State ex rel. T.C.
| Decision Date | 04 April 2018 |
| Docket Number | DOCKET NO. A–1784–16T1 |
| Citation | 454 N.J.Super. 189,184 A.3d 932 |
| Parties | STATE of New Jersey IN the INTEREST OF T.C., a juvenile. |
| Court | New Jersey Superior Court — Appellate Division |
454 N.J.Super. 189
184 A.3d 932
STATE of New Jersey IN the INTEREST OF T.C., a juvenile.1
DOCKET NO. A–1784–16T1
Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division.
Submitted January 24, 2018
Decided April 4, 2018
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (Frank M. Gennaro, Designated Counsel, on the brief).
Joseph D. Coronato, Ocean County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Samuel Marzarella, Chief Appellate Attorney; of counsel and on the briefs; Nicholas D. Norcia, Assistant Prosecutor, and Anthony V. Pierro, Chief of Special Litigation, on the briefs).
Before Judges Koblitz, Manahan and Suter.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
KOBLITZ, J.A.D.
To preserve its constitutionality, we interpret the Juvenile Justice Code (Code), N.J.S.A. 2A:4A–20 to –92, to prevent incarceration of developmentally disabled juveniles in county detention facilities because not all counties have access to a certified short-term incarceration program. T.C., who was seventeen at the time of the offense, acknowledged his responsibility for actions that would constitute second-degree robbery, N.J.S.A. 2C:15–1(a)(1), if committed by an adult. He admitted participating with two other juveniles in the unarmed forcible theft of marijuana from the backpack of a fourth juvenile.
The Juvenile Pre-dispositional Report stated T.C. was originally classified as "[m]ultiply disabled and on the [a]utistic spectrum" beginning "around the age of [four]." A 2006 psychiatric evaluation stated T.C. would "continue to have a significant amount of autistic qualities and manifested symptoms in the Pervasive Developmental Disorder spectrum." T.C. moved through school with the designation of developmentally disabled, although at the time of sentencing, T.C. attended school regularly, worked a part-time job, and was not taking any prescribed medications. T.C.'s developmental
disability was disputed by the State, but tacitly accepted by the judge without a specific ruling.2
In exchange for the guilty plea, the State agreed to recommend a two-year probationary term, conditioned on sixty days confinement in the Ocean County Juvenile Detention Center (OCJDC). T.C. reserved the right to argue instead for sixty days of electronic monitoring rather than custody in the detention facility, and to make the legal argument at the time of disposition that he should not receive a custodial sentence because of his developmental disability. Accepting that T.C. was developmentally disabled, the court nonetheless imposed a two-year probationary term conditioned on thirty days incarceration in the OCJDC, followed by thirty days of electronic monitoring.
Because T.C. has completed the custodial term, the State argues this appeal is moot. An issue is "moot when our decision sought in a matter, when rendered, can have no practical effect on the
existing controversy." Redd v. Bowman, 223 N.J. 87, 104, 121 A.3d 341 (2015) (quoting Deutsche Bank Nat'l Tr. Co. v. Mitchell, 422 N.J. Super. 214, 221–22, 27 A.3d 1229 (App. Div. 2011) ). A reviewing court may decide a moot issue with respect to a juvenile appellant, however, if the issue is of public importance and is likely to recur. See State In re. C.V., 201 N.J. 281, 286, 990 A.2d 640 (2010) (electing to resolve moot issue of whether juvenile was entitled to receive credit for time served even though juvenile's sentence was complete); see also Joye v. Hunterdon Cent. Reg'l High Sch. Bd. of Educ., 176 N.J. 568, 583, 826 A.2d 624 (2003) (electing to resolve issue of whether a school's random drug and alcohol testing program passed muster under the New Jersey
Constitution even though plaintiff had since graduated from the school).
T.C. remains on probation, so the possibility of future incarceration for this juvenile offense exists. As significantly, incarceration of developmentally disabled juveniles is of public concern. We decide the underlying issue because it "is one of substantial importance, likely to reoccur but capable of evading review." Zirger v. Gen. Accident Ins. Co., 144 N.J. 327, 330, 676 A.2d 1065 (1996).
During the dispositional hearing, T.C.'s counsel argued the law did not permit a developmentally disabled juvenile such as T.C. to serve a custodial sentence in either a State or county juvenile correctional facility. The State argued the statute prohibited confinement of a developmentally disabled juvenile in a State facility, but not a certified county short-term detention program. Although the judge agreed with defense counsel that "incarceration is incarceration," the judge interpreted the statute to permit the short-term incarceration of developmentally disabled juveniles in an approved county detention program.
The Code governs juvenile delinquency matters. C.V., 201 N.J. at 294, 990 A.2d 640. It "empowers Family Part courts handling juvenile cases to enter dispositions that comport with the Code's rehabilitative goals." Id. at 295, 990 A.2d 640. "Once the court adjudicates a juvenile to be delinquent, the Code permits the court to order incarceration or, in lieu of incarceration, any of twenty enumerated dispositions under N.J.S.A. 2A:4A–43(b)." Ibid. When making a disposition, "Family Part judges must determine the most appropriate course of action in respect of the individual to ‘accomplish both rehabilitation and preservation of the family unit and at the same time protect society.’ " Id. at 296, 990 A.2d 640 (quoting State In re. M.C., 384 N.J. Super. 116, 128, 894 A.2d 60 (App. Div. 2006) ).
N.J.S.A. 2A:4A–43(c) states in relevant part:
(1) Except as otherwise provided in subsections e. and f. of this section, if the county in which the juvenile has been adjudicated delinquent has a juvenile detention facility meeting the physical and program standards established pursuant to this subsection by the Juvenile Justice Commission, the court may, in addition to any of the dispositions not involving placement out of the home enumerated in this section, incarcerate the juvenile in the youth detention facility in that county for a term not to exceed 60 consecutive days....
(2) No juvenile may be incarcerated in any county detention facility unless the county has entered into an agreement with the Juvenile Justice Commission concerning the use of the facility for sentenced juveniles.
When incarceration of a juvenile is statutorily required, which is not the case here, juveniles in a county without an approved
program may serve the period of incarceration in a State facility, except that developmentally disabled juveniles in such counties must not be incarcerated. The court is directed to fashion an "appropriate" disposition other than incarceration for these disabled juveniles. N.J.S.A. 2A:4A–43(f)(2).
Juveniles "who are developmentally disabled as defined in paragraph (1) of subsection a. of [ N.J.S.A. 30:6D–3 ]" shall not be committed to a State juvenile facility. N.J.S.A. 2A:4A–44(c)(2). N.J.S.A. 30:6D–3(a)(1) defines "developmental disability" as "a severe, chronic disability of a person which is attributable to a mental or physical impairment or combination of mental or physical impairments."
The State emphasizes that N.J.S.A. 2A:4A–44(c)(2) states specifically that developmentally disabled juveniles shall not be committed to a State juvenile facility and, therefore, "has no bearing on T.C.'s term of incarceration in a county facility."
T.C. relies on State In re. R.M., 141 N.J. 434, 661 A.2d 1277 (1995), in support of his position that the law prohibits the incarceration of developmentally disabled juveniles in either a State or county juvenile facility. In R.M., our Supreme Court recognized that "the prohibition on the incarceration of developmentally-disabled delinquent juveniles arose from ‘a concern that correctional institutions were being used as dumping grounds for offenders with serious mental limitations and/or other developmental handicaps.’ " 141 N.J. at 446, 661 A.2d 1277 (quoting
Juvenile Delinquency Disposition Commission, The Impact of the N.J. Code of Juvenile Justice: First Annual Report 81 (1986) ). Regarding N.J.S.A. 2A:4A–44(c)(2), the Court explained that "[t]he statute prohibiting the incarceration of developmentally-disabled juveniles arose out of concern for their plight when jailed." Id. at 447, 661 A.2d 1277. The Court noted "the strong and continuing legislative and administrative concern to prevent the incarceration of juveniles suffering from developmental disabilities." Id. at 447–48, 661 A.2d 1277.
Critically, interpreting the Code to permit short-term incarceration of a developmentally disabled juvenile in a county facility but not a State facility also raises constitutional concerns, because not every county has access to an approved short-term juvenile detention program. Under the State's interpretation, and the...
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