State ex rel. Thompson v. Cave., 40889.

• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Missouri
• Writing for the Court: Clark
• Citation: 215 S.W.2d 435
• Parties: STATE OF MISSOURI, at the relation of GUY A. THOMPSON, Trustee for the MISSOURI PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY, a Corporation, Petitioner, v. NICK T. CAVE, SAMUEL A. DEW and EWING C. BLAND, Judges of the Kansas City Court of Appeals, and BETTY JONES (COOPER), a minor, by W.A. JONES, her next friend, Respondents.
• Docket Number: No. 40889.,40889.
• Decision Date: 13 December 1948

215 S.W.2d 435 STATE OF MISSOURI, at the relation of GUY A. THOMPSON, Trustee for the MISSOURI PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY, a Corporation, Petitioner,
v.
NICK T. CAVE, SAMUEL A. DEW and EWING C. BLAND, Judges of the Kansas City Court of Appeals, and BETTY JONES (COOPER), a minor, by W.A. JONES, her next friend, Respondents. No. 40889. Supreme Court of Missouri. Court en Banc, December 13, 1948.

Certiorari.

[215 S.W.2d 436]

REVERSED.

Thomas J. Cole, D.C. Chastain, H.E. Sheppard, Ludwick Graves, Keith P. Bondurant and William A. Betz for petitioner.

(1) A person who drives, or is driven into, the side of a train standing over a grade crossing at night cannot recover in the absence of special circumstances rendering the crossing peculiarly hazardous; and the burden is on him to show these circumstances. Dimond v. Terminal R. Assn., 346 Mo. 333, 141 S.W. (2d) 789; Zickefoose v. Thompson, 347 Mo. 579, 148 S.W. (2d) 784; Holt v. Thompson, 115 F. (2d) 1013; Capelle v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 136 Ohio St. 203, 24 N.E. (2d) 822. (2) Unless substantial competent evidence is produced showing the crossing to be unusually dangerous, the question is one of law for the court. Dimond v. Terminal R. Assn., 346 Mo. 333, 141 S.W. (2d) 789; Bledsoe v. M., K. & T.R. Co., 149 Kan. 741, 90 Pac. (2d) 9. (3) The presence of the train of cars over a crossing is adequate notice of obstruction and of danger and consequently no additional signs, signals or warnings are required. Dimond v. Terminal R. Assn., 346 Mo. 333, 141 S.W. (2d) 789; Fitzpatrick v. K.C.S.R. Co., 347 Mo. 57, 146 S.W. (2d) 560; Dolan v. Brenmer, 220 Iowa 1143, 263 N.W. 798; Crosby v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 187 Minn. 263, 245 N.W. 31; Reines v. C., M. St. P. & P.R. Co., 195 Wash. 146, 80 Pac. (2d) 406; Coleman v. Chicago, B. & Q.R. Co., 287 Ill. App. 483, 5 N.E. (2d) 103; Good v. Atlantic Coast Line Ry. Co., 142 F. (2d) 46; 161 A.L.R. 127; 52 C.J. 190. (4) Whatever the nature of the fault of the railroad in connection with stopping a train on a highway crossing, it must be the proximate cause of the collision between the motor vehicle and the train in order to make the railroad liable. Good v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 142 F. (2d) 46; Dolan v. Brenmer, 220 Iowa 1143, 263 N.W. 798; Megan v. Stevens, 91 F. (2d) 419; Simpson v. Pere Marquette, 276 Mich. 653, 268 N.W. 769; Burkhead v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 275 Ky. 841, 122 S.W. (2d) 970. (5) The length of time the train was standing on the crossing could not have been the cause of the collision for the same result would have followed had the motor car arrived at any time after the train stopped over the crossing. Hence if there was any negligence because the train had stopped too long, this could not have been the proximate cause of the injury. Jones v. A., T. & S.F. Ry. Co., 129 Kan. 314; Capelle v. Baltimore & O.R. Co., 136 Ohio St. 203, 24 N.E. (2d) 822; Killion v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P.R. Co., 107 Ind. App. 527, 25 N.E. (2d) 647; Simpson v. Pere Marquette R. Co., 276 Mich. 653, 268 N.W. 769; Kern v. Jones, 187 Okla. 94, 101 Pac. (2d) 242; Webb v. Oregon-Washington R. & Nav. Co., 195 Wash. 155. 80 Pac. (2d) 409. (6) A motorist familiar with the existence of a railroad crossing is chargeable with knowledge of and hence required to anticipate the possible presence of a train standing upon or moving over the crossing and decreased visibility imposes added care on the motorist and the railroad may assume that the motorist will exercise such care. State ex rel. K.C.S. Ry. Co. v. Shain, 340 Mo. 1195, 105 S.W. (2d) 915; Fitzpatrick v. K.C.S. Ry. Co., 347 Mo. 57, 146 S.W. (2d) 560; Monroe v. C. & A.R. Co., 297 Mo. 633, 249 S.W. 644; Flagg v. C.G.W.R. Co., 143 F. (2d) 90; Fannier v. Minn. & St. P.R. Co., 185 Wis. 30, 200 N.W....