as to the physical location of the property involved;
2. Then the defendants were to present evidence of the value of the property;
3. Thereafter the state was to present its evidence of value;
4. Finally the parties were to present any necessary rebuttal evidence.
Plaintiff offered the exhibits into evidence through its witness, William Sacht, during the first stage of the proceedings, prior to introduction of evidence by defendants concerning property value. The trial judge ruled that the exhibits might be relevant on the issue of value, refused to admit them into evidence at that stage of the trial, but gave plaintiff leave to re-offer them after defendants had put on their evidence of value. Thereafter, while witness Sacht was testifying on redirect, but again before defendants had introduced any property value evidence, plaintiff reoffered the highway department brochure. The court denied its admission on the same ground. No attempt was made subsequently to introduce the exhibits.
The order of trial and the order of presentation of evidence is an administrative decision within the discretion of the trial court. State v. Johnson, 92 Idaho 533, 447 P.2d 10 (1968); Lehman v. Bair, 85 Idaho 59, 375 P.2d 714 (1962). It has not been demonstrated that the court abused its discretion to the prejudice of plaintiff. That the state neglected to offer the exhibits after defendants had presented their case cannot be considered an error on the court's part.
The state contends that the district judge erred in sustaining an objection to a question asked on cross-examination of the defendant Emerson Collier. The question was:
'Now, what was the purchase price paid to Mrs. Holden for this property?'
The date of purchase was August 23, 1961. The date of taking by the state was April 1, 1967. The trial court ruled that the date of purchase was too remote in time from the date of taking for it to be considered by the jury on the issue of the value of the property.
In considering this assignment of error, we note that the parties and the trial judge accepted the date of possession, April 1, 1967, as the date for which value of the property was to be determined. I.C. § 7-712 states:
The agreement between the parties does not reflect an intention that valuation be determined as of the date of possession, although the agreement did read that interest would run from the date of possession. Concerning a statute analogous to I.C. § 7-712, the Supreme Court of Arizona made the following comment:
'* * * the legislature may establish some convenient time, as of which the value of the property will be assessed and the amount of compensatioin fixed. The date of summons, the date of trial, or some other date during the proceedings might have been chosen. The legislature has established the date of trial as this time in § 9-518 A.R.S., and while, in particular cases, the condemnee might fare better or worse under this than under another possible rule, the condemnee may not complain when, because of market fluctuations, the compensation fixed by this rule is less than the market value at some other time during the condemnation proceedings. Nor is the situation altered when the condemnor is permitted to go into possession prior to the date as of which compensation is fixed, since the market value on that date is unaffected by the identity of the party in possession.
When immediate possession is granted to the condemnor, however, the condemnee is deprived of the use of his property between the date of such entry and the date when the compensation is paid to him. He would therefore be entitled to interest on the amount of the award from the date of entry by the condemnor, * * *.'
Desert Waters, Inc. v. Superior Court etc., 91 Ariz. 163, 370 P.2d 652, at 659 (1962). But see, McElroy v. Kansas City & I. Air Line, 172 Mo. 546, 72 S.W. 913 (1903).
Thus it may well have been that the district judge in the case before us fixed an erroneous valuation date. However, it is not necessary to rule on this point since no objection whatsoever was made at trial or thereafter and no assignment of error was made on appeal. Furthermore, the date of possession was less than three months prior to the date of summons, and since the date of possession would have been only a month prior to the date of summons had the state initiated proceedings by the time agreed to, we would not find reversible error, if error there be, in using the date of possession as the date of valuation. I.R. C.P., Rule 61; Supreme Court Rules, Rule 41.
Returning to the assignment of error alleged, when a parcel of land is taken by eminent domain, generally the sales price which the owner paid is admissible either as some evidence of present value or to rebut other estimates of value, assuming that the sale was recent, that the sale was voluntary, that the parties to the sale were willing and able to protect their own interests, and that no major change in conditions or fluctuations in value occurred since the sale. Parker v....
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