State Ex Rel.Taylor v. Mirabal

• Decision Date: 28 November 1928
• Docket Number: No. 3356.,3356.
• Citation: 33 N.M. 553,273 P. 928
• Parties: STATE ex rel.TAYLORv.MIRABAL, State Comptroller.
• Court: New Mexico Supreme Court

33 N.M. 553

273 P. 928

STATE ex rel.TAYLOR

v.MIRABAL, State Comptroller.

No. 3356.

Supreme Court of New Mexico.

Nov. 28, 1928.Rehearing Denied Dec. 29, 1928.

Syllabus by the Court.

Chapter 82, Laws of 1925, and the title thereof examined, and held, that the main subject of the act is motor vehicles and trailers. If there be more than one subject mentioned in the act, if they be germane or subsidiary to the main subject, or if relative directly or indirectly to the main subject, have a mutual connection, and are not foreign to the main subject, so long as the provisions are of the same nature, and come legitimately under one general denomination or subject, the act is not unconstitutional.

The prohibition in the Constitution against enacting laws which embrace more than one subject must be given a broad and extended meaning, so as to allow the Legislature full scope to include in one act all matters having a logical and natural connection. To constitute duplicity of subject, an act must embrace two or more dissimilar and discordant subjects, that by no fair intendment can be considered as having any legitimate relation to each other. All that is necessary is that the act shall embrace some one general subject; and by this is meant merely that all matters treated of should fall under some one general idea, and be so connected with and relate to each other, either logically or in popular understanding, as to be parts of and germane to one general subject.

As respects the requirement as to expressing the subject in the title, the “subject” of a statute is the matter of public or private concern in respect to which its provisions are enacted, or the matter or thing forming the groundwork of the act, or the matter to which it relates and with which it deals.

The fact that the act may amend or repeal certain provisions of other statutes by implication does not offend against section 18 of article 4 of the New Mexico Constitution referring to amendments.

The act is a general and not a special law, because the act applies to, and affects alike, all persons and things of the same class.

The validity of a law is not to be determined by the fact that its application to extreme cases would result in some inequality and hardship.

The provisions of the act authorizing the collection of taxes on motor vehicles before such motor vehicles are permitted to operate on the public highways and before the time for equalization of taxes in general, is not discriminatory as compelling payment thereof earlier than taxpayers in general, as the statute does not discriminate between property owners similarly circumstanced.

The provision that the county assessor shall prepare an assessment roll of motor vehicles, fix the assessed valuation thereof, in accordance with a schedule of valuations prepared by the state tax commission, specifying the valuations to be assessed upon the motor vehicles of the several makes, types, and models, making proper allowances for depreciation on account of number of years in use, and extend the taxes thereon, does not contravene the uniformity clause of the Constitution (article 8, § 1), and is not invalid as delegating the power of assessment of the property to the state tax commission.

The taxing provisions of the act are not incapable of administration by the taxing officials.

The provisions of section 1, art. 8, of the Constitution, requiring that taxes upon tangible property shall be in proportion to the value thereof and that taxes shall be equal and uniform upon subjects of taxation of the same class, has no application to license or privilege taxes.

The provisions requiring that the owner of a motor vehicle before operating the same upon the public highways, shall have paid the property tax thereon, and that the registrar of motor vehicles shall, before issuing license plates for such motor vehicles, require satisfactory evidence that the property tax on such motor vehicles has been paid for the period for which registration is desired, are not incongruous and disconnected with the provision requiring a license or privilege tax upon motor vehicles as a condition precedent to the operation of the same upon the highways; it being competent for the state to annex any condition to the granting of a license which it deems proper.

Appeal from District Court, Santa Fé County; Holloman, Judge.

Mandamus by the State, on the relation of George C. Taylor, against Gilberto Mirabal, as State Comptroller. Judgment for defendant, and relator appeals. Affirmed and remanded.

Law requiring payment of property tax as condition precedent to issuance of automobile license held not unconstitutional as amending or repealing other law by implication Const. art. 4, § 18; Laws 1925, c. 82; Laws 1923, c. 96.

George C. Taylor, of Albuquerque, for appellant.

Robert C. Dow, Atty. Gen., and Frank H. Patton, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

BICKLEY, J.

This is a mandamus proceeding brought by the state of New Mexico, on the relation of George C. Taylor, against the comptroller of the state of New Mexico. The purpose of the proceeding was to compel the comptroller to issue to appellant an automobile license without complying with the provisions of chapter 82 of Session Laws of New Mexico 1925, requiring production of a property tax receipt as a condition precedent to the issuing of a license. The tax receipt was not produced, and the license was refused. The return affirms the validity of said statute. There is no dispute as to the facts. The sole question raised by the pleadings is whether or not, under said chapter 82 of the Laws of 1925, payment of property tax in accordance with said act is a condition precedent to the issuance of a license to operate the same on the public highways of this state.

Appellant bases his claim of the invalidity of the statute upon constitutional grounds which will appear in the course of the opinion.

[1] The first ground of objection to the act is that the title thereof embraces more than one subject; particular attention being drawn to the fact that one clause refers to fixing registration fees and that another clause provides for the payment of the property tax thereon.

From certain statements in the petition, we assume that the motor vehicle owned by appellant and for which a license was sought is one operated with gasoline.

The material portion of section 16 of article 4 of the New Mexico Constitution, which is controlling, is as follows: “The subject of every bill shall be clearly expressed in its title, and no bill embracing more than one subject shall be passed except general appropriation bills and bills for the codification or revision of the laws.”

The title of the act assailed is as follows: “An Act Relating to Motor Vehicle and Trailers; Fixing the Rates for Registration Fees Therefor; Providing for and Requiring Payment of the Property Tax Thereon Before the Same May be Operated Upon Public Highways; Amending Sections 2 and 3 of Chapter 96, Laws of 1923.”

The title of chapter 96, Laws of 1923, which is amended, is as follows: “An Act Relating to Motor Vehicles and Trailers.”

While it is sometimes said that the word “subject” and the word “object,” as used in similar constitutional provisions, are synonymous, we have leaned to the position that the word “subject” is broader than the word “object.”

In Lewis' Sutherland, Statutory Construction (2d Ed.) § 116, it is said: “The subject of a statute is the matter of public or private concern in respect to which its provisions are enacted.”

[2][3] The Supreme Court of Minnesota, in Johnson v. Harrison, 47 Minn. 575, 50 N. W. 923, 28 Am. St. Rep. 382, discussed the meaning of the word “subject” as used in such constitutional provisions in such an able manner that it is often quoted, as follows:

“Again, while this provision is mandatory, yet it is to be given a liberal, and not a strict, construction. It is not intended nor should it be so construed as to embarrass legislation by making laws unnecessarily restrictive in their scope and operation, or by multiplying their number, or by preventing the legislature from embracing in one act all matters properly connected with one general subject. The term ‘subject,’ as used in the constitution, is to be given a broad and extended meaning, so as to allow the legislature full scope to include in one act all matters having a logical or natural connection. To constitute duplicity of subject, an act must embrace two or more dissimilar and discordant subjects that by no fair intendment can be considered as having any legitimate connection with or relation to each other. All that is necessary is that the act should embrace some one general subject; and by this is meant, merely, that all matters treated of should fall under some one general idea, be so connected with or related to each other, either logically or in popular understanding, as to be parts of, or germane to, one general subject. The large number of related or cognate matters often treated of under some comprehensive title, such as ‘Criminal Code,’ ‘Penal Code,’ ‘Code of Civil Procedure,’ ‘Private Corporations,’ ‘Railroad Corporations,’ and the like, are familiar illustrations of what may be legitimately included in one act. Any construction of this provision of the constitution that would interfere with the very commendable policy of incorporating the entire body of statutory law upon one general subject in a single act, instead of dividing it into a number of separate acts, would not only be contrary to its spirit, but also seriously embarassing to honest legislation. All that is required is that the act should not include legislation so incongruous that it could not, by any fair intendment, be considered germane to one general subject. The subject may be as comprehensive as the legislature chooses to make it, provided it constitutes, in the constitutional sense, a single subject, and not several. The...